This conversation between J.V. Stalin and the leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party is revealing for a number of historical reasons. Firstly, it includes many unknown remarks of Stalin regarding Yugoslavia. He demonstrates that the USSR gave Yugoslavia postwar immense aid, and that they never received any gratitude. Further, he states that the Yugoslav Tito clique had become completely dependent on the West, with no independence or ability to think for themselves. Whether they consciously know it or not, he says, they do what they are told. And, rather than dictating terms to Yugoslavia, he simply states: “We’ll see how far they get with their so-called independence. These are dishonest people with nothing Slavic about them.” Noting therefore, also, the anti-Slavic nature of the Yugoslav clique. In general, this conversation is most valuable for the Yugoslav aspect.
It is also useful in light of the historical falsification of Milovan Đilas and Vladimir Dedijer that Tito wanted to help the Greek partisans, whereas Stalin had given up Greece to Churchill at Yalta. Stalin, on the contrary, points out the errors of the Greek Communist Party themselves, and proves that the Tito clique never aided the Greek partisan cause. In one case, he says, the Yugoslav government stole weapons postmarked for the Greek partisans. These remarks are unknown hitherto to Western historiography.
Secondly, when reading this document, one gets the distinct impression that all of Stalin’s remarks are advice and never dictate. This is typical of all records of his conversations, which abound with statements such as “the choice… is, of course, for them to decide.” His lack of interference in the internal affairs of other countries and parties was noted by all of his contemporaries and comrades.
Thirdly, Stalin’s intense focus towards the end of the document on heavy industry is also consistent with his characteristic and proven belief that it is the basis of self-reliance, and genuine sovereignty and independence for the nation. Stalin repeats that this is where independence lies, whereas the phoney independence of the Titoites, which was in fact an American turn, was dependence. His insistence on helping the Bulgarians with printing presses for their currency, the lev, which they were formerly dependent on Germany and Austria for, is revealing. This fraternal aid distinguished the Stalin USSR from all other Great Powers in history. Its aid was to build a country’s independence, to make it self-reliant economically, not for purposes of exploitation, no matter what some claimed.
N. Ribar
RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF COMRADE J.V. STALIN WITH CHERVENKOV, DAMYANOV AND YOUGOV
July 29, 1949
Present: Comrades Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky.
Comrade Stalin asks how things are in Bulgaria and whether the journey was difficult.
Chervenkov replies that it was a bit bumpy. He asks for permission to raise a few issues, mainly regarding party and government leadership. He reports that, for now, a Chairman of the Council of Ministers and three Deputy Chairmen have been appointed — all are members of the Political Bureau. No other reshuffles have been made, as it was considered inadvisable at this time and preferable to carry out the necessary changes after the November elections. He asks for advice on whether this is the right approach, or if it would be better to make the changes now. He also reports that the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers are Chervenkov, Yougov and Terpeshev. The appointment of three deputies is explained primarily by the heavy workload of the Council of Ministers and the illness of Kolarov, who will not be able to begin work in the next two months and, in general, will not be able to work fully — so he will need considerable assistance. He adds that Kolarov considers it advisable to make the necessary reshuffles after the elections. Kolarov also believes it would be appropriate to retain his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Comrade Stalin explains that such dual office-holding is inappropriate and that Kolarov is wrong in this case. When someone holds both positions, it causes a number of complications for the government, since the Prime Minister becomes responsible for all current affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the Prime Minister should act as a super-arbiter. He must have the ability to correct the ministers. If the same person holds both posts, this becomes impossible. Therefore, it is better to separate the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Regarding Chervenkov’s question about whether to wait until the elections to carry out the necessary changes in the government, Stalin says it is better not to wait. Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers should be relieved of their other posts immediately. As Deputy Chairmen, they will oversee ministries, but they should not serve as ministers themselves.
Chervenkov asks whether it would be advisable to divide the Ministry of Internal Affairs into two ministries — Internal Affairs and State Security.
Comrade Stalin asks what functions the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bulgaria currently performs.
Chervenkov provides an explanation, stating that the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs oversees the police, border security and fire prevention.
Comrade Stalin asks who handles the registration of marriages, births and deaths.
Yougov explains that the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs does not deal with these matters.
Comrade Stalin points out that Bulgaria is a small country, and that it may not be necessary to divide the Ministry of Internal Affairs into an MVD and an MGB. “There’s no need to copy the USSR,” says Comrade Stalin; “that is unnecessary, especially considering that the USSR is a very large country.”
Yougov notes that in Bulgaria, the police carry out combat tasks and are engaged in the fight against banditry. He asks whether, under such conditions, it would be practical to divide the Ministry of Internal Affairs into two ministries.
Comrade Stalin confirms that this would be impractical and unnecessary.
Returning to the question of combining the post of Prime Minister with that of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yougov says that Kolarov and some other comrades are concerned that it will be difficult to find a suitable candidate for the foreign minister position.
Comrade Stalin replies that there are people — they just need to be found. There are many promising young people, and they need to be promoted — and more boldly.
Chervenkov says that in connection with the Kostov case, it was decided to promote new people, especially to leadership positions.
Comrade Stalin: “That is correct. New people must be promoted. One should not rely on the old specialists, especially in the field of trade — they are people of the old mould. You need to promote not the old specialists who have been corrupted by bad habits from the old society, but new ones.”
Comrade Stalin emphasizes that Kostov surrounded himself precisely with such old-style people — and they should be replaced with young, new cadres.
Chervenkov says that some ministers have turned out to be implicated in the Kostov case, and that it has become clear that a number of ministers need to be replaced.
Comrade Stalin recalls that it was the same in the USSR. “Lenin was a great man, but even under him we overlooked similar facts. The GPU received much praise, yet among them only Dzerzhinsky was an impeccably honest man. There were many foreign agents, sent from abroad, who perhaps didn’t even want to harm us, but were forced to do so after being recruited by foreign intelligence services.”
Comrade Stalin refers to Yugoslavia, where many American and British agents are now active, and says these agents are under orders to gather information and perform services. “Whether they want to cause harm or not doesn’t matter — they are being told what to do, and they must comply. That’s the rule. There’s nothing extraordinary about it. There is nothing surprising in what’s happening in Bulgaria in this regard.”
Comrade Stalin names some of the most notorious Trotskyists and German and British agents in the USSR — Sheynman, Yagoda, Kolmanovich and others — and adds that in Britain and the US, “there are some seasoned wolves sitting in the shadows.” What’s happening in Bulgaria, he says, is nothing unusual. “It happened here too. The Kostov affair will help purge these agents and other hostile elements.”
Chervenkov says that Kostov admitted to his plans to break Bulgaria away from its friendship with the USSR.
Comrade Stalin, addressing the Bulgarians, says that Kostov is a foreign agent who betrayed his own people. He is currently afraid to tell the full truth, but if he is made to talk, he will reveal a great deal.
Chervenkov returns to the issue of the government reshuffle and reports that Kolarov wishes to delay the matter until after the elections.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Bulgarians know that Kolarov was once on the right wing and was considered an opportunist. He did a great deal of harm to Lenin at the time. He has a tendency to veer right, which he calls “caution.” Later, Kolarov corrected his course. He is undoubtedly a Marxist and a capable person; Kolarov is certainly one of us — but relapses can happen.
As for the government changes, Stalin says, this should not be postponed.
Comrade Malenkov asks whether there are any obstacles to appointing new ministers before the elections.
Chervenkov and Yougov explain that there are no such obstacles.
Comrade Stalin says there is no reason to wait — that approach is no good.
Chervenkov asks whether it is absolutely necessary to have a General Secretary of the Party.
Comrade Stalin replies that it is possible to function without one.
Chervenkov reports that until recently, the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party had consisted of nine members and two candidate members. It now consists of seven members and three candidates. The Central Committee believes it is unnecessary to add to the Political Bureau.
Comrade Stalin advises expanding the Political Bureau in order to involve more new people in the work. “Let them learn.” He adds that candidates for the Political Bureau can be drawn not only from current candidate members, but also from others who have grown and are worthy of the role.
Chervenkov reports that the Central Committee currently has two secretaries, and they had intended to elect a third. They had proposed the candidacy of Pilovsky, but then found it necessary to obtain additional information about him, so the decision was temporarily postponed. They believe that the third secretary should be a member of the Political Bureau.
Comrade Stalin agrees that it is better to have three secretaries, and that the choice of who that should be is, of course, for them to decide.
In response to Chervenkov’s repeated remark that Kolarov insists on holding both the post of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Stalin says that he should be advised to give that up.
Chervenkov explains that among the new Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, Terpeshev and Yougov will work within the Council of Ministers, while he, Chervenkov, will serve simultaneously as Secretary of the Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Chervenkov lists the other members of the Political Bureau by name and explains what government positions they hold.
Chervenkov says that within the structure of party leadership, they have found no place for an Organizational Bureau.
Comrade Stalin explains that in the USSR, the Organizational Bureau checks the practical work of local party organizations and mass public organizations. During these checks, a secondary report from a Central Committee instructor is heard, after which an appropriate resolution is adopted. This system works well.
Chervenkov asks whether the Bulgarians could become familiar with the work of the Central Committee apparatus and send a group of comrades — about seven people — to Moscow.
Comrade Stalin says, of course, they can. Let them come and get acquainted with the new work.
Chervenkov mentions difficulties in finding specialists in domestic trade and agriculture. They would like the USSR to assist with advisors.
Comrade Stalin says that help can be provided.
Turning to relations with Yugoslavia, Chervenkov emphasizes that trade between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has almost completely stopped.
Comrade Stalin asks who is refusing to trade — the Yugoslavs, or both sides.
Chervenkov replies that both sides are at fault. He adds that the trade agreement is not being implemented. Bulgarian trade is being negatively affected by the fact that all transit of goods passes through Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslavs are creating all sorts of obstacles.
Comrade Stalin says that the Yugoslavs will, of course, create obstacles.
Chervenkov brings up the idea of building a bridge over the Danube. This would allow them to break free from dependence on Yugoslavia. They would like to build the bridge within two years.
Comrade Stalin asks if there is a ferry across the Danube.
Chervenkov replies that there is a ferry in Ruschuk. But they want to build a permanent bridge at the narrowest point of the Danube. However, Soviet specialists recommend building the bridge near Ruschuk. The Bulgarians believe that, for economic and strategic reasons, it is better to build the bridge at the narrowest point, which the Romanians also support since the bridge would concern them as well. Chervenkov then explains in detail using a map where exactly they propose to build the bridge.
Comrade Stalin says that the USSR built a bridge across the Danube for the Yugoslavs, and that the Bulgarians should build one too.
Chervenkov reports that the Greek comrades are requesting help with food and weapons.
Comrade Stalin asks what happens to the weapons meant for the Greeks — are they being lost or surrendered to the enemy?
Yougov and Damyanov confirm that the Greeks are requesting weapons and that they are planning to build underground hangars in the mountains.
In response to Comrade Stalin’s question, it is reported that monarcho-fascist forces have occupied several sections along the Bulgarian border.
Damyanov adds that partisans are regularly violating the Bulgarian border.
Comrade Stalin says that the partisans are cut off from the population, and without the support of the people, it is difficult to wage a partisan war. A partisan war cannot be conducted in isolation from the population. As for underground facilities, he calls that nonsense.
Comrade Stalin notes that the partisans want to replenish their ranks through emigration, but among the emigrants there are many spies.
Yougov confirms that the partisans are indeed counting on reinforcement from emigration, and that there are around 900 Greek emigrants in Bulgaria. However, they are unwilling to fight, and the Yugoslavs are not helping the partisans.
Comrade Stalin states that the Yugoslavs never supported the Greek people’s movement.
He recalls that a supply depot was organized in Yugoslavia for Greece, containing much food and weapons, but the Yugoslavs never showed it to anyone — not even to Zachariadis. Later, it was finally inspected, and it turned out that everything of value had been removed from the depot.
Comrade Stalin proposes inviting Zachariadis, along with one representative each from the Albanians and the Bulgarians, to discuss the matter.
Chervenkov says that recently the Turks have become active, demanding permission to emigrate to Turkey. This campaign, he notes, has been instigated from abroad.
Chervenkov points out that the overwhelming majority of Turks are skilled in tobacco farming, and it is not possible to allow them to leave Bulgaria.
Comrade Stalin states that nevertheless, these Turks must be resettled — regardless of tobacco. “We removed such people from the border zone.”
Yougov mentions the difficulties, noting that the areas where the Turks currently live in Bulgaria are undeveloped and would need to be completely rebuilt. They are considering resettling the Turks from Bulgaria in the autumn.
Comrade Stalin asks whether Turkey will accept them.
Yougov replies that this is doubtful.
Comrade Stalin suggests sending a formal inquiry to the Turkish government to determine its stance on the matter. In the meantime, the resettlement can be postponed until autumn.
Yougov says it would be advisable to start by removing the Turks from the 25-kilometre border zone.
Comrade Stalin agrees, saying this is the right approach, since spies cannot be kept near the border.
Comrade Stalin asks whether there is also overpopulation in Bulgaria.
Yougov confirms there is an excess of people without land. He again emphasizes that resettling the Turks would weaken tobacco production.
Comrade Stalin replies that there are tobacco farmers in Bulgaria besides the Turks, and that the country must rid itself of the Turks. He asks how the Turks behave in Bulgaria’s central regions.
Yougov answers that they behave poorly, though they are not doing anything particularly serious.
In response to Comrade Stalin’s question, it is stated that there are several Turks in the Bulgarian National Assembly. It is also noted that Turkish youth, particularly in the Shumen region, are being reoriented toward democratic values.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Turks received any land after the revolution.
Yougov replies in the affirmative.
Comrade Stalin says, “Let the Turks go to Turkey — they’ll be dealt with there. Then they’ll feel the difference.”
Comrade Stalin asks whether there are mixed marriages between Turks and the local population in Bulgaria.
Yougov answers that there are very few. He also says that the Pomaks still live in Bulgaria — about 150,000 of them — and they also reside in border regions. They will need to be resettled inland.
Comrade Stalin asks what direction Bulgaria’s economic development is taking — what line it is following.
Yougov replies that Bulgaria has a five-year plan developed under Dimitrov. The focus is on developing the textile, leather, milling and metalworking industries, as well as small-scale agricultural machinery manufacturing (ploughs, irrigation pumps, etc.). There are railway repair workshops, but no locomotives are being built.
Comrade Stalin points out the need to expand repair workshops and that Bulgaria cannot manage without locomotives.
Yougov continues describing the construction plan. They plan to build a pig iron plant, two chemical factories and to expand nitrogen fertilizer production.
Comrade Stalin asks whether Soviet specialists have arrived and how they are assisting.
Yougov confirms they are helping well. He notes some planning inconsistencies. For example, the plan includes construction of new factories and power stations, but it turned out that existing plants are not being used to full capacity, and existing power stations cannot function due to a shortage of transmission wire.
In response to Comrade Stalin’s question, Yougov says that Bulgaria has many mountain rivers. They are building six large dams and hydroelectric plants, which will provide the country with substantial electricity. They are also expanding the canning industry, which is lagging due to a shortage of tinplate — as a result, there are vegetables, but the people can’t get them. They are also expanding the woodworking industry.
To Comrade Stalin’s question, it is stated that Bulgaria has coal, but its exploitation is not yet organized.
Comrade Stalin notes that gasoline can be made from coal.
Yougov replies that such plants are being built in Burgas. It is a large facility that should meet the country’s needs. Yougov adds that Bulgaria needs Soviet advisors — planners and specialists in power plant construction and operation.
Comrade Stalin says a few people should be sent to the USSR to study power infrastructure development.
Yougov reports that 30 people are currently being sent to study in the USSR. He also reports that a major railway line from Sofia to Burgas is under construction.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Bulgarians have received motorboats from the USSR.
Yougov replies that the boats are expected to arrive in Bulgaria by August 8.
Comrade Stalin asks whether there are arsenals for repairing weapons, particularly artillery. He notes that it would be necessary to place arsenals in the north.
Yougov answers that arsenals exist, but they are rather weak.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Turks are causing any trouble on the border.
Yougov replies no, and adds that the Turks are conducting an anti-Bulgarian campaign in the press.
Comrade Stalin remarks that this is being done deliberately for the benefit of the United States.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Bulgarians have any intelligence operations focused on Turkey.
Damyanov replies that Bulgaria currently has no military attaché in Turkey, as the Bulgarian government expelled the Turkish attaché. There is also no intelligence network in Yugoslavia, although the State Security services are operating effectively.
Comrade Stalin asks whether Turkish troops are stationed north of Constantinople and whether they are good-quality forces.
Chervenkov replies that, according to their information, the troops are indeed stationed there, but he cannot speak to their quality.
Comrade Stalin recalls that during the war Churchill complained that the Turks didn’t even recognize radio.
Comrade Stalin then asks why Kostov wanted to sever Bulgaria’s ties with the USSR.
Chervenkov says that Kostov claims he supposedly wanted to ensure Bulgaria’s independence.
Comrade Malenkov comments that Kostov is just using that as a cover.
Chervenkov agrees and suggests that Kostov is trying to hide his real intentions.
Chervenkov states that the situation in Bulgaria is difficult and asks the Central Committee for assistance.
Comrade Stalin replies that help will be provided, but the Bulgarians must act more quickly. Those who are unfit must be removed and replaced with new, suitable people.
Comrade Stalin emphasizes that Kostov was connected to representatives of foreign capital. These are the people who must be removed first — such individuals cannot remain in government. Kolarov, by delaying the replacement of these unfit individuals, is trying to appear more constitutional and more democratic — but no one will believe him anyway.
Comrade Stalin promises to send people to Bulgaria who can be of real use to the country.
Yougov reports that they are planning to carry out a financial reform.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the exchange rate of the lev is poor.
Yougov replies that the exchange rate is not bad, but there are inconsistencies — and this points to the need for a financial reform in Bulgaria.
Comrade Stalin says that the USSR can help with this matter. He names Comrade Zlobin, who assisted the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Hungarians — and will help the Bulgarians as well.
Comrade Stalin asks whether the Bulgarians have printing presses for producing banknotes.
Yougov replies that they do not — before September 9, 1944, Bulgarian currency was printed in Austria and Germany.
Comrade Stalin says that they must acquire their own printing presses. This is not difficult to arrange, and the USSR will help with it.
Comrade Stalin adds that this is where the struggle for independence lies — not in slandering Soviet power. In this context, he says the Yugoslav clique of scoundrels dares to claim that the USSR exploited Yugoslavia. “These scum shout about independence. We’ll see how far they get with their so-called independence. These are dishonest people with nothing Slavic about them.” In 1946, the USSR gave Yugoslavia 50,000 tonnes of grain free of charge, and now they are slandering the USSR, claiming it exploited them. “Shameless people.”
Yougov reports that the harvest in Bulgaria this year is poor. The country is short by 200,000 tonnes of various grains. Of this, 100,000 tonnes will need to be borrowed. He notes the poor soil conditions in Dobrudja.
Comrade Stalin says that corn and cotton could be successfully grown in Dobrudja.
Damyanov agrees, but notes that the region lacks water and has no rivers.
Comrade Stalin points out that strong pumps could be installed to draw water from the Danube. He asks how much arable land there is in Dobrudja.
Damyanov and Yougov reply that there are about 700,000 hectares.
Comrade Stalin remarks that cotton should grow well in Dobrudja — specifically in the area near the Romanian border (pointing to it on the map).
Chervenkov, Yougov and Damyanov agree.
This concludes the conversation. The meeting lasted approximately two hours.
Vostochnaya Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiyskikh arkhivov. 1944–1953 gg. Tom ÍÍ. 1949–1953 gg. S. 192–201. AP RF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 254. L. 7–21.
(Translated from the Russian original)