– Andrei Zhdanov –
The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations for an effective mutual assistance pact against aggression have reached a deadlock. Despite the absolute clarity of the Soviet government’s position and all its efforts to swiftly conclude the pact, there has been no significant progress in the negotiations. In the current international situation, this fact cannot but have serious consequences. It fuels the hopes of the aggressors and all enemies of peace for the potential failure of an agreement among democratic states against aggression, and it encourages the aggressors to further unleash their aggression.
In this regard, the question arises: what is the reason for the delay in negotiations, the successful conclusion of which is eagerly and hopefully awaited by all peace-loving peoples, all friends of peace?
I will venture to express my personal opinion on this matter, though my friends disagree with it. They continue to believe that the British and French governments, when initiating negotiations with the USSR for a mutual assistance pact, had serious intentions to create a powerful barrier against aggression in Europe. I think, and I will attempt to prove with facts, that the British and French governments do not want an equal treaty with the USSR — that is, a treaty to which a self-respecting state could agree — and that this very circumstance is the reason for the stagnation into which the negotiations have fallen.
What are these facts?
The Anglo-Soviet negotiations in the strict sense of the term — that is, from the moment the first British proposals were presented to us on April 15 — have already lasted 75 days. Of these, the Soviet government required 16 days to prepare responses to various British drafts and proposals, while the remaining 59 days were consumed by delays and procrastination on the part of the British and French. One might ask: who, in this case, bears responsibility for the fact that the negotiations are proceeding so slowly, if not the British and French?
It is further known from the practice of concluding international agreements similar to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet one that the same England concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Turkey and Poland in a very short time. This suggests that when England wanted to conclude agreements with Turkey and Poland, it was able to ensure the proper pace of negotiations. The fact of unacceptable delays and endless procrastination in negotiations with the USSR raises doubts about the sincerity of the true intentions of England and France and compels us to question what exactly underlies such a policy: serious efforts to ensure a front of peace or the desire to use the negotiations, and the delays themselves, for other purposes that have nothing to do with creating a front of peace-loving nations.
This question is all the more relevant given that during the negotiations, the British and French governments are creating artificial obstacles and projecting an appearance of serious disagreements between England and France on the one hand, and the USSR on the other, over issues that, with goodwill and sincere intentions from England and France, could have been resolved without delays or impediments. For example, it is known that one such artificially contrived “stumbling block” in the negotiations is the issue of tripartite guarantees for the immediate assistance of Latvia, Estonia and Finland in the event of a violation of their neutrality by the aggressors. The argument that these Baltic states do not want such guarantees and that this is supposedly the reason why England and France cannot accept the Soviet proposal is clearly untenable and can only be dictated by one intention: to complicate negotiations to derail them. In any case, we know of facts that indicate that, when England considers itself interested in guaranteeing certain countries, it finds appropriate ways to do so without waiting for those countries to request guarantees for themselves.
The British newspaper Sunday Times, in its issue of June 4 this year, writes that “Poland… agreed that if Great Britain is drawn into a war due to an attack on the Netherlands, it will assist Britain,” and that “on the other hand, Great Britain agreed that if Poland is drawn into a war due to an attack on Danzig or Lithuania, it will assist Poland.” It thus appears that Poland and Great Britain simultaneously guarantee both Lithuania and the Netherlands. I do not know whether Lithuania and the Netherlands were consulted about this bilateral guarantee. In any case, nothing about this has been reported in the press. Moreover, both the Netherlands and Lithuania, as far as I know, deny the existence of such a guarantee. Meanwhile, the pact on the bilateral guarantee of these countries has essentially already been concluded, according to the Sunday Times, and it is no secret that the Sunday Times report has not been refuted anywhere.
Not long ago, the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, in an interview with a French journalist, made an absolutely unambiguous statement that Poland had neither demanded nor requested any guarantees from the USSR and that it was perfectly satisfied with the recently concluded trade agreement between Poland and the USSR. How, then, does Poland’s position differ in this case from that of the ruling circles of the three Baltic states? Absolutely not at all. Yet this does not prevent England and France from demanding that the USSR provide guarantees not only for Poland and four other states — whose desire to obtain guarantees from the USSR is unknown to us — but also for the Netherlands and Switzerland, with which the USSR does not even have simple diplomatic relations.
All of this indicates that the British and French do not want a treaty with the USSR based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, despite their daily assurances that they, too, support “equality.” Instead, they seek a treaty in which the USSR would play the role of a labourer, bearing the entire burden of obligations on its shoulders. No self-respecting country would agree to such a treaty unless it wished to become a pawn in the hands of those who enjoy reaping benefits from others’ sacrifices. Even more so, the USSR, whose strength, power and dignity are known throughout the world, cannot agree to such a treaty.
It seems to me that the British and French are not seeking a genuine treaty acceptable to the USSR but merely discussions about a treaty. By speculating on the supposed intransigence of the USSR before public opinion in their countries, they aim to make it easier for themselves to strike a deal with the aggressors.
The coming days should reveal whether this is true or not.
(“Pravda,” No. 178 (7863), June 29, 1939)