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The Sixth Offensive against the National Liberation Army began in mid-October 1943 — less than four months after the end of the Fifth Offensive, when the enemy’s attempt to encircle and destroy our strike group at the tri-border area of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia had failed. In this short span of time, major events unfolded, in which our Army played the leading role. We must summarize these events in order to better understand the Sixth Offensive.
In two years of fierce battles — without any outside help and using weapons seized from the enemy — our Army killed 100,000 Italian fascists. These blows, combined with the strikes of the Allies, led fascist Italy to surrender in August 1943. At that point, the Germans rushed in from all directions with motorized divisions to occupy the territory and disarm the Italian Army. After intense fighting, our infantry stopped them, and the National Liberation Army liberated nearly the entire territory from Gevgelija to the Soča River — a length of over 700 km and a depth of up to 400 km. The Slovene Littoral, Istria and the Dalmatian islands — unjustly cut off from our living organism — were free. We became the guardians of the Adriatic, where our naval forces raised the blood-woven flag of freedom. Through glorious and heroic struggle, the National Liberation Army paved the way to the major Allied powers.
With the liberation of new areas, a surge of new fighters poured into the ranks of our Army. The uprising spread to regions where it had previously only smouldered. Veteran units, hardened through battle, were replenished, and new brigades, divisions and corps began to form. The entire country was mobilizing new forces to fight against the hated fascism. Italian weapons and equipment fell into the hands of seasoned warriors who knew how to use them effectively. The Allies began supplying us with weapons and military material along the coast. Artillery divisions, tank battalions and motor columns raced toward the front lines. The Supreme Commander received the first liaison officers who had flown in from the front by plane.
Thus reinforced and armed, the entire Army launched powerful offensive operations. All communication lines running from the Drava and Sava river basins to Italy and the Adriatic were cut, while the Morava-Vardar routes were subjected to heavy attacks, effectively severing links with Albania and Greece, where the liberation movement — protected from the north by our forces — was establishing a strong foothold. Crosswise communication routes along the Sava, Drava and Danube were also under threat, weakening connections with the eastern Balkans — Romania and Bulgaria — and making them thin and risky. In this situation, the Germans were unable to stabilize the Italian front or prevent the Allies from arming our Army across the Adriatic, fearing most of all a strike from our forces at their rear. In short, the entire German military structure in southeastern Europe had become rigid. The ability of German forces to manoeuvre in this theatre was severely limited. With the looming threat of a second front opening in Europe, Turkey’s wavering stance, and growing fear in Bulgaria and Romania, the German position in the Balkans became even more precarious.
The position of the Axis satellites in Yugoslavia was desperate. The “Royal Army in the Homeland,” created by Italian generals through bloody terror, suffering and repression of our people, had been crushed. When our troops entered the Western Morava basin, Nedić loudly cried, “Serbs to the rescue!” And when our units entered the outskirts of Zagreb, Pavelić’s lieutenants began applying for passports to Switzerland. In other words, the satellite regimes were on the verge of collapse, which threatened the strongest occupation strongholds and bases in Yugoslavia.
Let us go further. The right wing of our Army crossed the Vardar and extended assistance to the fraternal Bulgarian people. There, units began to form to fight against the fascist yoke. Our units from Vojvodina pushed into Romania, while those from the Drava Valley advanced into Hungary and Austria. Meanwhile, across the Soča, a wide corridor was established to connect with the partisan forces of Northern Italy. Thus, our National Liberation Army gave momentum and support to the rise and spread of popular uprisings across the Balkans and in neighbouring countries. It became a magnetic force and a strong link for uniting all oppressed peoples in the struggle against fascism. In other words, the southern flank of Hitler’s Reich was dangerously exposed. The fire was approaching the vital centres of Hitlerite Germany.
In conclusion: positioned along the major transport arteries of the Balkans, our Army was tying the hands of the German command, preventing it from manoeuvring its troops. With its presence on the Adriatic, it formed a solid right flank for the Allied armies, blocking the creation of German air bases for operations against the Allies on the Italian front. There was a growing threat that Yugoslavia could become a hotbed for the spread of a nationwide uprising in neighbouring countries. In other words, our Army posed a threat of striking at the southern, exposed flank of the German Army. Despite the advance of the Red Army from the east and the Anglo-Americans from the south, the German command assessed our Army as the most dangerous factor at that moment — a force that had been shaking the foundations of “Fortress Europe” for three years. The Germans attempted to resolve the situation with swift raids along certain directions, but these tricks failed. This is why they launched the sixth — and likely the last major — offensive against the National Liberation Army.
The enemy’s plan: Unlike the first five offensives, in the sixth the enemy did not attempt to destroy our Army using an “encirclement strategy.” The Germans knew that our Army could not be encircled even when the free territory was a small, isolated island and the forces significantly smaller. Now, the Germans faced a large and well-armed army with substantial combat experience, and the free territory covered nearly three-quarters of Yugoslavia. Though rigid and formulaic, they understood that such an Army could not be trapped in a “pocket,” so they devised the following plan:
To weaken the striking power of the National Liberation Army: To this end, the enemy aimed to use strong armoured and motorized units to rapidly break through and seize key communication lines, destroy the bases of the National Liberation Army, and split its forces into isolated groups, which would then be driven into the mountains and gradually crushed. The Germans, in short, sought to prevent manoeuvring by our forces through rapid occupation of communication routes — pushing them into mountainous areas where, cut off from supplies and exposed to attacks from aviation and specialized mountain units, they would lose their offensive strength. In addition, through these swift advances, the Germans intended to sever our Army from the coastal bases through which the Allies supplied us with materiel. Recognizing their military shortcomings, the Germans incorporated into their operational plan the looting of all essential resources and the burning of all villages within the area of operations. In this way, they sought to place our Army in an untenable economic position.
Plan of the Supreme Command: Two plans were considered:
a) To use major natural obstacles, accept a frontal battle, and prevent or delay for as long as possible the enemy’s advance across liberated territory. This plan could only be accepted as part of the broader development of Allied strategy — to secure landing operations along the coast or, more generally, to gain time for other manoeuvres. However, such a situation did not exist. Moreover, this plan required the engagement of strong — nearly all — forces along a defensive arc of varying size near the coast. That would have led to heavy frontal fighting, demanding high ammunition consumption, constant food supplies, evacuation of the wounded and so on. In the event of a front-line breakthrough, the enemy could quickly penetrate with motorized units and disorganize the rear, leaving our slower forces exposed on the defensive line. For these reasons, the Supreme Command implemented a second, more flexible plan.
b) By combining the actions of widely and deeply distributed autonomous operational groups, the aim was to deliver constant strikes against the enemy along extended lines of operation, creating conditions for a counteroffensive. In this way, the plan would disrupt the enemy’s intent for rapid penetration and avoid the blows of the enemy’s superior technical weapons. Small frontal screens, using natural obstacles and sabotaged infrastructure, were meant only to create the conditions for the deployment of manoeuvrable forces against the enemy’s flanks, sides and rear. In short, the plan carried an offensive character with the intent to seize the initiative from the enemy at the right moment.
This plan avoided the concentration of large forces in specific sectors — something dangerous when the enemy possessed faster and technically superior resources. Certain sectors of free territory served as strongholds, some even fortified. A solid connection was established between various operational zones — even across large rivers, which had been a serious challenge in earlier operations. This significantly improved manoeuvring conditions for our forces. Troops from one sector could intervene in support of neighbouring units by attacking enemy bases in the rear. By pushing successive battles deeper into the territory, the enemy lost time and became increasingly exhausted.
Implementation of the Plans: In the Sixth Offensive, the troops of the 2nd German Armoured Army — part of Field Marshal von Weichs’ Balkan group — took part, along with elements of the Italian group under General Kesselring. Around 25 German divisions participated, not counting the satellite forces of Rupnik, Pavelić, Nedić and Mihailović, who were the usual accomplices in such operations.
At the beginning of the offensive, the Germans first aimed to destroy our flanking groups in Slovenia and Macedonia. The Slovenian operational group was tightening the throat of the Italian front along the line: Tarvisio-Jesenice-Vrhnika. The Germans pulled three divisions from the Italian front (the 71st, 199th and the armoured “Hermann Goring” division) and launched them against the 9th Corps, which was holding the Soča and Vipava area. After stubborn fighting, the 9th Corps, by mid-November, left weaker units on the coastal front and moved across the Dolomites and Upper Carniola toward the communication lines in the Ljubljanica and Sava valleys — in the Vrhnika-Ljubljana-Jesenice sector. In doing so, it secured the northern flank of the 7th Corps, which had begun fighting this offensive group in early November in the Vrhnika-Rakek-Rijeka sector. In these battles, the Germans failed to achieve quick successes, so they deployed two additional divisions (the 367th and 162nd) along the directions: Zagreb-Novo Mesto and Ljubljana-Kočevje. Meanwhile, the “Hermann Goring” armoured division advanced to Rijeka, reached the Upper Kupa area and enveloped the 7th Corps forces from the south. With this manoeuvre, the 7th Corps was pushed off the communication lines, and fighting spread into the mountainous areas, lasting for more than a month. During that time, the 9th Corps returned to the communication lines in the Soča and Vipava valleys, liberating a significant portion of the Littoral. Units of the 11th Corps from Gorski Kotar and the 4th Corps from Žumberak moved into Inner and Lower Carniola. This allowed the 7th Corps an easier transition into a counteroffensive, during which almost the entire Ljubljana province was liberated and the remaining German garrisons in Kočevje and Novo Mesto were encircled. At the end of this operation, the Corps executed a manoeuvre, sending part of its forces across the Sava into the enemy’s rear — into Styria.
The Macedonian operational group, by October, had liberated a substantial area between the Vardar, Crna Reka and Drim rivers, establishing contact across the Drim with the Albanian partisans. Against this group, the Germans launched an offensive from Albania and Greece (the 100th Infantry Division and the 1st Alpine Division). After battles along the Drim, around Gostivar and Brod, the group moved toward the communication lines in the Vardar Valley, destroyed them and avoided encirclement.
The battles of the Slovenian and Macedonian operational groups were of great importance. Not only did these groups withstand the enemy’s initial surprise attacks, but they also inflicted heavy losses in both personnel and equipment. Offering resilient resistance, they held the enemy back for more than a month and a half, allowing the forces in other sectors to prepare and receive the enemy according to the previously developed plan. As the offensive progressed, these operational groups continued to engage alongside the rest of the forces.
By the end of November, the offensive had shifted to the operational areas of Lika, Banija and Kordun on one side, and the Sandžak and Eastern Bosnia on the other. In these regions — which posed a threat to the German-collaborationist bases in Zagreb and Belgrade — the enemy concentrated strong forces.
The enemy intended to cut off Lika, Banija and Kordun from Bosanska Krajina, and launched a two-pronged attack: from the Kupa Valley — Sušak (using the 371st, 392nd, 199th and 1st Cavalry Divisions) and from the Una Valley — Knin (with the 373rd and 144th Infantry Divisions). Fierce battles ensued with the units of the 4th and 11th Corps, lasting over two months. The 4th Corps was pushed back from the Una all the way to the Slunj-Kladuša-Dragotinja line. It then launched a counteroffensive, crushing the 1st Cossack and 371st Divisions, reaching the Kupa River and liberating the heavily fortified Garrison of Glina in the process. It then returned to the Una front, where its covering detachments had been holding back the enemy, and drove the 373rd Division back to its initial garrisons on the Una. The 373rd Division was unable to carry out a strong offensive in Banija, in part because the 5th Corps had threatened its bases in the Una Valley — from which it could not afford to stray. During this time, the 9th Corps, surrounded from three sides — Sušak, Ogulin and Gospić — engaged in combat in Gorski Kotar, Lika and the Littoral. Despite heavy losses, the Germans managed to break through from Ogulin and Gospić toward Senj, but were able to hold only the communication lines. During these battles, the 18th Division of the 7th Corps struck the enemy’s rear in Gorski Kotar, while the 19th Division of the 8th Corps continually threatened the Knin-Gospić communication route, where the 114th German Infantry Division operated. The actions of these units significantly eased the pressure on the 9th Corps.
While the fighting was ongoing in the Krka, Kupa and Una areas, the 10th Zagreb Corps launched a strong offensive in Zagorje and against the Sava communication network, providing significant support to our forces operating south of the Sava.
The Sandžak and Eastern Bosnia were encircled by the enemy from the Drina and Ibar valleys (the 1st Alpine Division with the 92nd Motorized Grenadier Regiment and the 181st Division), the Sava Valley (the 187th and 1st Volunteer Divisions), the Bosna Valley (the 5th Motorized and 369th Divisions) and the Sarajevo-Foča sector (the “Prinz Eugen” Division). The forces of the 2nd Corps held the enemy east of the Lim River for a long time. However, in a sudden raid, the Germans managed to capture an undamaged bridge over the swollen Lim in Prijepolje, allowing them to advance rapidly — one column via Pljevlja toward Goražde, the other via Priboj toward Višegrad. At that point, the 5th Division assumed a reconnaissance and covering role, retreating along the Višegrad-Rogatica-Olovo route while offering fierce resistance along the Lim and Drina rivers. Taking advantage of this, the 2nd Corps launched a counteroffensive from its flanking positions. The northern wing of the Corps cleared the Lim Valley all the way to Prijepolje and captured Nova Varoš and Ivanjica; the southern wing pushed offensively toward the Morava Valley and the Montenegrin coast. The 29th Division liberated Ljubinje and Lastva and fought fierce battles in Herzegovina that significantly contributed to the broader struggle in Bosnia. During the fighting in the Sandžak, the South Morava Operational Group, linked with forces from Metohija, Kosovo and Macedonia, launched heavy strikes on the Morava-Vardar railway, repelled the Bulgarian offensive and crushed the Chetnik bands of Draža Mihailović that had been collaborating with the Bulgarian troops.
In December, operations shifted to Eastern Bosnia, where the enemy had concentrated its forces most densely. The fighting lasted more than a month and a half. Units of the 3rd Corps, the 5th and 16th Divisions, and the 1st South Morava Brigade inflicted massive losses on the enemy. The battles at Han Pijesak, Ozren, Zvijezda and the Krivaja Valley can be compared to the heroic feats of the Fourth and Fifth Offensives. All units in the sector then launched a counteroffensive. In harsh winter conditions, the 5th Division carried out a brilliant manoeuvre across Zvijezda and Konjuh, broke through the enemy encirclement at Glasinac, destroyed the Pale-Višegrad supply line, and liberated Goražde, Foča and Kalinovik. The 3rd Corps units, the 16th Division and the 1st South Morava Brigade routed the enemy on Ozren, Konjuh, Zvijezda, Trebava and Majevica, and liberated Posavina, Semberija and Birač — essentially regaining all territory held before the offensive.
While battles were still ongoing in other sectors, the Germans began preparing an offensive against Bosanska Krajina and Central Bosnia, aiming to encircle these areas from all sides. In the Lower Vrbas and Sana valleys, they built a strong staging base. In early December, they launched an offensive from the Imotski-Knin line (the 118th and 264th Divisions) toward Bugojno and Glamoč, seeking to disrupt operational links between our neighbouring sectors. By drawing our forces southward in this sector, the enemy also aimed to ease the manoeuvring of its eastern and northern troops, who were otherwise hindered by rough terrain. However, the southern enemy group was halted after 20 days of fierce fighting by units of the 8th Corps and the 1st Corps. They suffered heavy losses and were stopped along the Duvno-Šujica-Livno line. This allowed the formation of a strong strike group composed of units from the 5th Corps (with smaller elements from the 1st and 6th Corps), which launched an attack in late December on the Banja Luka-Gradiška-Kostajnica-Novi-Bihać-Prijedor sector. The goal of this operation was to destroy this key stronghold, where the enemy had amassed war equipment and supplies for the offensive, to disrupt the plans of an already exhausted opponent, and to support the transition of units in Eastern Bosnia into a counteroffensive. The manoeuvre succeeded. A large quantity of enemy military equipment was captured and destroyed, and major strongholds in Banja Luka and Gradiška were eliminated. Communications along the Sana and Una valleys all the way to Bihać were completely destroyed. Frightened by this action, the enemy hastily improvised a new offensive in this sector. From the Novska area toward Banja Luka, it deployed the 114th Motorized Division — which had been en route to Italy — and the 92nd Motorized Grenadier Regiment. From the Derventa-Doboj-Sarajevo-Konjic line, it sent the 1st Volunteer, 1st Alpine, 369th and parts of the “Prinz Eugen” Division. The offensive began on January 5, 1944. An attempt by the southern group to resume its offensive from the Duvno-Livno line was thwarted. Likewise, the Una group — weakened and trapped within its own garrisons under constant attacks from the 5th Corps — was unable to mobilize. Thus, the offensive in this sector turned into a frontal movement. Near Čađavica, the 4th Division, after several days of fighting, crushed a German column. In 15 days of combat in the Mrkonjić-Mliništa sector, the 6th Division inflicted significant losses on the 114th Division, the 92nd Motorized Regiment and parts of the 1st Alpine Division. The 11th Division, by drawing strong enemy forces from Central Bosnia toward itself, enabled the 1st Division to carry out a bold and skillful manoeuvre from the Jajce-Travnik sector, striking at the enemy’s flank from the western slopes of Vlašić, relieving the 11th Division and together liberating Central Bosnia. The 10th Division, operating in the Prozor area, defeated elements of the “Prinz Eugen” Division and pushed them back toward the Neretva River.
Throughout the entire Sixth Enemy Offensive, the units of the 6th Corps and the General Staff of Vojvodina attacked and destroyed key transportation routes in the Sava, Drava and Danube valleys, thereby supporting the troops in other sectors while also repelling several local enemy offensives on their own.
Conclusion:
1. In this offensive, the Germans not only failed to achieve their objectives, but they also exposed their major weaknesses and shortcomings — poor combat effectiveness of their multi-ethnic troops, widespread desertions, inadequate food and clothing, and their inability to operate off major communication lines. Even along the communication lines themselves, they encountered such difficulties that they managed to overcome them only at the cost of massive casualties. They had counted on a swift success, yet after four months of offensive — from mid-October to mid-February — they barely managed to seize a narrow coastal strip and maintain control over a few inland-bound routes from the coast. It should be noted that winter conditions, which should have favoured the technically superior German forces, were on their side.
Despite their numbers, German forces became scattered across broad fronts of our battlefields, and encountering fierce resistance from our troops, their momentum gradually collapsed. Their final phase in Central Bosnia and Bosanska Krajina was utterly exhausted. They barely held on to their winter garrisons, which they now cling to desperately. During the course of the offensive itself, they were forced into a defensive posture in several sectors, and ultimately, they were compelled to adopt a defensive stance across the entire Yugoslav front.
2. This offensive clearly highlighted the role and significance of our Army within the framework of Allied strategy. While the fascists were retreating in both the East and in Italy, the German command was forced to commit substantial forces against our Army. And not only that. Our Army was confronting over 700,000 German and satellite troops in Yugoslavia — forces the fascists would have readily deployed elsewhere had we not been holding them in place. It is clear what such a force — or even significantly fewer — would have meant for the already endangered German fronts on the Bug River and in Italy. Rightfully so, for every step forward taken by the Allies on the battlefields, our fighters feel they have made their own contribution — in blood and sweat. With the opening of the Second Front in Europe and the Red Army’s advance across the Carpathians, we can already anticipate just how fierce our Army’s role will be for the fascists and their satellites in the Balkans.
3. Although the fighting occurred across separate sectors, the core operational strategy was carried out correctly. It was precisely this dispersal of forces that allowed our young command leadership to fully exercise initiative and implement manoeuvre combinations that successfully linked all forces operationally.
While the enemy attacked one sector, the forces in a neighbouring sector would envelop them — and the enemy consistently found themselves caught in a double ring of fire.
Therefore, our unit-level command, through its adaptability in the field, its ability to assess the combat situation and its decisiveness, has — for the sixth time — passed the test of the brutal school of war and proved itself worthy of leading the great National Liberation Army.
4. The units of the National Liberation Army have passed the test with distinction. Through their endurance, heroism, striking power and manoeuvring ability, they have proven capable of securing victory and ensuring that the people reap the gains of this bloody struggle. And not only that. As part of the great Allied coalition — on the left flank of the Red Army — our Army is ready to launch the assault on the bloodthirsty fascist monster, for which there is no fate left but death.
February 1944
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