— On the Third Anniversary —
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The Battle for Pljevlja, a small town in the Sandžak, marks a significant moment in the Montenegrins’ liberation war. It was preceded by a tumultuous period of six months of bloody fighting. The echo of those battles quickly spread beyond the borders of Montenegro and had no small influence in awakening resistance against the bloody conqueror. But that was not enough: Montenegrin arms sought battlefields even beyond the Montenegrin ravines and crags, amidst the sea of fascist tyranny that was suffocating our enslaved land.
Many patriots, outraged by the shameful betrayal of April 1941, headed toward Montenegro, believing that there had to be a frontline among the Montenegrins. Betrayal was the same everywhere — deep and bitter. There was no resistance and fascist hordes were pouring unchallenged through the homeland. But our peoples did not betray. One old Montenegrin woman, after the April catastrophe, was seen carrying five light machine guns into the mountains on a scrawny little horse. “The children gave them to me to take,” she said. “They’ll need them.” (She had three sons — every one of them fell in the liberation war.)
On July 13, 1941, the uprising truly broke out, as the Party’s order from Belgrade for armed resistance reached Montenegro. On that day, Montenegro became the epicentre of a nationwide uprising — the site of major battles. Through a voice of vengeance, partisan Montenegro spoke — a Montenegro that future generations would praise and honour.
Everyone who could carry a rifle rose up, young and old alike. It was a natural consequence of the Montenegrins’ refusal to accept betrayal. The honour of the people was at stake, and it could only be defended with weapons in hand. It was also a result of hatred toward the vile and cowardly Italian occupier who dishonoured our noble people. The pride of the Montenegrins had been deeply wounded.
It was the consequence of the great influence of the Party and the trust that the Montenegrin masses had in it which had led them into the sacred battle for the homeland. Montenegrins stood with our Party during the difficult struggle for the rights of the people throughout the entire 20 years of the old Yugoslavia — even when, like at Belvedere, the unarmed masses had to take up the fight against the regime’s army, armed to the teeth. Now, the Party had secured entire stockpiles of weapons and ammunition — the same ones Yugoslav generals, with their lined-up armies, had handed over to the German invaders.
Finally, it was the result of the deep and traditional love Montenegrins held for the reborn Slavic mother — Russia. Even though her name had not been allowed to be spoken over the past 20 years, the natural instinct of our people believed in her strength and power. The German attack on Russia did not frighten them — the people were convinced of her victory. It was a common occurrence that, during the most difficult battles, peasants would ask, “Does Russia know about our struggle?” — expressing their belief that, no matter how hard our fight was, with Russia’s support, it must be victorious.
With these feelings, the Montenegrin masses, without any particular military formation or organization, bravely launched their attack. Montenegro roared under the weight of intense battle. It felt as if the entire land would be consumed in a terrible hurricane of fire. It was the people’s wrath, surging like a flood upon the vile fascist intruders — grabbing them by the throat — and by the end of July, nearly all of Montenegro was liberated (except for Cetinje, Podgorica and Nikšić). We killed many Italians, captured 4,000 of them and seized a significant amount of war booty.
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Through a sudden assault and the speed of our actions, we achieved major results. The lack of resistance in other sectors of the Balkans occupied by the Italians gave them the ability to direct significant forces against us — a full corps of four divisions, supported by considerable air power. After fierce fighting lasting a month and a half, by the end of August 1941 the enemy had managed to retake the garrisons in Montenegro, pushing our forces away from key routes and communications. During these battles, our military leadership was unable to solidify the military and organizational readiness of the popular masses. These forces were unwieldy, slow to manoeuvre and unable to deliver swift strikes at various points to spread the enemy thin across a broad area. As a result, our larger formations were forced into uneven battles, holding rigid fronts where the enemy — more numerous and better armed — had the advantage. And after the enemy broke through those fronts, the uprising rapidly weakened. A lull followed — lasting through September — which our leadership used to reorganize the units. But the enemy also used this break in the fighting. They brought massive amounts of ammunition and food into the garrisons and fortified the towns and transportation routes.
After the reorganization of the units, the fighting in Montenegro began to take on a more dynamic character by the end of September. Communications were again cut, and the towns of Šavnik, Žabljak, Goransko, Vilusi, Velinja, Grahovo, Čevo and Mojkovac were liberated. Montenegrin shock battalions, led by the legendary hero Sava Kovačević, pushed deep into Herzegovina, reaching as far as Nevesinje, engaging in fierce battles to protect the Serbian population of those areas from Ustaša massacres. At Vjetrenik, a strong motorized column was destroyed — 500 Italians were captured or killed and 50 trucks were destroyed. Similar actions were carried out across all sectors of Montenegro, extending to Boka and Eastern Herzegovina. The enemy was pushed back into garrisons and was suffocating under the strikes of our units.
Through these actions, the fighting spirit once again spread among the masses. But even before that, in August and September, the uprising in Serbia had not only solidified but also intensified, achieving significant results. This gave a great boost to the revival and renewed strength of the uprising in Montenegro. In the important Serbian-Montenegrin region, our forces were on the rise. This needed to be used operationally and the forces organized and linked together. That is why, in mid-October, the Supreme Commander invited representatives of the General Staff for Montenegro, Boka and the Sandžak to Užice. At that meeting, the operational idea was put forward to create a strong base and stronghold in the region of the Sandžak — from which operations could be carried out in various directions depending on how the situation developed. This decision was explained by the following reasons:
1. Most of Serbia and Montenegro was free. These territories needed to be linked in order to give the uprising greater momentum and strength. This connection could only be achieved through the Sandžak.
2. For strategic and political reasons, the territory of Serbia was very important to the Germans. Meanwhile, the uprising there had taken on a larger scale. This was inspiring all our peoples towards a general armed uprising. The enemy could not remain indifferent — and already in October, it began deploying strong forces in Serbia against our Army. Nedić, Ljotić, Pećanac and Mihailović, through their betrayal and collaboration with the occupiers, further complicated our position in Serbia. This situation demanded the securing of a stronghold — one that could serve not only as a support for the Serbian forces but also as a base for launching offensive operations. The Sandžak was very well suited for this purpose. This referred to the entire geographical area covering the middle and upper Drina, the Western Morava and the Ibar rivers. The mountainous terrain, forests, canyon-like river courses and the spacious landscape made it possible to mount a solid defence and allowed our larger units to remain there for extended periods. The central position of this region enabled rapid transitions into offensive operations and linking with other regions of our country, where uprisings were gradually developing — some faster, some more slowly.
3. In the exhausted regions of Montenegro, where the entire population had risen up to fight, it was necessary to supply both the Army and the civilians with food brought in from the Sandžak and Serbia. In addition, the Montenegrin operational group needed to be supported with weapons and ammunition from our Užice factory.
4. The occupier in Montenegro, gravely threatened, had withdrawn and entrenched itself in garrisons, from which it barely dared to emerge. We did not have heavy weapons to strike them. The fighting had taken on a static character, and our large forces were left underutilized. It was therefore necessary to free up those forces, give them manoeuvrability and broader military and political prospects. Operations in the Sandžak promised significant results. The details of these operations were entrusted to the General Staff for Montenegro.
The idea of connecting the Serbian and Montenegrin forces and establishing a continuous liberated territory stirred enormous enthusiasm among our units and the people. Never had Montenegrins felt a stronger bond with the Serbs than at that moment. Admiration for the great successes of the Serbian partisans was genuine and all the greater because we were aware of various betrayals and speculations by the Serbian collaborators. After our own harsh battles, the burning of homes and the weakening of the uprising, a spark had flared up in Serbia — and from there, we in Montenegro drew new strength and inspiration. Serbia had come to our aid at the crucial hour. The capture of towns in Serbia was met on our side with celebratory salvos and cheerful humour: “Look what the gedže1 are up to now!” The feeling was so strong that we simply wanted to leap across the Sandžak and jump straight into Serbia. We were proud of what we had achieved in Montenegro — but we could see that what was happening in Serbia was bigger, much bigger than what we had done.
This also had an effect on the traitors in Montenegro — most of whom had gone into hiding.
For the planned operation, we were capable of mobilizing between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters. We considered just 4,000 to be sufficient — they were organized into a newly-formed brigade. The rest of the fighters were to be armed after the capture of enemy garrisons. We chose Pljevlja as the first target of attack. Pljevlja was the key — the gateway to the Sandžak — after which it would not be difficult to capture the remaining towns, especially those along the Lim River, located on the route toward Serbia. Pljevlja was an important transportation hub, and its fall would open up communications across the Sandžak — which was of great importance for the functioning and operations of our large operational group. The headquarters of the Italian division was located there and needed to be destroyed — after that, the remaining garrisons under its command would quickly fall. Pljevlja held a large stockpile of weapons, and by capturing it, we would have been able to arm many of our unarmed fighters. Our combat experience also played a role here. The Italian fascists were such cowards that they never once stood to fight hand-to-hand with our units, nor did they withstand being encircled.
At the end of November, a marching manoeuvre toward Pljevlja began — from all corners of Montenegro, even from the Montenegrin coast (Paštrovići, Boka, Konavlje). After twelve days, it culminated in a concentrated attack on Pljevlja. It was a magnificent campaign — a triumph and a show of force. The people, who had once watched the retreat of the defeated and battered army after the occupation, now saw their own victorious Army marching forward. The movement stirred and energized all of Montenegro and the Sandžak. Entire clans followed and welcomed their battalions.
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The Sandžak and the northeastern part of Montenegro were held by two Italian divisions, with a total strength of around 25,000 men. To this must be added the fact that the Muslim militia in the Sandžak was also hostile toward us. The entire sector was systematically connected, organized and fortified. In attacking Pljevlja, we had to allocate a significant portion of our forces to target enemy communication lines to prevent reinforcements from arriving. The battle therefore encompassed not just the town itself but a wide operational area. The town was surrounded by a single line of mines, reinforced with dug-in machine gun nests and trenches. Defensive positions were prepared within buildings. Immediate defence was organized into seven enclosed fortifications, linked by interlocking fire. The headquarters of the “Pusteria” Division was in Pljevlja, with 5,000 soldiers, 36 cannons, 60 heavy mortars, 15 tanks, 340 automatic weapons and several searchlights.
We attacked the town during the night between November 30 and December 1, 1941. The plan was to simultaneously strike the outer defences and break into the town, disrupting the entire defensive system. The movement from starting positions — located up to eight kilometres from the town — was to begin at 10 p.m., with entry into the town expected around 2 a.m. on December 1.
Due to the way the movement was organized and the long march of our units, the enemy was alerted to our intentions. They even learned the exact hour of the attack, and all enemy troops had been deployed in their battle positions. We could hear the Italian fascists sounding the alarm. Our fighters, undeterred, descended into the town. In the Bistrica ravine, they were even singing — until their voices were replaced by the fierce sounds of assault as our units launched attacks at every point of the fortified camp. By 2 a.m. on December 1, the night battle had taken on an intense and violent character. It was a great battle — hand-to-hand, close combat. It felt like we were inside a fiery volcanic crater. In that chaos, the traditional fighting spirit of the Montenegrin came to the fore. Barehanded, he grabbed the throat of the heavily armed enemy and did not let go from that bloody ground. Every soldier understood the importance of Pljevlja — the significance of the first and hardest battle of the Montenegrin detachment in its major campaign.
The “Bijeli Pavle” Battalion captured the strong fortifications at Veliki and Mali Bogiševac, which dominated the area and the town. It then pushed into the northwestern part of the town, continuing intense fighting through the day. The Lovćen Battalion had one of the most difficult tasks — to break into the town and expand the battle from the centre. This elite battalion, under the command of the fearless fighter Pero Đetković — who later died a heroic death during the Fourth Offensive, leading the famed 3rd Shock Division — fully completed its mission. The battalion took control of an entire district in the town centre and supported the actions of other units throughout the day and into the next night. The Italians launched relentless counterattacks and shelled the district with devastating fire, but they were unable to dislodge the Lovćen Battalion, which only withdrew the following night after suffering heavy casualties. Countless Italian soldiers died before the iron wall of the Lovćen fighters. The Drobnjak-Uskoci Battalion from the west and the Jezersko-Šaran Battalion from the east broke into the town, capturing the power station, church, new gymnasium, Grujić’s inn and part of Trebovina. They fought hard throughout the day and into the following night. In these battles, the commander and political commissar of the Jezersko-Šaran Battalion — Dušan Obradović and Vuk Knežević — died heroic deaths. The “Peko Pavlović” Kom Battalion and the Zeta-Lješanska Battalion captured the fortifications of Pliješ, Golubinja, Sveta Trojica, part of Dolovi, and advanced to the outskirts of the town, where they continued the fight. The Piperi-Kuči and “Bajo Pivljanin” battalions engaged in fierce battles along the communication lines, preventing the enemy from breaking through and threatening our main group engaged in the Battle for Pljevlja. The Sandžak units were deployed along the communication lines and among the Montenegrin battalions. As locals familiar with the terrain and the town, they provided significant assistance and demonstrated high combat readiness.
The enemy in the garrison had been crushed. Of the seven main fortifications, only three remained (Stražica, Dolovi and Moćevac), while the rest of the defensive structures had also been captured, apart from a number of houses in the town. From these remaining strongholds, the enemy defended itself with a fight to the death. The enemy bombarded our lines with intense fire — pre-sighted and coordinated — aided by the use of searchlights. This fire caused heavy casualties. After fierce fighting that lasted one full day and two nights, our units withdrew from the town, even though the majority of it had been in our hands and our fighters had danced the kolo in its streets. Just a bit more effort and the battle for the town could have ended in our favour.
The reasons for this outcome lie in the following:
The Montenegrin military leadership had, from the outset, tied the success of a large detachment — hastily formed and not yet solidified militarily — to one difficult operation: the storming of a town. Instead of leading the detachment into such a major battle gradually, through a series of smaller actions, we, relying on the bravery of our fighters — who truly displayed extraordinary heroism — placed that large unit before an extremely difficult task that it could not accomplish, despite persistent efforts. This once again confirms the principle that an army is not built overnight, but only through prolonged fighting and continuous action.
The detachment, after long and exhausting marches, had been thrown into a night attack on the town. And just when the final effort was needed, the strength was lacking, and we withdrew from the town spontaneously — not because the enemy forced us to through any external action.
Our young officer cadre was unable to manage the truly difficult and complex night battle, and so, in decisive moments, they failed to capitalize on the gains our units had already achieved. The result was an uneven commitment of the units, which the enemy exploited by meeting individual echelons with concentrated fire.
We lacked heavy weapons and sufficient ammunition to strike enemy fortifications. The little heavy ammunition we had was quickly spent, leaving us with grenades and bayonets, which were not enough to break through the reinforced concrete bunkers — though a significant number of enemy troops were taken down even with those. We had greatly underestimated the enemy, their weaponry and fortifications, so our fighters were caught off guard by the resistance. The enemy had been surrounded and had nowhere to retreat. But this was not simply a matter of defending a small town — it was the defence of a large operational area, with its headquarters in Pljevlja, which, during the battle, was in fact hidden in a cellar.
In this battle — and in the fighting around Pljevlja — we suffered 353 killed, 545 wounded and 35 missing, while the enemy had 1,150 killed, 1,870 wounded, 900 captured and a large amount of military equipment destroyed.
However, this tactical failure did not break us. We continued the battle for the Sandžak, though under more difficult conditions. After fierce fighting in December, units of our detachment captured Rudo, Čajniče, Goražde, Ustikolina, Foča, Šehovići and several other enemy strongholds. After all of this, they linked up along the Lim River with the Serbian partisan detachments that had been pushed into this sector following the First Enemy Offensive. On December 22, 1941, drawing from elements of the Serbian and Montenegrin units, the Supreme Command formed the 1st Proletarian Brigade in Rudo — the first-born of our glorious Army. Its 1st and 2nd battalions consisted of fighters from the Montenegrin detachment. This stood as the greatest honour and recognition ever granted to Montenegrin arms.
The struggle of the Montenegrin detachment should not be viewed solely through the tactical detail of the battle for the small town of Pljevlja — which, in my opinion, is glorious in and of itself — but rather through the operational idea that was achieved; through the series of battles for the Sandžak; through the position of that operational group in December 1941, when the Germans and collaborators had launched a fierce offensive to destroy the Serbian partisans, and; finally, through the arrival of the Supreme Command in this important operational area — at the tripoint. Looking at things from this perspective, we reach the following conclusions:
1. In these complex and difficult operations, at the beginning of our campaign, the great moral values of our fighters came to light. Political awareness and a sense of strength led them — nearly unarmed — into battle, far from home, to confront some of the best fascist troops and crush them decisively. These are the facts on which our military and political leadership based its future plans and decisions. On the other hand, the ability to resolve the difficult issues of supply, food and care for the wounded instilled trust in our leadership — and the fighters followed it with unmatched loyalty. Even today, three years later, we can rightfully say that the first battle of Montenegrin arms outside the borders of Montenegro was won.
2. Our presence in the Sandžak, where the uprising was still in its early stages, had a profoundly positive impact. We prevented the Chetnik-Ustaša massacres. The local masses, witnessing the justice of our struggle first-hand, were stirred. New fighters joined the ranks of the National Liberation Army. From that moment on, the Sandžak served as a bridge between our fighting forces in Serbia and those in the southern and southwestern parts of the country. Today, in this sector — which for centuries had been neglected — we have an entire division of the Army.
3. Although we did not liberate all the towns, we nonetheless succeeded in breaking the enemy’s defensive system in the Sandžak, taking control of important sections of territory, disrupting their command structure and transportation lines and forcing the enemy into the towns. The liberated territory expanded northward, which gave us freedom of movement and room to manoeuvre. In the area of the upper Drina, Neretva and Morača rivers, a strong territorial stronghold was secured.
4. The people of Montenegro, accustomed to our victories, were initially confused by the setback at Pljevlja, but that feeling lasted only a short time. Our losses and the failure stirred them deeply and ignited a renewed flame of vengeance. Less than 20 days after the battle, all the Montenegrin detachments were sending new battalions into the Sandžak.
During and especially after the Battle of Pljevlja, the role of the Montenegrin reactionary forces was revealed. The traitors saw that the entire population of Montenegro stood with the partisans so they tried to exploit our failure at Pljevlja. The Italians, feeling threatened in this region, supported the reactionaries with all their might. After our forces were pushed out of Serbia, Draža Mihailović’s agents began infiltrating Montenegro and the reactionary movement began to grow stronger. From that moment on, this became a new element in our war in Montenegro — one we had to take very seriously.
5. The battles of the Montenegrin detachment in the Sandžak took place during a time when the Serbian partisan forces were retreating under very heavy fighting from Užice across Zlatibor toward Uvac and Nova Varoš. The Montenegrin detachment engaged significant Italian forces, preventing them from reacting to the north and closing off the southern escape route of the Serbian group. This undoubtedly made it easier and faster for Serbian units to regroup and consolidate.
6. The course of events did not allow for the creation and unification of a Serbian-Montenegrin liberated territory. However, Serbian and Montenegrin forces did link up — and that came after a long and difficult period of fighting in Serbia, Montenegro and the Sandžak. What came together there had been tempered by harsh trials — it was the most conscious and most battle-hardened part of the Serbian people, ready to continue bearing the heavy burden of war across the entire country, fighting for the freedom of all our peoples. That was the core of the shock force which the Supreme Command used to give new momentum to the uprising in other parts of our country. This connection would not have been possible — or at least not established so quickly — had it not been for the Battle of Pljevlja and the fighting in the Sandžak.
7. With the arrival of the Supreme Command to this important operational area, the military-political situation was stabilized. This was reflected not only in the reorganization of our units, but also in the broader scope of our strategic planning and in a deeper understanding of partisan warfare. After the intense fighting of the first year of the war, this brought renewed momentum and striking power to our entire Army. Instead of large, disorganized units — which had been common in Montenegro — we adopted a system of light, mobile brigades. These brigades were better suited to move across the difficult terrain where we were mainly fighting at the time. This allowed operations to be transferred more quickly to distant sectors and made it easier to manoeuvre in front of a numerically superior enemy. From this stronghold, with this reorganized army, the command launched the manoeuvre of its forces toward Bosanska Krajina.
8. Montenegro took up arms with courage on July 13, 1941 and made a great contribution to this magnificent liberation war. Montenegrins selflessly gave their lives not only for the freedom of Montenegro but for the freedom of all of Yugoslavia. As Comrade Mitar Bakić rightly said at a Montenegrin assembly, responding to certain malicious interpretations: “Montenegro has never been greater than it is today — and has never entered a state union with greater justification than it does today.”
Glory to the fearless fighters who fell in the Battle for Pljevlja! In their example, future generations will learn what it means to love one’s homeland and fight for the freedom and honour of their people.
1944
Note
1 Colloquial Montenegrin term for Serbs.
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