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The Sixth Offensive concluded after a four-month-long campaign, at the end of January 1944, and ended in failure for the Germans. Not only did they fail to destroy our Army, but it emerged from the offensive even stronger — with three additional corps (the 9th, 10th and 11th) — and enriched with new combat experience gained while fighting an enemy armed to the teeth with modern military technology. Moreover, our Army retained control over a large territory and even expanded it after the offensive, securing a continuous area from the Prekosočje Hills to the Strumica River. Of particular note is the Serbian free territory in the Morava region.
Following the offensive, the German command did not gain freedom of action — instead, it found itself facing new difficulties. The main enemy bases in the rear were under threat. The few remaining communication routes still in use by the enemy were under heavy attack and had become virtually unusable. The occupying troops stationed along the Adriatic, cut off from their hinterland, found themselves in a difficult position. And more than that — the entire German military apparatus in southeastern Europe had become rigid, its freedom of movement paralysed, as our National Liberation Army was tightening the noose around the entire theatre along the Drava-Sava-Danube line.
The occupier saw our Army as an increasing threat. With the adoption of the historic AVNOJ decisions and the formation of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, a new wave of fighters began joining the National Liberation Army. Following the successful conclusion of the 1943-44 winter campaign — and with the arrival of spring — recruitment rapidly increased. Recognizing the true significance of our Army at last, the Allies began sending more military supplies, which made it possible to mobilize even more fighters. As the general situation evolved, our struggle began to inspire armed resistance among neighbouring peoples — particularly among the Bulgarians and Hungarians. Our Army provided broad support to Bulgarian and Hungarian anti-fascist units. In doing so, the Balkan front expanded, and the fire of war crept closer to the vital centres of Hitlerite Germany. The moment of joint Allied strikes against fascist Germany was also drawing near. Our Army, positioned as a link between the Allied Carpathian and Italian groupings, represented the greatest threat to the exposed southern flank of the German forces — a flank hanging in the air. All of this deeply alarmed the Germans, and therefore they launched the Seventh Offensive against the National Liberation Army. This offensive was a continuation of the sixth, following the regrouping and reinforcement of German troops and resources.
The Enemy’s Plan: Through the first six offensives, all German plans to destroy our fighting forces had failed. Thus, in this Seventh Offensive, they changed tactics — forming strong groups composed of motorized and mountain divisions. With these strike groups and garrison forces, supported by strong aviation, they launched attacks on specific sectors, aiming to gradually destroy our units and disrupt life in the affected areas. The flaws in this German tactic were clear: the shortage and weakness of the German forces, which led them to try to establish superiority in only selected sectors of our front. On the vast battlefield we controlled, the enemy’s strike groups were subjected to intense attacks, and even before the offensive concluded, they were losing their striking power. Our units retained full freedom to manoeuvre and strike at the enemy’s rear — especially targeting their staging bases and weakened sectors. The Germans conducted their operations according to rigid templates, well-known to our command, which meant that initiative and freedom of action remained in the hands of our forces. Our command always had enough time to gather intelligence and take countermeasures.
For the Seventh Offensive, the German High Command deployed the troops of the Balkan Armeegruppe F under Field Marshal von Weichs, a significant portion of the Italian group under General von Kesselring, and all Bulgarian and other satellite forces operating in Yugoslavia.
Plan of the Supreme Command: The strategy was not to group forces together, but rather to deploy them broadly and deeply across operational zones — to weaken the enemy and inflict as many losses as possible in manpower and equipment, and then transition into a general counteroffensive.
Conduct of Operations: The Seventh Offensive began in the first days of April and lasted until the end of June. It can be divided into three phases, although not strictly separated in time. The first phase involved the operational sectors: a) the Serbian-Macedonian sector, and; b) the Slovene-Istrian sector. The second phase included the operational sectors: a) Montenegro, the Sandžak, Herzegovina and Eastern Bosnia (for brevity, we’ll refer to this as the Drina-Neretva sector), and; b) Lika, Banija, Kordun, Zagorje, Slavonia and Srem (which we’ll call the Sava-Kupa sector). The third phase covered the operational sector of Central and Western Bosnia and Dalmatia (the Krajina-Dinaric sector), and began on May 25 with an airborne assault on the Supreme Headquarters in Drvar.
First Phase: The German command was deeply concerned by the growing strength of our forces and the development of operations in the Serbian-Macedonian and Slovene-Istrian operational zones. Our forces in these areas were threatening three active German fronts: the Carpathian, the Italian and the Greek. On the Yugoslav front itself, these flanking operational groups had isolated the occupying forces in the Adriatic and Sava Basin regions, restricting their ability to manoeuvre more broadly.
These flanking sectors were direct support bases for the liberation forces in neighbouring countries, where — under the influence of our struggle — liberation movements had begun to emerge. Lacking the strength to launch a simultaneous offensive across our entire front, the Germans first attacked these two flanking operational zones. Their primary objective was to cut off links and prevent any support from our forces to neighbouring liberation movements. They especially sought to sever the connection between our and Bulgarian units along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, where military cooperation had been established.
In the offensive on the Serbian–Macedonian operational area, over 190,000 enemy soldiers took part, with numerous artillery pieces, tanks and strong air support (including one German Alpine Division, a Schutzpolizei Division, the 3rd and 4th Brandenburg Motorized Regiments, the 20th Regiment of the 13th SS Division, elements of the SS “Skanderbeg” Division, the 1st and 2nd Bulgarian Cavalry Regiments, Bulgarian divisions: 7, 14, 15, 17, 22, 24, 27 and 122, Nedić’s “Serbian Volunteer Corps” and Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks). The staging bases for this offensive were: the Breganica River Valley, Kyustendil, the Timok Valley, Požarevac, the Great and Western Morava, the Ibar River, the Lepenac River, Skopje and the Crna Reka — with the enemy’s troops advancing in a concentric movement, aiming to drive our units toward the South Morava and destroy them there.
Scattered battles broke out across a wide area. A portion of the Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohija), Macedonian and Bulgarian forces was forced to retreat toward the South Morava and Vlasina sector, where the enemy was tightening the encirclement. Our forces found themselves in a difficult situation. Guided by the developments in this area, as well as in the Drina-Zeta operational zone — where the enemy had already begun its offensive — the Supreme Command took the following measures:
1. The existing Serbian forces in this sector — detachments and brigades — were to be formed into solid military units: divisions. From these divisions, as well as the Kosovo-Metohija, Macedonian and Bulgarian forces (the “Vasil Levski” and “Hristo Botev” brigades), a strong strike group was to be formed to break the enemy’s encirclement and transition into a counteroffensive.
2. A strike group from the Sandžak (the 2nd and 5th Divisions) was to be sent across the Morava into Western Serbia and Šumadija, driving a wedge between these two enemy groups, threatening their vulnerable points and staging bases, and drawing off some of the forces that were heavily pressuring the neighbouring operational zones.
Two months of fighting broke out across the entire Serbian-Macedonian operational area. The renowned 2nd Serbian and 5th Krajina Divisions set off from the Sandžak, crossed the Lim River in the Rudo-Prijepolje sector, and crushed Nedić’s 5th Regiment, the 3rd Motorized Brandenburg Regiment and Draža’s so-called “Zlatibor Corps.” On the Ibar, in Studenica and Dragačevo, they defeated the 24th Bulgarian Division, Nedić’s 2nd, 3rd and 4th Regiments, and Draža’s so-called Javor, Ravna Gora and Požega Corps. After that, this group skilfully shifted direction, crossed the Western Morava in the Čačak-Užice sector, and via Suvobor, Povlen and Maljen, appeared near Valjevo. This swift advance by our forces surprised the Germans and struck at the heart of the traitors Nedić and Mihailović, who cried out in alarm: “Serbs to the rescue!” The occupier was forced to redeploy forces from both the Serbian and Drina-Zeta operational zones against this group (the 4th Brandenburg Regiment, the 22nd and 24th Bulgarian Divisions, elements of the Schutzpolizei Division, the remnants of Nedić’s Volunteer Corps, the Russian Volunteer Corps and Draža’s so-called Pocerska, Valjevska, 1st and 2nd Ravna Gora, Požega Corps and the Mountain Guard). Fierce battles began on Povlen, Maljen and Suvobor — the same ground where, in 1914, the famous Battle of Kolubara was fought, where the Serbian Army achieved one of its most glorious victories against the German invaders. And once again, on this historic battlefield (for the second time — the first being in autumn 1941), our units defeated the occupiers and Serbian Brankovićs — Nedić and Mihailović. While these battles were being fought in Western Serbia, our Morava Operational Group (and later the Drina-Zeta Group — the 3rd and 2nd Corps) launched an offensive.
Macedonian units began an offensive from the Vranje-Kumanovo-Skopje sector and captured Kriva Feja and Kratovo, where they crushed the Bulgarian occupiers and then pushed toward the Central and Lower Vardar. After fierce battles in the Trn sector, Bulgarian partisan units advanced toward Kyustendil and Sofia. The 23rd Serbian Division captured Babušnica, then turned northward, routed the German mercenary forces on Ozren, and continued operations toward the Lower Timok. The Serbian 21st, 22nd, 24th and 25th Divisions, along with Kosovo-Metohija units, defeated the enemy in the Skopska Crna Gora, Jablanica and Toplica sectors, cleared the Kopaonik area and extended operations into Kosovo and Metohija and the Western and Great Morava River basins.
Conclusion:
1. In this offensive at the tri-border area of Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria, coordination and blood-forged combat unity were achieved between the Serbian, Macedonian and Bulgarian peoples. This is a major contribution to the continued success of the liberation struggle in the Balkans.
2. With the formation of five Serbian divisions, the growth of numerous partisan detachments, and the ever-increasing influx of new fighters, the struggle once again spread and flared up across the sacred and unyielding soil of Serbia — the land where our forces launched the first battles against fascist tyranny, where the first shock brigades were formed, which sowed every inch of Yugoslav soil with the lives of their fighters and soaked it in their blood in the pursuit of freedom, unity and brotherhood for our peoples, and for the hope of a better future for generations to come.
The expansion of fighting in Serbia will greatly ease operations for our units in other sectors of the Yugoslav front and will provide the Supreme Headquarters with broader tactical and strategic options.
3. The traitorous bands of Nedić, Ljotić and Draža Mihailović — created by German generals and Gestapo agents through crimes, bloodshed and the suffering of the Serbian people — have been defeated and no longer represent any military force. Only the pitiful remnants of these butchers and murderers still hide within German formations. The Serbian people welcomed their divisions with joy, offered them every kind of support and responded with the mobilization of new forces for the National Liberation Army. Neither bloody terror, nor suffering, nor hardship could extinguish the spirit of freedom and the centuries-old traditions of the Serbian people.
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The Slovene–Istrian operational area is of primary importance. It serves as a barrier dividing the Balkan and Italian fronts. From this area — specifically from Trieste and Rijeka — the shortest and most vulnerable operational route for the enemy leads toward Vienna. Due to its strategic value, this sector has been constantly subjected to attacks by large enemy forces. This time, the offensive involved troops from the Italian group under General Kesselring (the 178th Mountain Rifle Division, the 188th and 236th Grenadier Divisions, the 287th and 256th Infantry Divisions, parts of the 171st Division, the 13th and 14th Divisions, and all the White Guard bands under General Rupnik). Fighting broke out across the entire sector — from the Soča to the Sutla rivers, and from the Drava to the Kupa. The enemy suffered heavy losses, including a catastrophe at the hands of the 7th Corps near Žužemberk and Trebnje, and in the Savinja Valley by units of the Styrian Operational Zone. Our forces held their strongholds firmly, secured connections with the partisan forces of northern Italy, and extended support to small groups of Austrian patriots across the Drava.
Second Phase: A) The units of the Drina-Zeta operational area severed the enemy’s links with Albania and Serbia, and threatened the communication network in the Neretva, Bosna and Sava river valleys. This area served as a springboard for our forces to enter Serbia — a region of primary strategic and political importance to the enemy due to its central geographical position in the Balkans. Fearing a breakthrough, Hitler aimed to preserve the crumbling regimes of his vassals: Nedić, Ljotić and Mihailović. Moreover, he even sought to strengthen their position by annexing Montenegro to “Nedić’s Serbia.” As in the Sixth Offensive, this area was once again exposed to fierce enemy attacks.
Strong enemy forces launched an offensive in Eastern Bosnia, encircling it from all directions (the 100th German Infantry Division, the 13th SS Division, parts of the “Prinz Eugen” Division, elements of the 1st Russian Volunteer Corps, Nedić’s groups, two Ustaša and three Mountain Brigades, Ustaša militia, and Draža Mihailović’s so-called Sarajevo and Majevica Chetnik Corps). In prolonged fighting, our forces achieved victories at Glasinac, near Vlasenica, Kladanj, and along the Krivaja River, until finally, the heroic 16th Vojvodina Division defeated the 13th SS Division in the Majevica sector, capturing significant war trophies. Thus, the Germans failed to clear Eastern Bosnia or to establish the strong Sava bridgehead at Majevica-Semberija for which they had fought so hard.
The 2nd Corps came under attack from significantly superior enemy forces advancing from Vrmoša, Peć, Rožaje, Pljevlja, and from the Neretva and Zeta valleys (German: 181st Division, 169th Division, 3rd and 4th Brandenburg Motorized Regiments, parts of the 369th Division; Nedić’s 5th Regiment, 5th Schutzpolizei Regiment, the Muslim militia from Pešter and the Chetnik bands of Draža Mihailović). The 2nd Corps Headquarters made a sound military decision. Faced with overwhelming enemy numbers, it could not defend the entire liberated territory with a thinly stretched and dispersed formation. Therefore, small reconnaissance and covering units were left in front of the enemy, while the main force was concentrated in the Mojkovac-Kolašin-Mateševo-Trešnjevik area, positioned for action along internal operational routes. The most dangerous group was the one advancing from Prijepolje and Pljevlja. Peko Dapčević struck this group with all available forces and crushed it entirely at historic Mojkovac. In 1915, it was at Mojkovac that the Montenegrin Army secured the retreat of the brotherly Serbian Army. Now, at Mojkovac, the Montenegrins prevented the annexation of Montenegro to the so-called “Nedić’s Serbia,” refusing entry to the betrayers and outcasts of Serbia into the free Montenegrin land. Other enemy groups were then gradually defeated at Trešnjevik, Veternik, Kuči and near Nikšić, after which the previously held territory was liberated once again. During this time, our 29th Division achieved several brilliant victories near Trebinje, Bileća, Gacko and Nevesinje. As previously mentioned, the strike group led by Colonel Morača (2nd and 5th Divisions), which had earlier been transferred into the enemy’s rear toward Valjevo, significantly supported and eased the operations of the 3rd Corps, and especially the 2nd Corps.
Conclusion:
1. The plan to unite Serbian and Montenegrin collaborationist forces was prevented — and those forces were successively defeated.
2. The Drina-Zeta operational area firmly remained in our hands, serving as an important central geographic and strategic pivot, from which our command maintained freedom of action in all directions. This pivot has gained even greater significance now that it is connected, via the Ibar and Kopaonik, with the Serbian free territory.
B) The units of the Sava–Kupa operational zone cut off all enemy connections from the northern Croatian Littoral and Bosnia leading toward Zagreb, while the Belgrade-Zagreb communication network was subjected to heavy strikes. The connection across the Drava River with occupied Hungary was extremely weak. Our strongholds — Gorski Kotar, Žumberak and Zagorje — disrupted the link between the German groupings of von Weichs and Kesselring.
Across this entire area, the Germans simultaneously launched an offensive (the 392nd Division, 373rd Division, 42nd Mountain Division, 5th Motorized Division, 173rd Reserve Division, 230th Division, 96th Mountain Division, 1st Cossack Division, 1st Mountain Reserve Regiment, 28th SS Regiment, 121st Mountain Regiment, 607th Garrison Regiment, and all of Pavelić’s Ustaša and Domobran units). At first, the enemy managed to seize control of all communication routes in Lika, while in Banija and Kordun, Žumberak, Zagorje, Bilo Gora and Pruska Gora, they suffered a clear defeat. In the second half of June, our units captured Krbavsko and Bijelo Polje in Lika. In this way, all strongholds remained in our hands. The enemy failed to dislodge us from any sector of this area.
Third Phase. Thus, the enemy suffered defeat in all four operational areas, while the central and geographically rugged Krajina-Dinaric operational area remained firmly in the hands of our Army. All mountain passes along the Dinaric ridge and all routes leading inland from the coast were under our control. The units in this region served as a dagger in the back of the large German forces deployed along the Adriatic coast.
To salvage some success from this completely failed offensive, Hitler devised a gangster-style attack on the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia — aiming to strike at the heart of the movement by capturing or killing its leadership. With this, Hitler hoped to achieve the following:
1. By destroying the unified military and political leadership of the National Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia, Hitler aimed to erase in one stroke all the achievements of that magnificent struggle. He needed this to maintain morale within his army, which had been declining due to the heavy losses in Yugoslavia, as well as to preserve political prestige abroad and among his increasingly shaken satellites. After all, what kind of power was Hitler’s — the one that had conquered so many European nations — if he could not, even after three years, defeat the so-called “bands” in Yugoslavia?
2. To create chaos and panic within our command structure, and in doing so, eliminate — on the eve of the opening of the Second Front in Europe — a dangerous army in the Balkans, one that for three years had been shaking the walls of “Fortress Europe.”
3. To undermine our reputation and present us abroad and to the Allies as an unserious leadership.
Because of this, Hitler sent high-ranking military figures to Knin to oversee the operation personally — an operation in which he placed great hope. Taking part in this offensive were units from the “Der Fuhrer” airborne group, the 11th Airborne Division, all the units of the 15th and 5th SS Alpine Corps, reinforced with the 92nd Motorized Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Brandenburg Motorized Regiments, an armoured battalion from the 2nd Panzer Army, and all Ustaša, Domobran and Chetnik bands in the area. The plan was to destroy the leadership of the National Liberation Army through an airborne assault, and then — using a dense encirclement — trap and eliminate the disorganized units in the Krajina-Dinaric sector. The staging bases for the offensive were: Mostar-Sarajevo-Banja Luka-Bihać-Srb-Knin-Imotski, from which concentric troop movements toward the Srnetica Mountain were to be launched.
The offensive began on May 25 at 5 a.m. with a heavy bombing of Drvar and an airborne assault. Simultaneously, motorized and mechanized columns launched attacks from all the previously mentioned garrisons. The most characteristic feature of this entire operation was the airborne landing in Drvar. The Germans had used various permitted and prohibited methods of warfare against us — including even chemical weapons — although they had not yet used them against the other Allies. But this was the first time an airborne assault was used against our forces. During this war, Hitler had previously carried out airborne assaults — seizing Holland, Belgium and Crete with their help. However, this airborne assault was unlike any of those. According to prisoners’ statements, the paratrooper units were made up of disgraced officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers from Hitler’s Army. This military criminal scum, whose unit bore the name “Der Fuhrer,” was given the opportunity to redeem itself through this operation. These executioners were to atone for their bloodlust with even more bloodshed — having received direct orders from Hitler himself to kill everything and everyone they encountered. The objective was to destabilize our operations by striking at their core. To aid in the assault, each German soldier was issued photographs of figures marked for capture. Draža Mihailović’s Chetniks had “perfected their warcraft” to such a degree that even in this special operation, some took part — a few were tasked with guiding the Germans to the suspected location of the command post (the journalist Pribićević reported seeing one such Chetnik, and our fighters killed three of them). Another defining feature of this operation was the massive use of aviation. Officers from the Allied military missions told us that in two and a half years of war on their own front, they had never seen aviation used so intensively, both in number of aircraft and frequency of flights. However, aviation did not accompany the full course of operations in this sector and had no significant impact on the pace of the offensive’s conclusion. Its role was to assist in the destruction of the Supreme Headquarters, to cut off communication and to disorganize the rear. Considering that not a single German plane could be seen on the front lines during the Allied offensive in Italy, this operation clearly demonstrates just how much importance Hitler placed on it.
We had no combat unit stationed in Drvar. We knew the enemy was preparing an offensive on this sector, so we had deployed all our troops to the front. This was a regular occurrence in our style of warfare. Every individual — fighter and commander alike — had to be ready at any moment to engage in battle. In other words, we always had to be prepared to find a way out of any situation and turn it to our advantage. This time, victory was achieved thanks to the deep love for our Supreme Commander, the combat experience and courage of our fighters, and the initiative of our command staff. As paratroopers and gliders began landing in Drvar, the accompanying battalion and the officer school of the Supreme Headquarters immediately joined the fight. The staff of the 6th Division withdrew the 3rd Lika Brigade from the Lapac front and rushed with it to Drvar. The 8th Corps sent a Dalmatian battalion from Tičevo. Three quarters of the enemy paratroopers were destroyed. After two days of fighting, German motorized units entered Drvar. Without this support, the remainder of the German airborne force would have been completely wiped out.
Fierce fighting then continued across the entire Krajina-Dinaric sector. All of the enemy’s attempts to encircle our units and trap them in a ring failed. Once again, it was proven that our infantry brigades were faster than German motorization. We always managed to strike the enemy first — then reposition ourselves to a more favourable position for delivering the next blow. After intense battles at Tičevo, Jadovnik, Trubar, Ripac, Ribnik, Sitnica and Mlinište, the entire territory was liberated — except for Drvar and Petrovac.
General Conclusion:
1. The Germans failed to destroy our military and political leadership. Thus, their attempt turned into a major military and political defeat for Hitler. We were the first to successfully repel Hitler in an airborne operation. This, on one hand, speaks to the weakness of the Hitlerite “machine” — all the more so since this operation also concerned prestige — and on the other hand, to the strength and striking power of our Army. Due to the failure and heavy losses in this offensive, Hitler was forced to resort to the lie that he had captured our leadership. This clearly reflects the increasingly shaky state of his position.
2. While fighting our Army, Hitler claimed he was fighting against bandits. And even though he had already carried out six major offensives against us — which went far beyond ordinary “skirmishes” and “cleansing operations” — it was in this Seventh Offensive that he most contradicted himself. He used every tool of modern warfare: tanks, aviation, airborne assaults, deployed large forces and personally concerned himself with the outcome of the operation, entrusting it to the most capable military “minds.” Yet even so, his Seventh Offensive collapsed in the face of our resistance. After this offensive ended, his position only continued to deteriorate.
3. Hitler and his command once again contradicted themselves on another front. They studied the tactics and strategy of our Army so thoroughly that they had already changed their approach to fighting us four times: First: the method of encirclement — the system of “pockets,” “cauldrons” and “Cannae” strategies aimed at the destruction of our entire Army; Second: the encirclement of individual operational sectors; Third: offensive operations by strike groups, based on fortified positions and strongholds, carried out across all areas to sever connections, destroy our bases, break up our forces, conduct reconnaissance, etc., and; Fourth: the formation of powerful operational groups from motorized and mountain divisions, which, with support from garrison troops, transferred operations from one area to another. The German command was constantly searching for methods and means to destroy us — in other words, to remove from the battlefield a dangerous, active fighting force. This, in itself, clearly shows how our military strength continuously grew — that we had our own way of waging war, our own tactics and strategy that surpassed the enemy’s. It also proves that the leadership of our Army consistently anticipated enemy methods and intentions in time, always found appropriate countermeasures, and successfully led our forces through all these major battles.
4. While the German front in Italy was collapsing and the Allies were beginning landings in the West, Hitler was forced, during this Seventh Offensive against the so-called “bandits” in Yugoslavia, to deploy no fewer than 18 German operational divisions, 9 Bulgarian divisions and all the satellite forces. In doing so, he suffered the following losses: around 20,500 killed; 6,500 captured, and; 16,000 wounded. Captured war materiel included: 96 cannons; 19 tanks; 3 aircraft; 80 trucks; 110 motorcycles; 500 automatic weapons; 16,000 rifles; over 60 wagon loads of various ammunition; over 100 wagon loads of food; large quantities of medical supplies and communications equipment; 800 horses, and; 15 watercraft. Destroyed enemy materiel included: 175 cannons; 230 mortars; 108 tanks; 37 aircraft; 1,400 trucks; over 900 automatic weapons; 94 locomotives; 700 railcars; 96 watercraft, and; large amounts of ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies. The growth of our Army, the broadening of the front, weapons received from the Allies, favourable spring weather and the enemy’s move out of fortifications into open terrain — all these factors contributed to the powerful blow we dealt the enemy. And that is not all. The German divisions, when decimated and forced to withdraw from the land of a poorly armed people fighting for freedom, emerge demoralized and incapable of offering strong resistance. All of this speaks volumes about the strength of our Army, its importance within Allied strategy and its role in the further development of military events in Europe.
5. Hitler had promised his frightened vassals in Yugoslavia that he would deal with us, and that by doing so, their position would be secured. He had already begun a new division of the Yugoslav lands. But together with them, he suffered defeat. With this, all hopes and illusions of those traitors were shattered. Their ranks are falling apart, while the striking power of our Army continues to grow. So, on this front as well, Hitler suffered a defeat — and his position only worsened.
6. After this offensive, the international reputation of our struggle rose even higher, and the true strength of our Army was recognized. The entire global public followed the development of the Seventh Offensive with great interest, in which large German forces participated, equipped with all modern military technology. This offensive further strengthened our ties with the Allies. Never before had the Allies provided us with such abundant support as during this period. Our units at the front lines received medical supplies, ammunition and food. Allied aviation directly supported our operations, strafing enemy columns and bombing enemy bases and strongholds. On this front as well, Hitler suffered a complete failure.
7. Through these difficult battles, our Army was reinforced with five new divisions in the important Serbian operational area, and the ranks of other units were significantly replenished with new fighters. In the face of the German offensive, everyone capable took up arms and joined our units. This proves that after this offensive, we became stronger and further consolidated our military and political front from within. On this front too, Hitler suffered defeat.
8. For a full three years, the fighting here has raged with full intensity, without pause or rest. These battles, at their most intense moments — when enemy forces and resources were most concentrated against us — took on the character of major offensives, even if they did not all begin as such. Therefore, there will be no pause after this Seventh Offensive — nor can there be. Yugoslavia is an active front — one that connects with the Allied Carpathian and Italian groupings, a front positioned along the Balkan-Pannonian corridor, a route of critical sensitivity for Hitler, both militarily and politically. Strengthening our front by shifting operations from Italy to its upper section (Trieste-Gorizia-Jesenice), or possibly through an Allied landing on our soil, would place Germany in a critical situation. It is because of the great military and political significance of this theatre of war that the ongoing three years of combat and so many major offensives against our National Liberation Army can be understood. After the Seventh Offensive, our Army seized the initiative, and Hitler has been forced once again to bring in fresh reinforcements, including from Greece. Thus, the fighting on our front is becoming ever more intense and is entering its decisive phase.
9. Finally, our Army, having drawn upon the inexhaustible strength of our peoples, who have triumphed in this great war of liberation, is ready to honourably carry out its mission of liberation, to secure for its people the gains of this hard and bloody struggle, and to participate alongside the Allied armies in the liberation of humanity from fascist tyranny.
July 1944
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