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The operations of the National Liberation Army, due to their scale, great significance and the complexity of the military-political circumstances in which they were carried out, are the subject of in-depth studies in military history. Here, only a brief outline will be provided — a general review of those operations that had a major impact on the development of the National Liberation War. Furthermore, this review will not assess certain political events, such as the first session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Bihać, the Second Session in Jajce, etc., which were a consequence of the successful completion of specific wartime periods and were closely linked to military operations.
When discussing operations, one must also discuss the army that conducts these operations. A country’s politics create an army to safeguard the vital interests of its people. We have learned this through our own experience. The former reactionary Yugoslav rulers, who pursued a treacherous policy, led their people into the most disgraceful and horrific enslavement in our history. Their army, undermined by internal reactionary forces, lacking a military doctrine and a vision for modern warfare, suffered collapse and complete disintegration.
However, when the liberation and patriotic forces of our peoples, led by the Communist Party, began waging war and organizing uprisings, they created an army that fought against the occupiers for four years, thus becoming part of the broader anti-fascist bloc of democratic nations. In this struggle, all the moral values of our peoples, which had been suppressed for centuries, came to the forefront. The people recognized their own strength, new political horizons opened up to them, they felt freedom and they were ready to fight for it through all the trials of this war. Even the numerous offensives by superior enemy forces, supported by all the traitors of our country, could not shake or break the ranks of our units. From battle to battle, the Army was forged and continuously grew until it finally became a great force — a firm guarantee of the freedom and independence of our homeland and a guardian of the achievements of this magnificent struggle, for which our peoples shed much blood.
The great liberation war saved our peoples from nazi extermination. This struggle erased the shame of betrayal brought upon us by the traitors and eliminated the danger of the Ustaše and Chetniks holding a bloody knife to the people’s throat. Viewed narrowly from the perspective of 1941, one might have thought that our peoples would destroy each other through internal strife. However, through our long and difficult struggle, the brotherhood of our peoples was realized — the greatest achievement of this fight. Through bold and heroic resistance, we have gained an international reputation greater than ever before in our history. This struggle has given us not only the right to decide on the organization of our internal affairs but also the ability to participate, alongside our great allies, in shaping the future of Europe.
Our struggle and the very existence of our Army in the so-called “European fortress” were significant strategic factors for the anti-Hitler coalition. Yugoslavia did not become a base for the fascist forces — it became a graveyard for numerous fascist divisions. Our struggle exposed the cracks and weaknesses of fascist Germany and marked the path that all freedom-loving peoples of occupied Europe should follow. This gave our fight great international significance.
During the liberation war, the enemies of our struggle spoke of a so-called “Draža’s army.” Draža’s army was never truly an army. It was composed of sharply divided forces driven by national chauvinism, power struggles, political speculation, inciting internal conflicts and civil war. These were poorly organized groups, and lacking internal unity and without a solid political foundation, they inevitably disintegrated under stronger blows.
Let us look at the National Liberation Army. It endured the most difficult period in the history of our peoples — the period of fascist occupation — through heroic struggle. The soldiers of our Army carried the banner of freedom, brotherhood and unity across our land through harsh and bloody battles. Brotherhood and unity were forged first within our Army. This was the essence of the liberation war. All our peoples rose up to fight for their freedom, forming their own national combat units, which merged into a unified National Liberation Army. Within this Army, not only did fraternal solidarity and the fighting unity of our peoples manifest, but also their great military traditions, heroism, self-sacrifice, and deep love for freedom and independence were revived.
Our forces always held fast to the goal of liberating the country and securing the democratic rights of the people. They remained unwavering in the path of uncompromising armed struggle against the invaders, firmly convinced that our fight — within the broader course of wartime events and with the support of our allies — would lead to victory and the liberation of our country. That conviction was not misplaced. We achieved great and decisive successes.
The foundation of every military endeavour is strong organization. An army cannot function with improvisation — especially not under the harsh conditions of life and struggle that defined our liberation war. It required a great deal of systematic planning and strategic thinking to organize the resistance of a people oppressed under the fascist boot. This task was even more difficult because the occupier had, to a large extent, inherited and harnessed the entire state apparatus of the former Yugoslavia for its own purposes.
The reactionary political parties completely disintegrated. Some of their leaders fled abroad where they continued working against the people; others entered the service of the occupiers, while some passively observed events from the sidelines. The Communist Party, however, made every effort to unite all patriotic elements into a single front for the fight against the occupiers. Our people did not accept betrayal and did not recognize the capitulation, as the former rulers had hoped. The masses responded to the call of the Party and resolutely joined the struggle. The gathering of democratic forces into the liberation front only grew stronger as various enemies of the people increasingly sided with the occupiers in the fight against their own nation. Thus, as the struggle intensified, the democratic forces established a solid military organization led by the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army. The Supreme Headquarters was not only a military command but, for an extended period, also the political leadership of the National Liberation War. Despite brutal persecution and heavy losses, the Communist Party maintained an extensive underground network throughout the country — politically well-directed and hardened by past struggles, even during the old Yugoslavia. As a result, the decision to launch armed resistance was quickly communicated across the country, ensuring the proper implementation of a broad, nationwide liberation war. The Party had an organized Military Committee, established as early as 1940, which led the preparations for armed resistance. Less than three months after the April catastrophe, in early July 1941, military headquarters were formed and the armed uprising began across the country.
A favourable military-political moment had arrived for the uprising. The main fascist forces were engaged on the Soviet front, leaving the occupied territories with only minimal enemy presence. Furthermore, with the Soviet Union entering the war, the anti-Hitler coalition took its full shape.
It is also important to recognize that ever since the time of Peter the Great, whenever a Russian rifle was fired, we have risen in rebellion. That we have never fully reaped the benefits of these great struggles is due to the imperial system of the time and the selfishness and backwardness of our own monarchies. Today, the circumstances are different. With the Soviet Union — a land of brotherhood, unity and democratic freedoms — at the head of the anti-Hitler coalition, small nations had the prospect of winning their freedom and independence through this struggle. Thus, once again, after 23 years under the old Yugoslavia, when even mentioning Russia was forbidden, we stood by our great Slavic mother, Russia, believing in its strength and victory.
The Soviet Union was the first to extend a hand to us after March 27 by signing the Pact of Friendship. There is no need to emphasize why this pact could not have an immediate effect, but it provided us with great moral support and demonstrated the interest of our Slavic brothers in our struggle.
To hinder the formation of a united front against the occupiers, traitors spread slander, claiming that the Communist Party had only entered the fight after Germany attacked the USSR. They sought to conceal the following facts: the enormous efforts the Party made to establish a united front for the defence of the country’s threatened independence, the organization of massive demonstrations across the country against the anti-national regimes and acts of betrayal, and the leadership of the people’s movement on March 27 against the treacherous clique of Maček and Cvetković. One of the Party’s actions was the courageous resistance of the 41st Regiment near Skadar against the Italian fascists, as well as the resistance of the reserve officers’ school in Maribor against the German fascists. During the betrayal, many soldiers, following the Party’s call, refused to surrender their weapons to the enemy, instead hiding them for later use against fascism. Every Party member, regardless of military obligations, was ordered to report to military units, but these units rejected them. Even during that brief war of betrayal, many Party members fell in the front lines of battle. They did everything in their power to prevent panic and demoralization, but the betrayal was so deep that little could be done. However, launching a general armed uprising in Yugoslavia while the main German forces were not yet engaged against the Soviet Union would have meant knowingly marching toward destruction — risking the annihilation of the people’s uprising and, with it, the entire liberation war. Clearly, such an action would have benefited the enemy the most, not the broader fight against fascism.
The uprising developed gradually in some areas and surged forward rapidly in others.
By August 1941, the uprising in Serbia was not only firmly established but had already achieved significant successes. The weapons factory in Užice fell into our hands. Large territories in Western Serbia, Šumadija and Eastern Serbia were liberated. Almost all of Montenegro was freed. The uprising was steadily advancing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in the mountainous regions of Lika, Banija, Kordun and Northern Dalmatia. In Slovenia and Macedonia, the uprising was still in its early stages.
As we can see, the struggle quickly expanded and reached a massive scale, particularly in the eastern regions of our country — Serbia, Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia. This threatened all the strategic, political and economic advantages that the Germans had gained through their plundering of the Balkans. In other words, German control and conquest of the Balkans were called into question.
This was extremely dangerous for the Germans because the Balkans secured the flank of their forces on the Soviet-German front and protected the southern approaches to the German Reich. We know that the Germans considered the conquest of the Balkans a prerequisite for their expansionist ambitions, both toward the USSR and the Middle East. The Balkans was a crucial route for their global domination. This explains the large-scale occupier offensives against our National Liberation Army, which posed a serious threat to that so-called “living space” of nazi Germany.
By the summer of 1941, it was already clear that Germany’s “blitzkrieg” in the East had failed and had turned into a prolonged conflict. However, on their southern, vulnerable flank — Yugoslavia — a very dangerous war had begun, a war behind their lines. The Germans sought to crush our struggle, and by the end of October 1941, they launched an offensive against our units in Serbia. For this offensive, they brought in four divisions along with part of Gavrilović’s Ustaša-Domobran forces. The staging bases for the final phase of the offensive were the towns of Šabac, Valjevo, Kragujevac and Kraljevo, with a converging movement toward Užice. Užice was the most important military-political centre, housing the leadership of the liberation war, weapons factories and the most strategically advantageous sector of Western Serbia, held by our forces.
Here, it is important to highlight the treacherous role of Draža Mihailović. No agreement could be reached with him. His fundamental political strategy was:
a) To preserve the old state apparatus under German control so that, after Germany’s collapse, he could seize power — an arrangement he had already made with Nedić. This explains his passive stance toward the occupiers, allowing them unrestricted access to the country’s resources;
b) To prevent the mobilization of the masses into the partisan ranks by any means necessary, including terror, direct combat and collaboration with the occupiers, and;
c) To wage a fratricidal war aimed at exterminating Muslims, Croats, Macedonians and others.
We waged an uncompromising and relentless struggle against the occupiers and our ranks grew rapidly. Draža’s “units,” which hid in the forests under the excuse that the time was not yet right, not only failed to grow in numbers but continuously dwindled. Our struggle forced Draža into a decision:
— Either to join the fight against the occupiers, as some of his detachments did — most of whom eventually joined our side, or;
— To align himself with the occupiers in the fight against us.
He chose the second option. At that time, our forces in Serbia numbered around 15,000 partisans, while Draža had up to 5,000 men, many of whom had been forcibly conscripted.
The enemy had suffered heavy losses and had been pushed back into larger garrisons. Both the Chetniks and the occupiers were weak, so Draža still did not dare to attack us, although his bands were killing our couriers, smaller groups and individuals leaving Belgrade. However, he did not waste time before launching a full-scale attack on us. He established contact with Ljotić and Nedić and signed an agreement with the Germans in Valjevo.
To weaken us before the start of their general offensive, the Germans forced Draža to attack us in Užice. Because of this, we had to withdraw some of our forces for defence, which weakened our front lines against the Germans. At Karan near Užice, we defeated Draža, pursued his forces and surrounded him at Ravna Gora. He then offered a truce, which we accepted in the interest of the people and the fight against the occupiers. However, this agreement never materialized. A German offensive followed in which the Chetniks, together with the Germans, fought fiercely against us. After two months of heavy fighting, the bulk of our forces withdrew from Serbia and relocated to the Sandžak, from where we continued the struggle across all of Yugoslavia. In Serbia, smaller partisan units remained in Mačva, the Kosmaj sector, Eastern Serbia, Toplica, Jablanica and Vlasina. Many of these groups operated underground for a long time. Despite all the persecution and terror by the occupiers and traitors, the insurgent rifle in Serbia never fell silent. Numerous offensives against Crna Trava, Toplica, Jablanica, Eastern Serbia and Kosmaj failed to destroy Serbia’s liberation forces. With the favourable development of military and political circumstances, the National Liberation Army of Serbia re-emerged and played a decisive role in the liberation of Serbia.
Draža Mihailović, together with Nedić and Ljotić, divided power in Serbia. As the so-called “mountain king,” as he was referred to abroad, Draža was granted control over mostly mountainous districts and villages by the Germans. There, he established his administration, coordinated with Nedić, and remained under the control of the occupiers. Many reactionaries, both within the country and abroad, placed great hopes in this authority.
Now, let us turn to Montenegro. A massive uprising broke out there on July 13, 1941. Everyone capable of carrying a rifle — young and old alike — rose up. This uprising clearly demonstrated, among other things, the deep love Montenegrins had for the Russian people. The masses, like a tidal wave, surged against the Italian fascists, and by the end of July, nearly all of Montenegro had been liberated, except for the cities of Cetinje, Podgorica and Nikšić.
With the liberation of Montenegro, the Italian occupation zone along the Adriatic coast was severed at a depth of up to 200 kilometres. This created a major breach, cutting through the enemy’s communication network along the crucial coastal route. The breach was particularly dangerous for the enemy because it was located in mountainous terrain, well-suited for partisan warfare and its further expansion.
Because of this, the Italians reacted quickly and aggressively to suppress the people’s uprising in Montenegro and prevent its spread. The lack of resistance in other areas of the Balkans under their occupation allowed the Italians to deploy significant forces against Montenegro — an entire corps consisting of four divisions, heavily supported by air power. Since the communication routes from the Neretva region eastward toward Montenegro had been cut off, the Italians brought troops from Greece and Albania. A smaller force was sent from Metohija, advancing through Peć and the Plav Valley along the Lim River, with the goal of preventing the uprising from spreading and linking up with Serbia through the Sandžak. The bulk of their forces advanced along the Skadar-Podgorica route to crush the partisan resistance in the Zeta Valley and the Montenegrin coast.
After intense battles lasting several days, by the end of August 1941, the enemy managed to take control of key garrisons and push our forces further back. Following the breakthrough of the front, the uprising weakened. A portion of the population abandoned the fight, while reactionary elements began collaborating with the occupiers and actively participating in actions against the liberation movement. Another part of the population, however, rallied even more firmly into military ranks. This led to a brief pause in fighting throughout September, which the military leadership used to reorganize and restructure the armed units.
While the uprising in Montenegro was waning, the uprising in Serbia had not only solidified but had also intensified and achieved significant successes, particularly in Western Serbia. This fact, along with the organizational measures that had been undertaken, provided momentum for the rapid revival and renewed strengthening of the uprising in Montenegro. In the crucial Serbian-Montenegrin region, our forces were steadily growing.
The battles in Montenegro during September and October took on a more dynamic character. Communication lines were once again cut, and several towns — Šavnik, Žabljak, Gornje, Velimlje, Grahovo, Čevo and Mojkovac — were liberated. The enemy was pushed into larger garrisons, which had been fortified with strong defensive structures. Lacking heavy weaponry, we were unable to breach these positions. The fighting became stagnant, leaving our large forces underutilized. Therefore, it was necessary to free up these forces, give them greater manoeuvrability, and expand their military and political objectives. Thus, Montenegrin shock battalions, led by the legendary hero Sava Kovačević, advanced deep into Herzegovina, reaching Nevesinje, where they engaged in fierce battles to protect the Serbian population from Ustaša massacres. This had a significant impact on mobilizing the people of Herzegovina to join the uprising.
Other significant Montenegrin forces moved north at the end of November 1941 to link up with Serbian and Bosnian units and establish a stronghold for further offensive operations. This led to the Battle for the Sandžak. The attack on Pljevlja was unsuccessful, but during December, Montenegrin units captured Ljubiše, Foča, Goražde, Rudo and several other enemy strongholds. After these operations, they joined the Serbian partisan detachments along the Lim River, which had been pushed into this sector after the First Enemy Offensive in Serbia.
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The expulsion of partisan forces from Serbia had an adverse effect on the entire operational area east of the Bosna and Neretva rivers — encompassing Eastern Bosnia, the Sandžak, Montenegro and Herzegovina. This region was closely linked to Serbia, as both areas relied on the mountainous terrain along the Drina River, stretching from its sources in Montenegro to its confluence with the Sava. Weapons, ammunition and material aid were supplied from Serbia.
After our withdrawal from Serbia, Chetnik betrayal, combined with terror and massacres against Muslim and other patriotic civilians, created insecurity and confusion not only among the population but also within some partisan units. This was exacerbated by the fact that many had not fully grasped the extent of this treachery. Under the influence of Chetnik betrayal and their destructive propaganda, a wave of unrest emerged within several partisan detachments in Eastern Bosnia and the Sandžak, leading to wavering elements abandoning the partisan ranks.
The Montenegrin forces, in their attack on Pljevlja, failed to capture the town and suffered losses. The reactionary elements in Montenegro took full advantage of this, along with the events in Serbia, to fuel their treacherous propaganda and plans.
Unprecedented cold, burned villages, masses of refugees fleeing massacres, shortages of ammunition, food, clothing and footwear — all these factors worsened our position.
The occupiers and domestic traitors had taken all necessary measures to suppress the uprising at its core. The partisan detachments, as the initial, cumbersome and inert organizational formations of the people’s uprising, were unable to keep up with the pace of modern warfare. Under increasing difficulties and enemy pressure, they began to dwindle. Our forces were in decline. The national uprising and its organizational military-political structures were not yet firmly established and there was a real danger of collapse. Only a fighter with high political awareness, strong moral resilience and unwavering loyalty to his people could resolutely confront these hardships and overcome them. A new military organization was needed — one that was not only different in structure but also in its very essence. We found such fighters and such units in the Proletarian Brigades.
Due to this critical situation, on December 22, 1941, the 1st Proletarian Brigade was formed in Rudo from Serbian and Montenegrin partisan detachments. A little later, the 2nd Proletarian Brigade was formed from Serbian partisan units gathered in Nova Varoš.
The newly-formed 1st Proletarian Brigade crushed the occupying and Chetnik forces advancing concentrically on Rudo. However, the Lim region was too narrow and within immediate reach of the German offensive group from Serbia. A prolonged stay there was not beneficial. It was necessary to stabilize the already shaken situation and establish a suitable stronghold — not only for rest, regrouping and strengthening our forces but also for regaining the initiative.
The Bosnian mining region and the Upper Neretva area, in connection with Montenegro, offered better military and political prospects. The rugged mountainous terrain, forests, canyons and rivers facilitated a more persistent defence. The central position of this area allowed for quick connections with other parts of our country. The mining basin promised the mobilization of new forces and its destruction would deprive the enemy of important industrial resources. For this reason, at the end of December, the 1st Proletarian Brigade advanced into the Jahorina-Romanija-Vareš sector. The 2nd Brigade remained behind to secure the stronghold in the Nova Varoš sector. Additionally, it had the task of maintaining connections with the remaining forces in Serbia and linking up with our forces in the Sandžak.
Through its energetic advance, the 1st Proletarian Brigade changed the situation on the Eastern Bosnian front. It provided strong support to partisan forces, reactivated operations on all major routes, gathered partisan detachments around it and prevented their further decline. The brigade also took over positions abandoned by the Chetniks, halting their massacres. Many Chetnik units, which had fallen into disarray due to Chetnik betrayal, were absorbed and reorganized into volunteer detachments for resistance against the occupiers.
After shifting the operations and intensifying the struggle in this sector, the enemy launched a second offensive from two directions: one thrust from the Bosna River Valley toward the east and southeast, and the other from the Drina and Lim valleys toward the west. This was a manoeuvre aimed at encircling our forces.
Fierce battles unfolded around Sarajevo, on Jahorina and Romanija, in the Krivaja Valley near Olovo, around Vlasenica and Rogatica on one front, and near Nova Varoš, Prijepolje and Pljevlja on the other. After persistent efforts and intense fighting in January and February 1942, this hastily launched offensive — based on the assumption that we could be easily destroyed — was successfully repelled.
One of the most famous actions of this campaign was the breakthrough of the 1st Proletarian Brigade from Vareš through Rajlovac, Igman and Bjelašnica to Trnovo — one of the brigade’s most glorious feats. The march lasted 18 continuous hours in harsh winter conditions. Mount Igman will forever stand as a monument to the struggle and endurance of our proletarian fighters. Climbing over the frozen mountain ridges, no one was left behind. However, 160 proletarians suffered severe frostbite, and those who survived proudly bore the name “igmanci.”1
Another remarkable action from this offensive was the breakthrough of the 2nd Proletarian Brigade, which, under continuous battle, moved from Nova Varoš to Čajniče, crossing Mount Zlatar and the Lim River. In January, they waded through the icy waters, carrying all their wounded across.
By the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, after two major enemy offensives, our forces managed to consolidate and establish control over a key strategic area at the border of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia. In this region, we succeeded in breaking the occupiers’ defence system and forcing the enemy into the cities.
The liberated territory was vast, providing the necessary freedom for manoeuvring. The emergence of strong Proletarian Brigades, their victories and their incredible endurance during these most difficult days instilled confidence and renewed momentum in the struggle. These mobile proletarian units managed to unite and support the partisan forces in Montenegro, Herzegovina and Eastern Bosnia, giving new strength to the uprising — especially in Herzegovina, where it was still in its early stages.
By the spring of 1942, forces from Serbia, Montenegro, Eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandžak formed four Proletarian Brigades (1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th) and three Shock Brigades (3rd, 6th and 10th). These brigades were the pinnacle of the people’s uprising in the eastern part of our country. Despite all the measures taken by the occupiers, Chetniks and Ustaše, the uprising was not crushed. Instead, it produced strong military formations that would continue the struggle.
During these difficult early operations of the war, our fighters demonstrated great moral strength. Their political awareness and sense of purpose drove them into battle against fascism — far from their own homes. It was on this foundation that our military and political leadership based its decisions and future plans. On the other hand, the correct resolution of all the wartime challenges instilled trust in our leadership, and the fighters followed it unwaveringly. In this region, through the unification of Serbian, Montenegrin, Herzegovinian and Eastern Bosnian partisan forces, combat unity was forged in action. Here, the most battle-hardened, most determined and most self-sacrificing among the Serbian people gathered — ready to bear the heavy burden of war across the entire country, fighting for the freedom of all our peoples.
Before the start of the Third Enemy Offensive, launched in the spring of 1942 against the main partisan strongholds in Yugoslavia (Montenegro-Herzegovina-Eastern Bosnia; Bosanska Krajina-Lika; Slovenia), our forces, through energetic efforts, managed to secure enough time to reorganize all our units into brigades in the tri-border region. The previous practice of large partisan detachments, which were tied to their specific areas, was abandoned. We applied all our operational experience to these new brigades, adapting them to the new conditions of warfare: fast and flexible movement, shifting operations to distant regions and greater manoeuvrability against a superior enemy that was doing everything possible to destroy us. These brigades became the true foundation of our Army — a solid, resilient and battle-hardened core.
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The stabilization of the military-political situation in the tri-border area influenced not only the reorganization of our forces but also the strategic planning and approach to further partisan warfare. After forming a strike group of brigades, our leadership sought to support and intensify uprisings in the western regions of the country. Remaining in the tri-border area was no longer useful for our main forces. The Italians had fully exploited the Chetniks, to the point that the fight was losing its primary purpose — the struggle against the occupiers. Keeping such a strike group on harsh mountainous terrain, with scarce food supplies, had no long-term potential and would weaken its striking power. At the same time, the Croatian masses, who had largely remained on the sidelines, needed to be mobilized and brought into the National Liberation Movement. Seizing the right moment — at the peak of the Third Enemy Offensive in the tri-border area — the command launched a victorious offensive westward. It carried the banner of the National Liberation War — the banner of armed brotherhood and unity of our peoples — into new regions of Yugoslavia. The fighters themselves, by action and persuasion, would prove that they were an army of a new type.
The movement began from Sutjeska in late June 1942, advancing in two directions: 1. 1st and 3rd Brigades advanced through Lelija-Kadinovik-Konjic-Prozor-Livno, and; 2. 2nd and 4th Brigades moved along the Foča-Trnovo-Igman-Raštelica-Kreševo-Fojnica-Bugojno-Glamoč route. To secure the movement in the tri-border sector, the 5th Montenegrin Brigade and the 10th Herzegovinian Brigade remained behind, while the 6th Bosnian Brigade, in order to protect the Eastern Bosnian base, had already been sent from the Romanija sector toward Mojkovac. Before the strike group set off, in April, we eliminated the strong Ustaša stronghold in Borač, located in the Upper Neretva Valley. This den of criminals, hidden deep in a canyon, had inflicted great suffering on our people in Herzegovina. By destroying this stronghold, which was positioned on the left flank of our advance route, we secured our movement across the Lelija mountain range. This movement resulted in the liberation of a vast territory in the western part of our country, where the strike brigades linked up with Krajina and Croatian partisan forces. In terms of its outcomes, this operation can be considered one of the most significant moves in the history of our war. Our partisan forces in the western regions (Bosanska Krajina-Kozara, Slovenia) had been put in a difficult position by the Third Enemy Offensive; Chetnik-Ustaša bands had gained significant momentum. The victorious march of our strike brigades, the destruction of the Sarajevo-Mostar Adriatic railway — the first major sabotage operation of such scale in our war — along with the capture of towns such as Konjic, Prozor, Kreševo, Gornji Vakuf, Mrkonjić Grad, Duvno and Livno, had a tremendous impact, bringing new energy to our forces in the western regions. The arrival of these brigades and their battles along the Vrbas, Sana, Una and Dinara ignited mass resistance among the people.
As operations expanded across Bosnia and Croatia, we dismantled Pavelić’s quisling apparatus and eliminated the bulk of his bloodthirsty Ustaša forces. Pavelić and his deputy Maček were completely exposed politically. The Croatian people saw firsthand the justification of the liberation war. In Dalmatia, a popular uprising erupted, spreading even to Croatian regions where resistance had previously been weak, such as Žumberak, Slavonia and Zagorje. This also had an impact on Slovenia.
The Army grew rapidly. We advanced from brigades to a higher level of military organization, forming divisions and corps. This marked the second major phase in the development of our Army. We now had strong strike groups, capable of conducting large-scale operations and solving strategic challenges across the entire Yugoslav front.
With the liberation of vast territories, a state began to emerge and people’s power was established, culminating in the formation of AVNOJ in Bihać. Thus, the uprising of our peoples not only built and strengthened an armed force but also laid solid foundations for a people’s government. This was of great importance, not only for our internal stability but also for our international position.
For the first time in history, fighters from all our nations stood together on the same battlefield. This unity led to major victories — achievements that could only be attained through collective efforts and shared sacrifice. From this shared bloodshed grew the brotherhood and unity of our peoples — the greatest achievement of our struggle. With this movement, we established ourselves in the central region of our country, linking all our forces and securing control over the rugged terrain of the Dinaric mountain range, where the enemy could not fully exploit its modern military technology. From this powerful central stronghold, we launched operations toward the Sava Basin on one side and the Adriatic coast on the other. From this point onward, the Dinaric mountain range became a strategic lever, connecting Slovenian forces with our units in the eastern regions — Montenegro and Serbia.
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During 1942, the focus of our operations shifted from the eastern to the western regions. As a result, the occupier’s bases in the west were seriously threatened. In other words, just as the Allied offensive in Africa advanced westward toward the Italian mainland, the focus of our operations moved toward the Adriatic coast. This established a coordinated strategic alignment, even across a great distance.
The entire German communication system, which ran from the east and north toward the Adriatic coast and Italy, was disrupted. Our units operated in the hinterlands of Adriatic ports, from where Romanian oil was to be transported to Africa and Italy. In this situation, the Germans wanted to eliminate their enemy in the Balkans, and in January 1943, they launched a massive Fourth Offensive against us. This offensive involved six German and seven Italian divisions, all Ustaša units and 18,000 Chetniks under Draža Mihailović, recruited from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The enemy’s main plan was to encircle the free territory within the arc of Dinara-Neretva-Sarajevo-Banja Luka-Sisak-Karlovac-Gospić-Knin, and, through a converging movement, force our forces into Bosanska Krajina and destroy them.
It was extremely dangerous and risky to engage the superior enemy forces in frontal battles, as they were heavily armed to the teeth. This was especially true given that it was winter, making long-term survival in forest regions impossible. Our units were not well-equipped for winter warfare. Food supplies were insufficient. Having fought fierce battles throughout the second half of 1942, we had over 4,000 wounded in this region. Keeping these wounded fighters here would mean putting their lives in grave danger. Meanwhile, the uprising in the western regions of our country had fully solidified. Strong offensive forces could now be set aside and used to improve the military-political situation on other fronts.
The situation in Montenegro and Serbia had become very difficult after our main forces moved westward. Lacking support from the people, the Chetniks unleashed brutal terror. Reactionaries from abroad continued to support Draža Mihailović despite the fact that he was nothing more than an ordinary servant of the occupiers, and even supplied him with aid via airlifts. It was necessary to rekindle the fight in the eastern regions, to support the partisan groups struggling under extremely harsh conditions. Additionally, we needed to extend a hand to Albania and Bulgaria. In Albania, the uprising was still in its early stages, while in Bulgaria, a strong popular wave was rising against the traitorous ruling clique.
And so, our leadership made the following decision in Bihać: with a strong offensive group of five divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th), to evade enemy encirclement and, in the first stage, move into Montenegro and the Sandžak, then in the second stage, continue the advance toward Metohija and Central Serbia — into the heart of the Balkans.
To execute this decision, the following plan was adopted: Two manoeuvring cover units were tasked with slowing the enemy’s advance eastward, ensuring that the offensive group, along with 4,000 wounded, could cross the Neretva. The 4th Corps was assigned to fight from the Kupa to the Una, then move behind enemy lines and remain on its own territory. The 1st Bosnian Corps was given the role of covering the Una sector, escorting the operational group to the Neretva, and then, like the 4th Corps, moving behind enemy lines while staying on its own territory.
By mid-January, the offensive group had begun its movement eastward. Long operational routes, difficult terrain, bad weather, and the large number of wounded and refugees significantly slowed its progress.
The 4th Corps was subjected to envelopment attacks from Lika, the Kupa region and the Sisak-Kostajnica sector. It fought heavy battles until mid-February, after which it turned from the Una sector and launched a full-scale assault on Italian forces in the Gračac area, decisively defeating them before returning to the Kordun and Banija regions.
On the Una and Sana, the 1st Bosnian Corps took on the cover role, engaging in fierce battles. The enemy encircled it from the directions of Krupa, Prijedor and Banja Luka, forcing it back into the Vitorog-Srnetica mountain massif and then toward Mount Šator. As a result, the corps was unable to fully complete its cover mission.
During its movement toward the Neretva, the offensive group captured Imotski, Prozor and Jablanica, completely defeating the Italian “Murge” division, which had been closing the encirclement on the western bank of the Neretva. A massive amount of war booty, stockpiled in these garrisons, fell into our hands — supplies intended for this division’s planned offensive westward. However, our offensive group struck first, preempting their plans.
As the attack continued, our units assaulted Konjic to open a passage through the Upper Neretva Valley, but the attack failed due to a Chetnik offensive from the east. At the same time, Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks arrived at the Neretva to complete the encirclement. Italian specialists operated their heavy artillery, while the Italians provided food and ammunition supplies. The Chetnik command and field hospitals were located in Mostar.
Bloody battles broke out over the river crossings at the Neretva. This slowed and complicated the transfer of the strike group. Meanwhile, the Germans moved the 1st Alpine Division along the Sarajevo-Ivan Sedlo route to attack our left flank, while the 92nd Grenadier Division advanced from Bugojno toward Prozor, hitting us from the rear. The protective elements of the 1st Bosnian Corps were unable to halt their advance.
A very difficult situation arose in the Neretva River Valley. In response, we withdrew two divisions from the frontal battle on the Neretva and redirected them toward the Prozor-Donji Vakuf-Bugojno sector. Fierce fighting lasted for three days and three nights until we finally pushed back and partially destroyed the 92nd German Division, forcing it into a chaotic retreat beyond Bugojno. This victory allowed us to regroup our forces, cross the Neretva in mid-March, and then, near Prenj and Velež, completely crush Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks.
The Battle of the Neretva lasted 37 days, fought under extremely harsh conditions. Our wounded soldiers slowed down troop movement and manoeuvrability. A typhus epidemic spread among the units, further worsening our position. The swollen Neretva River and the icy slopes of Prenj and Velež, occupied by traitor bands, seemed impassable for any army. The occupiers and traitors already celebrated, thinking they had trapped us in a “cauldron.”
But our fighters’ great courage and endurance, along with their deep love for their wounded comrades, ensuring they did not fall into enemy hands, prevailed. We broke through the encirclement and escaped the enemy trap. During the breakthrough, we completely crushed Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks and continued pursuing the enemy across Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Sandžak, capturing Nevesinje, Ulog, Kalinovik, Gacko, Avtovac, Foča, Ustikolina, Goražde, Čajniče, Goransko, Žabljak, Šavnik, Mojkovac, and reaching the Lim River near Brodarevo and the Morača near Bioče. The defeat of Draža Mihailović was of great military and political significance. From that point on, he no longer posed any real threat. His treacherous role was fully exposed to the international public, and only after this did Allied missions begin arriving at our Supreme Headquarters.
* * *
The battles during the Fourth Offensive were extremely intense and difficult. Upon entering Montenegro and the Sandžak, we had to take a short break to transport a large number of wounded across difficult terrain and prepare for the next phase of the operation — advancing into Metohija and Central Serbia.
However, the enemy did not remain idle. Seeing that they had failed to destroy us, they quickly and unexpectedly launched the Fifth Offensive in May 1943 against our operational group. In reality, this was a continuation of the Fourth Offensive, as the enemy had regrouped and brought in fresh forces.
The Germans transported already concentrated troops from Sarajevo by truck through Višegrad to the Lim Valley, securing full control of the area. The Italians closed the Nikšić-Podgorica route. From Peć and Novi Pazar, the Germans deployed two new divisions, occupying the Berane-Andrijevica-Kolašin sector. Just as we began advancing toward Morača and Lim, we encountered very strong enemy resistance.
In this situation, crossing Pešter toward the Ibar Gorge was extremely risky. We had to pull back our forces, which had already been oriented eastward. However, the enemy, by rapidly transferring troops from Mostar and Sarajevo, closed the Nevesinje-Kalinovik and Gacko-Foča routes along the Sutjeska River, thus completely encircling us strategically, and this encirclement was turning into a tactical blockade.
Remaining in this area under constant air and artillery attacks was not an option. There was no food in this terrain. We had to break out of the encirclement once again. The chosen breakthrough route was Maglić-Zelengora-Jahorina-Eastern Bosnia, as it was the easiest tactical option. In Eastern Bosnia, we had a stronghold and access to food supplies for our units. Breaking through was extremely difficult. The canyon rivers hindered rapid troop movement and the evacuation of the wounded. The enemy employed a cunning strategy — they took defensive positions in canyons and mountain passes, while we had to forcefully break through each of these defences. Despite this, two key moments defined the success of the breakthrough: 1. Securing the mountain passes on Maglić, ensuring the crossing of the most challenging mountain terrain, and; 2. Holding defensive positions at Velike and Male Bare along the Gacko-Foča route, allowing our deep columns of units to pass through safely. The 2nd Dalmatian Brigade provided flank protection and, with unmatched heroism, endured intense enemy fire and relentless attacks to hold its ground. The 1st, 2nd and 7th Divisions carried out the breakthrough. There were three enemy defensive lines in the breakthrough area: on the Sutjeska; on Zelengora, and; on the Foča-Kalinovik and Višegrad-Sarajevo routes. Despite these challenges, we successfully broke through, defeated the enemy, and although we suffered significant losses, particularly from enemy aviation, we emerged victorious. Maglić, Sutjeska and Zelengora now stand as monuments to the heroic struggle and sacrifices of our people. The 3rd Division served as the rear guard for the strike group. In fulfilling this role, it sacrificed itself. It failed to break through with the main force. Scattered into smaller groups, its units fought their way into Herzegovina and Montenegro. After breaking through in June 1943, the strike group continued its offensive operations in Eastern Bosnia, capturing Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Kladanj, Srebrenica and Zvornik. After a short rest, part of our operational group continued toward the Adriatic coast, while another part moved towards the Sandžak and Montenegro, holding these key strongholds at the doorstep of Serbia. This provided a strong boost to the renewal of the fight in Serbia and revived the uprising in Macedonia.
As can be seen, this account covers the operations of only a small part of our Army — specifically, the strike operational group, which, in relation to our entire Army, comprised at most 40 per cent of its forces. This was a manoeuvring group tasked with:
— Transferring operations to distant operational areas and expanding the uprising in regions where it was weaker;
— Drawing strong enemy forces toward itself, thereby allowing the partisan units on other fronts to develop and operate more freely;
— Launching surprise attacks to disrupt the enemy’s transport system and supply bases, and;
— Resolving major military-strategic challenges through powerful offensive actions.
Given these tasks, it is clear that this group carried a heavy burden in the liberation war.
* * *
Through two years of intense battles, we inflicted heavy losses on the Italian occupiers. These blows, combined with the attacks of our allies, led to the capitulation of fascist Italy in August 1943 — a major event for the anti-fascist coalition.
We rightfully took advantage of this surrender, liberating vast territories from Gevgelija to the Prekosavska Hills, stretching over 700 kilometres in length and up to 400 kilometres in depth. The Slovenian Littoral, Istria and the Dalmatian islands, which had been unjustly severed from our national borders, were now free. We controlled almost the entire Dalmatian coast.
In Serbia and Macedonia, the fighting intensified and liberation forces secured important strongholds in the West Morava and Vardar regions, providing support to the Bulgarian liberation forces.
Alongside these military successes, this period also saw the Second Session of AVNOJ in Jajce, where historic decisions were made, laying the foundations of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.
All these events gave new energy and momentum to the struggle. A flood of new fighters poured into the ranks of our Army, which grew significantly. The entire country was mobilized, bringing in new forces to fight against the hated fascists. Seized Italian weapons fell into the hands of battle-hardened fighters who knew how to use them effectively. Recognizing the increasing importance of our Army, the Allies began supplying us with weapons and military equipment along the Adriatic coast.
Our reinforced and well-armed Army launched powerful offensive operations across the entire country. The satellite regimes in Yugoslavia were on the verge of collapse, threatening Germany’s strongest bases and outposts in the region. All communication routes leading from the Sava and Drava basins to Italy and the Adriatic were cut off, significantly worsening the German position on the Italian front. Similarly, all Morava-Vardar routes came under heavy attack, severely disrupting German connections with Greece and Albania, where the liberation movements — shielded from the north by our forces — were creating a stronghold.
Thus, our Army tied down German forces in the Balkans, preventing their troop movements. By securing the Adriatic, we held a firm right flank, preventing the Germans from establishing naval and air bases for operations against the Allies on the Italian front. There was now a real danger that Yugoslavia would become a centre for spreading the people’s uprising to neighbouring countries. The entire German military structure in southeastern Europe was at risk, and Germany’s position in the Balkans was seriously shaken.
By the end of 1943 and throughout 1944, Germany was preparing to defend the Balkans to secure its southern flank, which was exposed toward the Danube lowlands. Additionally, having lost significant territories in the East, Germany was highly motivated to maintain control over the Balkans to continue its plundering operations. The Germans sought to preserve their weakened reputation among their Balkan vassals and Yugoslav quislings. The struggle for democratic rights among the Balkan nations, which was strongly supported by Yugoslavia, had the potential to escalate further and bring an end to the brutal German regime in the region. Because of these factors, the Germans launched two major offensives against our Army in quick succession — the sixth and seventh offensives. These began in mid-October 1943 and ended by late June 1944, when our Army fully seized the initiative.
We will not go into detailed accounts of these offensives. What is notable, however, is that the Germans changed their previous approach to fighting us. Previously, they stubbornly sought to encircle and destroy us in “Cannae-style” operations. They believed that by eliminating the uprising, they were simply crushing a series of isolated rebellions. However, they eventually realized that they were engaged in a full-scale war against us. Our Army had not been destroyed even when our forces were small and our free territory was a tiny, isolated stronghold. Now, however, the Germans faced a well-armed army with extensive combat experience, spread across three-quarters of the liberated territory of Yugoslavia. The change in German tactics consisted of forming strong strike groups, primarily composed of armoured and mechanized units, which were used to attack specific operational areas. In both offensives, they began by attacking the flanks — the Slovenian-Istrian and Macedonian operational areas — before converging these mobile groups in the Bosnian operational sector to complete their offensive. Through rapid advances, they aimed to disrupt life in our controlled territories, hinder the unified deployment of our Army and complicate our strategic operations, in accordance with the broader European military situation. However, the weaknesses of this German strategy were clear. They lacked sufficient forces. Across the vast expanse of our battlefield, the enemy’s strike groups were met with fierce counterattacks, causing them to lose their offensive strength before the final phase of operations. This left our units with full freedom of manoeuvre. Forces from one sector could intervene to support neighbouring units, attacking enemy bases in the rear. During the final Seventh German Offensive, the airborne attack on the Supreme Headquarters in Drvar on May 25 also took place. With this assault, the Germans attempted to destroy our unified military and political leadership, delivering the most serious blow to the gains of our struggle. They sought to decapitate the movement and the Army, sow chaos and panic in our command, and, just before the opening of the Second Front in Europe, eliminate one of the warring forces that was shaking the foundations of the “European Fortress.”
All the German plans failed. As in all previous offensives, our Army emerged stronger and further battle-hardened through new combat experiences. We retained control over all key strongholds in our country.
By late spring 1944, after the Seventh German Offensive, the bulk of our forces was concentrated in the Bosnian-Montenegrin operational area. Positioned on this powerful central stronghold, our forces were ready to quickly intervene across all regions of the country, depending on developments in the military and political situation.
During the summer of 1944, the military situation was defined by the following factors:
— Allied progress in Italy had stalled, offering no prospects of a rapid breakthrough into the Po Valley or further northward advance. As a result, there was no operational need to keep large forces in the western part of the country. The forces stationed in the Slovenian-Istrian sector were sufficient to continue disrupting enemy transportation, further worsening the German position on the Italian front.
— The situation on the Eastern Front presented an entirely different picture. During the summer operations, the Red Army had broken through German lines along a wide front, rapidly advancing westward and southwestward, reaching the Bug River. Concentrating stronger forces in the eastern part of the country now offered significant operational opportunities.
— In Serbia, the traitors Nedić, Ljotić and Mihailović, sensing their imminent downfall, carried out unprecedented terror against the patriotic Serbian population. Various opportunists, both domestic and foreign, hoped to turn Serbia and Belgrade into a second Warsaw. Although the liberation movement in Serbia had gained significant momentum, our forces struggled to withstand the numerically superior German and Bulgarian occupation troops, along with local traitor bands. Support was needed for the Serbian forces, which had already secured solid strongholds and controlled large liberated territories near the South Morava River and Eastern Serbia, while smaller units held certain areas in Šumadija.
— Among the Bulgarian people, there was a growing movement to overthrow the fascist regime. A strong blow against the Bulgarian occupation troops in Serbia could accelerate this process.
All these factors necessitated shifting the main focus of operations eastward and deploying a stronger strike group into Serbia.
Throughout the entire war, the Germans defended Serbia with exceptional determination, as it was located at the most strategically sensitive point in the Balkans.
Two vital geo-strategic corridors ran directly through Serbia: the Morava-Nišava and Morava-Vardar routes, which linked all Central European transport routes to the southeast. For the Germans, these were “lifelines” for their vision of global domination. By defending and keeping Serbia under control, the Germans safeguarded much of their strategic, economic and political advantages, which they had gained through their plundering of the Balkans. This explains their constant efforts to create and maintain a large number of quislings — Nedić, Ljotić, Mihailović, Pećanac and a host of other “vojvodas”2 — who were the main pillars of German occupation in Serbia.
Throughout 1944, the Germans prepared to defend the Balkans with the aim of exploiting material resources, securing the Romanian front and protecting themselves from attacks from the south. For them, Serbia was a highly sensitive area, as it was in close proximity to the southern flank of the Eastern Front, and the liberation movement had grown significantly. The liberation of Serbia would jeopardize the withdrawal of German forces from the southern Balkans and open the way into the Danube lowlands. For this reason, the Germans carefully guarded Serbia and Belgrade, which was an important stronghold of German defence in the southeast. Additionally, by holding Serbia, they aimed to support their satellite collaborators — Nedić, Ljotić and Draža Mihailović — who, in this complex situation, provided them with valuable services and were used for political manoeuvres.
The Germans anticipated the entry of our main forces into Serbia and, as a result, organized a defensive line along the western borders, specifically on the Drina, West Morava and Ibar Rivers. The West Morava front was particularly well-organized and defended, as it was directly exposed to attacks from the Sandžak and Montenegro. However, this defensive cordon did not provide the Germans with sufficient security so they attempted to shift operations further west, engaging our main forces away from Serbia, in the Montenegro, Sandžak and Eastern Bosnia sectors. This was the reason behind the fierce battles in these regions in early summer 1944. Nevertheless, all enemy attempts to push us back from these key strongholds failed. By the end of July, we had assembled significant forces in this broad operational base, ready to launch a concentrated attack into Serbia.
The deployment of our forces was as follows: Right-flank group (2nd, 5th and 17th Divisions) in the Andrijevica-Berane-Kolašin sector; Central group (1st and 12th Corps — 1st, 6th, 16th and 36th Divisions) in the Pljevlja-Foča-Šavnik sector, and; Left-flank group (11th and 28th Divisions) in the Srebrenica-Vlasenica-Zvornik sector. Since the first two groups were relatively distant and had to cross difficult terrain, their initial phase involved advancing to the Kopaonik-Golija-Zlatibor-Tara Mountain line, from which they would quickly launch an offensive.
The enemy learned about the concentration of our forces and, at the beginning of July, positioned two divisions (the SS “Skanderbeg” Division and the 1st Alpine Division) along the Peć-Kosovska Mitrovica-Raška line. Their goal was to prevent our forces from advancing into Serbia and to isolate the Serbian forces in the Morava region, which were already enduring a fierce enemy offensive. These Serbian forces, attacked from multiple directions, were in a critical situation.
By mid-July, the Skanderbeg Division launched an attack from Peć toward Andrijevica. Our right-flank strike group, operating from the Berane sector, launched a powerful counterattack, completely defeating the enemy and forcing them back toward Peć. Building on this success, the strike group quickly disengaged from the front, moved through Pešter, where it crushed the Albanian bands, and in fierce battles on the Ibar, broke through the defence of the 1st Alpine Division and Nedić-Chetnik forces. It then unexpectedly appeared on Kopaonik, in the rear of enemy forces advancing southward toward Toplica and Jablanica, in pursuit of the Serbian units. The arrival and aggressive action of this strike group shattered the enemy offensive in the Jablanica sector. Together with the newly-formed 13th and 14th Serbian Corps, a strong defensive position was secured in the Ibar and South Morava region.
At the end of July, the Germans launched another attack on the Sandžak, aiming to destroy our central group and prevent its breakthrough into Serbia. This time, the attack came from two directions: 1. The reorganized 1st Alpine and Skanderbeg Divisions advanced along the Raška-Sjenica-Prijepolje route, and; 2. The Prinz Eugen Division attacked along the Romanija-Goražde-Čajniče route. To avoid entangling the central group in direct frontal battles, which would waste precious time, the 2nd Montenegrin Corps was assigned to engage the enemy head-on in both sectors: In the Lim Valley, from Prijepolje upstream; and in the Drina Valley, from Goražde upstream, retreating toward Tara and Durmitor if necessary. Taking advantage of this, our central group (1st and 12th Corps) quickly manoeuvred northward. On the Lower Lim, it destroyed Nedić-Chetnik defensive positions, and along the Ivanjica-Čajetina-Vardište line, it broke through Bulgarian-German defences, securing control over Zlatibor and Tara Mountain. Thus, the German offensive collapsed completely. We outmanoeuverd the enemy and positioned ourselves exactly where we had planned.
The 2nd Montenegrin Corps, after engaging the enemy on the flanks, creating time for the central group’s breakthrough northward, gradually withdrew toward Durmitor and the Duga Gorge. In doing so, it tied down three German divisions — the 1st Alpine, Skanderbeg and Prinz Eugen Divisions — and drew them into the difficult terrain of Northern Montenegro. Later, these units struggled to extract themselves from this area before finally being redirected toward Serbia.
In the second half of August, our offensive groups were positioned for decisive action. The strongest central group, advancing from the Zlatibor-Tara Mountain sector, was the first to launch an attack, moving along the Užice-Valjevo axis. Its objective was to draw the bulk of enemy forces toward itself, easing the movement of the flanking manoeuvre groups, which needed to cross the West Morava and Drina Rivers. During its northeastward advance, this group captured Kosjerić, Bajina Bašta and Rogačica. Alarmed by this breakthrough, Nedić’s, Ljotić’s and Mihailović’s forces — reinforced by the Germans — threw their strongest units against this group, including: the Serbian Volunteer Corps; the Corps Groups (Kolubara-Posavina, Belgrade and Assault groups); the “Royal Mountain Guard,” and; elements of the German “Brandenburg” motorized regiment. At that point, we launched an encircling manoeuvre with our flanking groups. However, the central group, which was sufficiently strong, boldly attacked the enemy, completely destroying them in the Jelova Gora-Medvednik-Suvobor sector. Pursuing the retreating enemy, our forces liberated Ljubovija, Pecka, Osečina, Valjevo, Ljig and Lajkovac.
The right-flank strike group, advancing from the West Morava Valley, engaged elements of the Prinz Eugen Division, which was relocating to Serbia. After fierce battles, it captured Gornji Milanovac, Vraćevšnica, Stragari, Lazarevac and Aranđelovac.
The left-flank group forced the Drina River under heavy fighting in the Zvornik sector, advanced to the Sokolska Planina-Gučevo mountain range, and, after linking up with elements of the central group, liberated Krupanj, Bela Crkva, Koviljača, Loznica and Lješnica after minor battles. This group also eliminated the remaining enemy units, which had been scattered and fleeing from our central group.
By late September, after long advances and battles, all three strike groups had secured the strategically vital geographic mass of Rudnik-Suvobor-Cer, along with all its key transportation hubs. At that point, the 1st Army Group was formed and prepared to launch an attack from this stronghold against the last remaining enemy forces in Serbia.
While the 1st Army Group advanced through Western Serbia and Šumadija toward Belgrade, the 2nd Army Group was formed with the task of securing the southern flank of the Belgrade Operation in the West Morava-Kragujevac sector. From this army group, the 14th Serbian Corps was redeployed from Jastrebac to Eastern Serbia, where, after intense battles with enemy and collaborationist forces, it linked up with units of the Red Army’s 1st Army on the Danube on September 14.
As we can see, before the final battle for Belgrade, the entire collaborationist apparatus in Serbia had already been completely dismantled. Caught off guard by the rapid advance of our forces in Šumadija and the swift arrival of the Red Army on the Danube, the Germans hastily took defensive measures. Northern Serbia was now directly threatened. Its defence, divided into three sectors, was taken over by the Army Group Felber.
The eastern Timok sector was completely exposed (as it had already been liberated by the 14th Corps), prompting the Germans to deploy three divisions: 1. The 117th Division, arriving from Greece, was assigned to the Negotin sector; 2. The 1st Alpine Division took Zaječar, and; 3. The Prinz Eugen Division was positioned in Knjaževac-Pirot-Niš. These last two divisions, which had previously fought in the Sandžak offensive, were rushed into the Timok sector and thrown into battle directly from their marching columns. Under heavy pressure, the 14th Corps withdrew from the Timok Valley to the Carpathian Ridge, from where it coordinated with the Red Army troops during the Danube crossing and continued clearing the Morava Valley alongside them. The German defence in the Timok sector was also supported by Chetnik units from the Great Morava and Eastern Serbian “Corps Groups.”
The southern and southwestern sector — Kruševac-Mačak-Aranđelovac — was defended by the 34th German Corps, which included units from the 104th, 118th and 297th German Divisions, the “Russian Volunteer Corps,” and Chetnik units from the Rasina-Toplica and Šumadija “Corps Groups.”
The Belgrade sector, extending to the Obrenovac-Mladenovac-Smederevo line, was defended by a mixed force consisting of: the 92nd Motorized Brigade; the 2nd Brandenburg Regiment; the “Belgrade” Fortress Regiment; the 5th Police Regiment; a supplementary battalion from the Prinz Eugen Division; three territorial battalions; the 38th Motorized Anti-Aircraft Regiment; seven artillery battalions, and; smaller detachments from the Serbian Volunteer Corps. Additionally, forces from the first two sectors were ordered to retreat and reinforce the defence of Belgrade after completing their initial tasks.
This was the situation before the launch of the coordinated attack by our forces and the Red Army units.
At the beginning of October, the 1st Army Group launched its offensive, advancing from the Rudnik-Cer line toward the Sava and Danube Rivers. After brief battles, it cleared Mačva and Posavina before regrouping along the Aranđelovac-Kosmaj-Obrenovac line, preparing to join the Red Army forces arriving from the east in the battle for Belgrade.
Thus, we have seen the operations of the western force, which was formed and launched in early summer 1944 from the central mountainous region of our country. Now, let’s examine the actions of the eastern force.
At the end of August (August 20-31), a major military and political event took place on the southern Russian front. During the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the Red Army units shattered the German Balkan front, knocked fascist Romania and Bulgaria out of the war, and continued their rapid advance toward Hungary. South of the Danube, a Soviet force, primarily composed of motorized and mechanized units, was dispatched to assist us in the fight for Belgrade. After completing preparations, these forces began crossing the Danube at Đerdap on October 5.
When German forces became engaged in frontal battles along the Danube and Timok River line, a tank corps under the command of General Zhdanov launched an advance from the Vidin area on October 7. This corps moved through extremely difficult terrain, advancing along the Zaječar-Žagubica-Palanka-Topola-Mladenovac-Belgrade axis. With its rapid breakthrough, it shattered the enemy defence in the eastern sector of the Serbian operational area. The 1st Alpine and 117th Jager Divisions were forced northward toward the Danube, while the Prinz Eugen Division was pushed southward toward the Morava River. This opened the way for the tank corps, which, after brief battles, captured the strategic transport hub of Velika Plana on October 10, linking up with elements of the right flank of our 1st Army Group.
After short but intense battles near Mladenovac and the Ralja positions, the joint forces reached the outskirts of Avala on October 13. As the tank corps advanced, it forced German forces northward toward Požarevac, Smederevo and Grocka. To quickly neutralize the defence of Belgrade, the tank corps coordinated with our infantry units, which completed the attack plan.
The defence of Belgrade was structured in three defensive lines: 1. A wide perimeter defence near Avala; 2. A narrower line at the city’s approaches, and; 3. Fortifications within the city itself, with a main defensive ring at Kalemegdan and the railway station complex. Key flanking strongholds within the city included Čukarica, Tašmajdan and Karaburma. Additionally, all major buildings were prepared for defence. All defensive positions relied on the Sava and Danube rivers. The city could not be bypassed, and a frontal assault through the deepest part of enemy defences was necessary. The primary attack strategy was to split the city’s defence in two and seize the Sava bridges, preventing the Germans from establishing a defensive position on the Zemun side.
The direct battle for the city began on October 14. Under heavy artillery fire and a powerful tank assault, Belgrade’s outer defences fell quickly and our units pushed into the city. However, the defenders put up fierce resistance, forcing our forces to capture each stronghold one by one. This delayed progress, allowing German forces that had been pushed back toward the Danube (the 117th Jager and 1st Alpine Divisions) to regroup around Grocka and launch an attack along the Smederevo road toward Mali Mokri Lug, aiming to link up with the city’s defenders. Part of our forces had to be redirected eastward from the city, and the German attempt to break through was thwarted. The Germans then attempted to retreat south of Avala toward Obrenovac and across the Sava into Srem. They even managed to cut our Belgrade-Mladenovac supply lines near the village of Vrčin. There was a serious risk that these German forces would escape, and this had to be prevented. While smaller units continued fighting within the city, our stronger forces turned south, encircled the German grouping south of Avala and completely eliminated it, capturing or killing up to 15,000 enemy troops. Following this, the intense battle for the city resumed. During the advance through Belgrade, tanks and artillery units of the Red Army played a decisive role in destroying the strongest German fortifications. After this final assault, the combined forces liberated Belgrade on October 20 and crossed the Sava into Srem, where our 1st Army and elements of the Red Army continued the advance. During the immediate battles for Belgrade, more than 30,000 enemy troops were killed, wounded or captured, and a large quantity of military equipment was seized.
At the same time, Red Army units and our 2nd Army Group repelled all German attempts to break through from the West Morava sector toward Belgrade via Kragujevac. They then liberated Kragujevac, Jagodina, Kruševac and Trstenik, finally stabilizing the front along the West Morava on the Kraljevo-Čačak line.
A portion of the forces from the 2nd Army Group, together with units of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front Army, liberated Niš, Leskovac and Prokuplje, and continued joint operations in Kosovo Polje. After this, units of the 2nd Army pushed further westward, south of the Sava River.
Summarizing the results of these operations, we arrive at the following conclusions:
1. With the destruction of Germany’s powerful defensive positions in Romania, the Red Army decided the fate of the Balkan campaign. The final stage of this great victory was the Belgrade Operation.
During the Belgrade Operation, the main transportation artery of the Balkan Peninsula — Salonika-Belgrade-Budapest — was severed at its most critical point, the “throat of the Balkans” — Belgrade. This completely shattered the remaining German defensive system on the Balkans, resulting in the rapid withdrawal of German forces from southern Balkan regions. However, with the main communication route cut off, the entire German Balkan force — over 150,000 troops — was pushed into the harsh mountainous terrain of Montenegro, the Sandžak and Bosnia, where it was met and annihilated in the mountain ravines by our National Liberation Army. Thus, the German command’s hope of forming a compact strike group from these large forces to attack the southern flank of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was completely crushed.
2. The liberation of Belgrade marked a turning point in our war of liberation. Our Army established direct contact with the fraternal Red Army and received significant material support. As a result, all regions east of the Drava-Drina-Neretva line were quickly liberated. This enabled us to establish a strategic front for the first time, securing a stable operational base, which allowed us to fully utilize all available resources for the continuation of the war.
In partisan warfare, when our units were primarily equipped with light weaponry, the creation of rigid frontlines was disadvantageous for us and we avoided it. The enemy constantly sought to impose a fixed front where, with superior numbers and better-equipped forces, they could bring their full strength to bear against us. However, over time, the balance of power shifted — the enemy weakened while we grew stronger. By the time of the Belgrade Operation, we had gained military superiority over them. From that point on, mountain paths became too narrow for us and mountains became impassable for heavy howitzers and tanks. The deployment of our large forces, now equipped with modern Soviet weaponry, required the use of communication routes, the establishment of supply lines and the securing of territory. This inevitably led to the formation of a stable front, which became a necessary and unavoidable development.
A stable front with a secure rear introduced new challenges in warfare. Previously, to avoid attacks from superior enemy forces, we often used flexible formations to exploit weak points on the flanks, in the rear or along the enemy’s lines. Now, frontal battles became the norm, involving the breakthrough of deeply layered enemy defensive positions. This, in turn, required the concentration of large forces in relatively confined areas, leading to a new phase in our military organization — the formation of armies. From small partisan detachments, which were the initial core of the people’s uprising, through brigades, divisions and corps, we had now built large military formations and full-scale armies. This marked the completion of the reorganization and full modernization of our National Liberation Army, which ultimately led to its renaming as the Yugoslav Army — a unified formation of all nations.
3. In our war of liberation, there was a constant tendency to expand and maintain free territories, which were organized to support the liberation war as effectively as possible. Despite all our efforts, these territories remained unstable. The occupier constantly threatened them with attacks, altering their shape and often completely overrunning them, destroying our strongholds. However, with the establishment of a strategic front after the Belgrade Operation, a significant portion of national territory was fully secured and consolidated. This also led to the definitive establishment of central authority (the government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia) and a systematic effort to organize governance at the local level, among the people, through National Liberation Committees.
The centre of the liberated territory was Belgrade. With the establishment of a stable political leadership in the capital, all national forces became united in the struggle for the complete liberation of our country from fascist tyranny. Thus, Belgrade became the capital of all our peoples — the capital of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.
4. On our front in the Vardar Valley, the South Morava region and Kosovo Polje, the Army of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front fought alongside our units. In this struggle, the Bulgarian forces achieved notable successes and suffered significant sacrifices. This marked a decisive turning point for Bulgaria, bringing it back into the great community of Slavic nations. Bulgaria had now chosen the path that aligned with its vital interests — brotherhood and unity with the peoples of Yugoslavia.
This brotherhood, forged in blood, would no longer allow our two nations to be drawn into fratricidal wars. The brotherhood of our nations is a key condition for stability in this region and should become the foundation for unity among all Balkan peoples.
5. The great Russian people have always been our hope and support. So it was this time as well. Faith in their strength and ultimate victory was a decisive factor in our long and difficult struggle. Beyond this great moral support, the Red Army directly provided us with immense assistance by making great efforts to liberate our peoples. For our liberation, they made invaluable sacrifices. With the capture of Romania, the gateway to the Pannonian Plain was opened, leading to the decisive operations of the Red Army, for which all forces had to be concentrated. And yet, they diverted part of their forces and, under fierce battles, forced the great river barrier of the Danube, broke through the Balkan and Carpathian ridges, all to help speed up our liberation. The joining of our two armies north and south of the Danube eased the extremely difficult conditions of our struggle up to that point, which quickly brought major successes to our forces. The Red Army knew of the heroic fight of our peoples, they knew about our active battlefield, which, for four years, tied down significant enemy forces. And so, they selflessly extended a fraternal hand to us. On the sacred soil of our homeland, in Serbia, on the streets of Belgrade, in Srem, the fraternal blood of Soviet soldiers was shed. From our shared suffering and spilled blood, an enduring brotherhood and unity between our two Slavic nations has emerged. This is the only correct orientation in foreign policy, one that aligns with the centuries-old aspirations, cultural and historical development of our peoples. It is the only guarantee that our nations will be saved from national catastrophes, of which there have been far too many in our difficult history.
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The formation of the Yugoslav Army is the culmination of a glorious historical era and the military development of our armed forces. It is highly significant that it emerged as a unified Yugoslav Army during the period of the final assault on fascist Germany, at a time when fascism was facing catastrophe. Its role is to complete the liberation of our country and to participate alongside other Allied armies in the liberation of humanity from fascist tyranny. It stands as an equal factor in this great struggle of democratic nations. It has fulfilled its role, just as all the other armies of Allied countries, by taking up a strategic front between the Allied Pannonian and Italian forces. By doing so, it has secured international standing for its people. After this hard-won victory, it is now responsible for protecting the gains achieved through bloodshed and for ensuring the peaceful development and reconstruction of our country based on the very principles born out of the National Liberation War.
Notes
1 Igmanists.
2 Leaders (Serbo-Croatian in the original).
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