Canada-USSR Relations During the Second World War

– A.N. Uchaev, Doctor of Historical Sciences,
Associate Professor at Saratov State University –

The global civilizational crisis that was the Second World War officially ended 75 years ago. However, even today, we cannot say that historical science has provided comprehensive answers to all questions regarding the causes and course of this defining tragedy of the 20th century. The complexity, multifaceted nature and massive impact of the 1939-1945 war, coupled with the intense social and political perception of those events, mean that historians continue to work toward constructing an objective picture of it. Despite the steady publication of new works and the discovery of new documents from that era, a complete understanding remains distant.

One challenge in creating a complete historical narrative of the Second World War lies in the focus (driven by objective factors) on the main actors in this tragic drama: the “Big Three” of the Anti-Hitler coalition and the three main Axis powers. This emphasis was predictable and logical, as it was these players whose actions shaped the war’s trajectory. However, if we aim to take a comprehensive approach to studying the events of 1939-1945, we must also analyse the involvement of medium and smaller powers. Although these countries influenced the war’s events and outcomes to a lesser extent than the major powers, their contributions were nonetheless significant and should not be disregarded. Among these nations, Canada, the most developed and powerful of the “middle powers” of that era, stands out; its relationship with the USSR is the focus of this edition.

It is necessary to mention the specifics of Canada’s involvement in the global conflict, as this aspect has remained largely unknown to the wider public in Russia.

Canada entered the war on September 10, 1939, after Britain and France declared war on Germany. The week-long delay between actions by the metropolis and the dominion was officially due to the need to convene Parliament and make a formal decision to declare war, but in reality, it reflected a degree of “stubbornness” in Canada and a desire to demonstrate its recently acquired independence from London in practice.[1] Additionally, economic factors played a role — by remaining officially neutral for a week, Canada could make military equipment and supply purchases from the United States for Britain. This desire to display independence in foreign policy and elevate its status through active conflict involvement remained characteristic of Canada throughout the war.

Another unique feature of Canada’s wartime participation was the emphasis on maximum development and deployment of the navy and air force, with minimal use of ground forces. There were several reasons for this. First was a political consideration — the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King recognized that ground forces suffered the highest casualties in combat. Remembering the significant losses Canada incurred during the First World War (or the “Great War”),[2] men of conscription age, especially the French Canadians of Quebec, were reluctant to participate in the European war.[3] Given that Quebec traditionally represented a Liberal Party stronghold, focussing on the navy and air force was entirely predictable. Consequently, despite the fact that nearly one in ten Canadians (about a million people in a population of almost 11 million) served in the armed forces during the war, most of these personnel remained within Canada.

Economic considerations also influenced Canada’s “model” of participation in the war: the development of shipbuilding and aviation industries provided an opportunity to transition from being a supplier of raw materials and agricultural products to becoming an industrialized nation and significantly boosted the budget through military contracts from Britain. Geographic factors also played a role — Canada’s distance from the main theatres of war meant that it primarily deployed ships and aircraft, rather than infantry, tanks and artillery.

At the same time, Ottawa understood that without active participation in combat, Canada would be unable to raise its international standing. This awareness, coupled with a desire to avoid heavy casualties that might lead to domestic political issues, led to the creation of a distinctive Canadian “style” of involvement — Canadian soldiers, sailors and pilots were present in all theatres of the Second World War, albeit often in supporting roles due to smaller numbers and various technical limitations.

The Canadian navy participated in all phases of the “Battle of the Atlantic,” ranking fourth among the Allied navies. By 1943, Canadian ships escorted nearly half, and later all, lend-lease convoys across the Atlantic,[4] with Canadian Rear Admiral Leonard Murray playing a key role in the maritime theatre.[5] The Canadian navy consisted mainly of patrol vessels and destroyers without heavy ships, as Canadian shipyards were not equipped to build them; two cruisers and two aircraft carriers included in the fleet were received from Britain at the end of the war.[6] New equipment and vessels were supplied to Canada only after the British fleet was sufficiently equipped, which is why Canada’s navy did not achieve significant successes in the Atlantic until 1943.

A similar mixed picture emerged with Canada’s air force and aviation industry. On the one hand, over 16,000 aircraft were produced during the war, with more than 120,000 people employed in the sector (compared to about a thousand before the war).[7] However, of the 20 types of aircraft produced, most were training or outdated models. Canada only had four original designs from two companies, which totalled 1,339 units.[8] Lacking an industrial base and personnel, Canada was unable to produce modern combat aircraft at scale, which led many Canadians who wished to fight in the skies to go to the UK and join the Royal Air Force. Additionally, Canada lacked enough officers capable of commanding large formations, so even after the creation of a “Canadian” air group in England, many Canadians preferred to stay in “British” units.[9] Canada’s significant success in this field was the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP). By late 1943, at its peak, the program employed 104,000 military and civilian personnel to train cadets. Throughout the war, Canada trained 131,000 people under the BCATP, 72,000 of whom served in its own air force.[10]

Canada’s ground forces participated in combat operations everywhere except the African theatre. However, the early phase of the war brought only disappointment to the Canadians. The 1941 catastrophe in Hong Kong led to two Canadian battalions being either destroyed or taken captive by the Japanese, and not all of them managed to return home.[11] The second encounter for Canadian soldiers occurred in August 1942 during an attempted landing on the western coast of France near the town of Dieppe. This landing was unsuccessful; the operation’s objectives were not achieved, and the Canadian division, forming the backbone of the Allied landing force, suffered significant losses in terms of killed, wounded and captured.[12]

The next operations involving Canadians were the landing and liberation of Sicily, followed by the landing and liberation of Italy. Working alongside British and American units, Canadian forces demonstrated not only their high combat skills but also the “growing pains” typical of the Western Allies’ ground forces. For instance, in Sicily, the Canadian division found itself without transportation and adequate artillery (their equipment had been sunk by a German submarine while approaching the island). Unable to rely on significant fire support, Canadian units had to adopt a more inventive tactical approach, moving away from straightforward, predictable frontal assaults with heavy artillery backing, instead utilizing the terrain more effectively and taking calculated risks. This tactical shift often confounded the Germans and allowed the Canadian division to advance faster than British units. However, upon receiving artillery support, they reverted to a “by-the-book” approach, matching the British advance rate…[13] As is well-known, the Italian campaign did not yield strategic success; the Allies were unable to break through quickly into Central Europe, and the advance northward through Italy was slow, if not gruelling. Fighting on the Italian front continued until February 1945.[14]

In Western Europe, Canadians participated in nearly every major Allied operation. Their importance increased: during Operation Overlord, one of the five landing sectors, “Juno,” was assigned to Canadian forces; soon after the Normandy landing, the 1st Canadian Army was established. This army later played a crucial role in liberating the Netherlands (helping to prevent, in modern terms, a “humanitarian catastrophe”) and advancing into Germany.[15]

It is worth noting that the Canadian government successfully implemented its war strategy, which aimed to minimize human losses while maximizing political and economic gains — raising Canada’s international standing and boosting domestic industrial growth through military contracts. Canada’s losses in the Second World War totalled 42,000 killed and 55,000 wounded.[16]

Canada’s foreign policy during the Second World War was influenced by its geographic position and political status. Canada’s two main allies were predictably Britain and the United States, but the partnership was unequal. By the war’s end, Ottawa managed to lessen Britain’s influence, while Washington’s influence had grown by 1945. In 1939-1941, Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King attempted to position Canada as an equal “corner” of a “North Atlantic Triangle,” but without success. From 1941, Ottawa recognized and accepted its status as a “secondary player,” while continuing to pursue policies that would raise its international profile, even if as a “middle power.”

As the Blitzkrieg faltered and the “Big Three” Anti-Hitler coalition crystallized, it became clear to the Canadian government that active participation in opposing nazi aggression and strengthening Canada’s global influence would require direct contact with the Soviet Union.

* * *

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Canada were established on June 12, 1942, in the midst of the war. Prior to this, relations had been contradictory.

The first encounter Canadians had with the Soviet state occurred in 1918, when the Dominion joined the intervention in Bolshevik Russia. The presence of Canadian troops on Soviet territory (in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok from September 1918 to June 1919),[17] combined with the increased activity of the Communist Party of Canada and the anti-religious policy of the Bolshevik government, did not provide a foundation for establishing normal diplomatic relations. Bilateral relations between Canada and Soviet Russia only began to develop after 1920, when the Supreme Council of the Entente lifted the economic blockade on Russia. Mutual interest was evident: Russia needed to recover from the World War, the Civil War and the intervention, and Canada could profit by supplying food, agricultural machinery and industrial equipment to aid in this recovery. As a result, in 1922, Canadian-Soviet relations were formally established when Ottawa joined the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921. It was clear that the agreement was mutually beneficial. Soviet Russia, recognized by Canada de facto, continued to emerge from diplomatic isolation and, through foreign trade cooperation, acquired the machinery and equipment necessary to restore its economy. Canada, meanwhile, gained access to a vast market, which was highly advantageous in the post-World War era. In 1924, relations were further solidified when Canada granted de jure recognition to the USSR. Two Canadian representatives joined the British trade delegation to the Soviet Union (one of whom was L. Dana Wilgress, who would later become Canada’s first ambassador to the USSR), and the Soviet side sent a delegation to Canada led by A.A. Yazykov. It is noteworthy that anti-Bolshevism remained a constant in Canada’s attitude toward the USSR during this period. A telling example is the selection of the head of the 1924 Soviet delegation: A.A. Yazykov was confirmed in this role only after Ottawa rejected the candidacies of two professional revolutionaries, P.L. Voykov and Y.D. Jensen. It was apparent that relations between the two countries lacked stability and reliability.[18] In May 1927, the United Kingdom accused the USSR of interfering in British foreign policy and severed diplomatic relations, and Canada followed the lead of the metropolis. For the next fifteen years, Canada and the USSR did not interact or maintain diplomatic relations at the official level.[19]

During the Great Depression, from 1930 to 1935, Canada was governed by the conservative R.B. Bennett, known for his anti-Soviet stance. Tensions peaked in 1931 with a mutual embargo: Ottawa banned imports from the USSR, and Moscow reciprocated by banning all Canadian imports. However, in 1935, the newly elected Liberals under Mackenzie King sought to normalize economic relations. Canadian Trade Minister William D. Euler visited Moscow, leading to the lifting of the embargo in September 1936.[20]

Unfortunately, relations between the two countries did not improve further. Instead, the deteriorating international situation brought Canada and the USSR close to potential conflict.

In the pre-war years, the Land of the Maple Leaf followed the diplomatic strategy of its metropolis, supporting the policy of appeasement toward Germany in the belief that this approach would help avoid another global war. Soviet experts, both at the time and later, believed this policy aimed solely at provoking a clash between Germany and the USSR. Clearly, these two tendencies complemented each other.

Canada’s policy was a clear illustration of the combination of these two tendencies. Mackenzie King was a staunch supporter of appeasing Germany. In 1937, he visited Adolf Hitler, genuinely viewing him as a strong national leader willing to do anything for the well-being of all Germans. Moreover, as a deeply religious man, King saw it as his mission to influence Hitler in a way that would ensure the triumph of good over evil in the latter’s soul. Added to this was a desire to maintain neutrality; in 1936, during the crisis triggered by the remilitarization of the Rhineland, King informed Chamberlain that Britain could count on Canada’s support only in the event of a direct attack on the metropolis. If Britain became embroiled in a continental war, Canada would strive to remain neutral.[21]

King’s eagerness to resolve issues in the most conflict-free way was illustrated by his enthusiastic response to the signing of the Munich Agreement on September 30, 1938. According to his diary entries, after visiting the German Embassy, the Canadian Prime Minister asked a German diplomat “to convey to Mr. Hitler how much relief and admiration I felt that an agreement had been reached between the four powers and what the signatures on it meant for humanity.”[22] Under such circumstances, any rapprochement between Canada and the USSR, which advocated for a system of collective security, was out of the question.

The situation worsened after the failure of the tripartite talks between the USSR, Britain and France in Moscow and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. Unlike the Munich Agreement, King received this with indignation.

On August 24, 1939, he noted in his diary:

“Thus, it has been proven beyond doubt that Russia has completely deceived the British. The Soviet ambassador in London lied, as did the negotiators in Moscow; they played the most deceitful game any nation has ever played.”

In this entry, King ignored the fact that Britain never intended to reach real agreements with the USSR, instead using the negotiations to pressure Germany. Otherwise, Britain would have sent higher-ranking negotiators with real authority to Moscow, or at least would have expedited their arrival by plane, as Ribbentrop did, rather than by ship around Europe. Canada’s Prime Minister applied a double standard to the USSR, believing that only Britain was entitled to pursue its national interests.

Germany’s attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, the ensuing Polish defeat and the entry of Soviet forces on September 17 left a deep impression on Canada. On September 6, King wrote:

“…the Poles themselves are to blame for not hastening to meet Hitler’s terms. He clearly intended conquest, and much of Poland would have ended up in the Reich in any case. Only heaven knows how terrible this situation might become if Germany decides to fight France and England with no enemy behind them, as the Poles are nearly defeated, and Russia may be ready to help them. I think this is the darkest hour for the British.”[23]

On September 17, he noted:

“Rumours say the Russians have entered Poland and Warsaw is under its final attack. This is the worst situation we’ve ever faced. While I understand that we are fighting forces of evil, I do not see how Britain and France can avoid ruin unless an armistice is reached, and a conference is held where the Germans and Italians receive much of what they demanded without an armistice. Otherwise, all the Balkan states might end up occupied by Germans, while the so-called free democracies of the north may fall to Germany or Russia.”[24]

As we can see, Mackenzie King was deeply pessimistic. This diary entry also reflects one of King’s primary characteristics — a desire (at times excessive) to avoid conflict at all costs.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which began in late 1939, along with the USSR’s incorporation of the Baltic states, did not improve Moscow’s popularity in the West, particularly in Canada. Western nations were further alarmed by the unpredictability and uncertainty of the USSR’s future plans. In the winter of 1940, the Hamilton Spectator, in an article titled “Where Will Russia Strike Next?” noted that despite the USSR’s control over vast and resource-rich territories and its numerous domestic issues, “Big Boss Stalin” seemed unwilling to halt after the war with Finland, leaving no one able to predict his next moves with certainty.[25] These concerns, combined with the Soviet-German agreements of 1939, led Canadians to believe that the USSR and nazi Germany were similar aggressive states. This was evidenced by the frequent use of the term “commu-nazism” in Canadian media.[26]

Another negative factor complicating diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ottawa was the role of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), directed by the Comintern. Canadian authorities were not pleased with the presence of a foreign-funded organization that aimed to overthrow the government through revolution. As a result, the CPC was frequently banned (1921-1924, 1931-1936). Efforts by Canadian communists to follow Moscow’s directives to incite revolution were ineffective, due to both a lack of necessary conditions and, likely, the Canadian mentality. Consequently, in 1940, the CPC was once again forced underground due to a renewed ban on its activities. Only the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 restored the Canadian communists’ legal status.[27]

After Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the situation began to change. Notably, after listening to Churchill’s speech supporting the USSR, Mackenzie King, that very evening, prepared his own statement for the Canadian media, even before receiving a request from London to endorse the metropolis’ decision (which arrived on June 23)[28] and without consulting his cabinet. The War Committee of the government reviewed King’s statement only on June 24, endorsing his stance in line with Churchill’s position.[29] In his address, King stated, “The nazi attack on Soviet Russia is not a crusade against the Red Threat. It is a new phase of the assault on England and all democratic states.” He further noted that “regardless of our opinion of the Russian revolutionary philosophy, it is clear that, since Russia is fighting Germany, Russia is not a threat to freedom and peace. Nazi Germany is the true threat… Anyone fighting our enemy serves our cause.” Moreover, King underscored the significance of the USSR’s resistance to Germany, not only for the national security of Western countries but also for the “preservation of Christian civilization.”[30] According to H. Kinleyside, Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, it was typical for Western leaders, including King, to express antipathy towards communism even while declaring support for the USSR.[31] Canada’s unique position was influenced by Quebec’s Catholic clericalism, which formed a core Liberal Party base, as well as King’s own strong religious beliefs, evident in his diary filled with biblical references.

Canada’s approval of the Soviet-British agreement for joint action against Germany soon followed. On July 15, 1941, three days after the agreement was signed, Churchill announced that it had the support of the people of the USSR, Britain and the dominions.[32]

However, the initiatives in the summer of 1941 went no further than declarations, and several factors contributed to this. First, a significant portion of Canadian society harboured, at best, distrust and, at worst, hostility toward the USSR. This negative perception was prevalent throughout Canadian society — not only among the “ruling circles” but also among “ordinary Canadians.” Canadian newspapers were also far from sympathetic to the “first state of workers and peasants.” A notable example was an article in the Toronto Telegram on December 6, 1941, titled “Under the Czars, Russian Soldiers Fought With Fanatical Fury.” It argued that the resilience of Soviet soldiers should not be attributed to the Bolshevik regime, as during the war with Napoleon, Russians displayed the same tenacity under the rule of the czar. Moreover, the article suggested that communism should not be praised for the lack of “quislings” in Russia, as nazi Germany also had none, a result in the USSR achieved through repression: 30,000 executed and 500,000 ethnic Germans exiled to Siberia.[33]

The lack of direct military assistance had several reasons. Primarily, this situation stemmed from Canada following in the “wake” of British and American military plans without significantly influencing them. Within these strategies, the goal was to exhaust Germany on the Eastern Front as much as possible and only then, minimizing risks, launch a continental attack. The second important point, mentioned earlier, was that Canada’s armed forces were primarily focussed on developing the air force and navy, as King’s administration was wary of the challenges associated with implementing a full mobilization for overseas service. At a War Committee meeting on July 31, 1941, Mackenzie King noted that conducting raids on the European continent with Canadian forces in 1941 was unwise, as there was a “favourable situation with Russia absorbing much of Germany’s energy.”[34]

It would be inaccurate, however, to say that Canadian society was uniformly anti-Soviet. On September 16, 1941, Deputy Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson reported to King that “over the past three months, we have received hundreds of resolutions from workers and unions calling for more direct and tangible support for the Soviet Union. This demand has been echoed in editorial articles, particularly in Western Canada and the Globe and Mail.”[35] Large Canadian cities held rallies in support of the USSR from late June onwards. For example, in early July, 5,000 people gathered at Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto, calling for stronger support for the USSR.[36]

Economic cooperation between the USSR and Canada developed slowly. From the start of hostilities on the Soviet-German front until the conclusion of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers from the USSR, the U.S. and UK (September 30-October 1, 1941), Canada’s largest deal with the USSR was a $258,000 supply of leather soles.[37] This sluggish progress was primarily due to the West waiting to see the outcome of the Battle of Moscow and logistical challenges in shipping goods from Canada to the USSR, with most of Canada’s strategic products directed to Britain.

By late 1941, the rapprochement between Canada and the USSR began to accelerate: Ottawa lifted its ban on Soviet publications imposed in 1940, and on December 7, declared war on Romania, Hungary, Finland and Japan.

The German failure at Moscow, the success of the Soviet counterattack, and Japan’s attack on the U.S. and Britain hastened the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition. On January 1, 1942, the United Nations Declaration was signed in Washington by 26 nations, including Canada.

In this situation, it became necessary to establish direct state-to-state relations between the USSR and Canada. Shortly after the Moscow Conference, the Canadian government agreed to the USSR’s proposal to send one or two Soviet consuls to facilitate supplies to the USSR. This information was relayed to Ottawa by the Soviet Ambassador to the UK, I.M. Maisky.[38]

The response from Ottawa was positive.[39] Beyond practical considerations (the exchange of diplomats allowed for direct military supplies to the USSR rather than via London), Canada also saw this as an opportunity to increase its diplomatic weight within the emerging Anglo-American command structures formed at the Washington Conference. On January 6, 1942, the War Committee decided that Canada should be represented in the USSR at the envoy level, and an urgent appeal was made to the Soviet government on this matter. The decision also granted Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, the authority to negotiate a consular exchange agreement.[40]

Politicians across the Canadian spectrum recognized the need to accelerate normalization with the USSR. CCF (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation)[41] leader Major Coldwell initiated a parliamentary inquiry into the state of Canada-Soviet relations; additionally, CCF MP Angus MacInnis proposed that King begin negotiations with the USSR on diplomatic relations.[42] In response, King presented a report on Canada’s relations with the USSR since July 3, 1922 (Canada’s de facto recognition of the USSR) and informed Parliament about the February 5, 1942 agreement on consular exchanges.[43]

However, it was clear that full interaction between the USSR and Canada should occur at the envoy level. This was also emphasized by N. Robertson in his memorandum, arguing that Canada needed representation in the USSR equivalent to that of the U.S. and Britain, as this would provide more comprehensive information on a wide range of issues, without reliance on “second-hand” sources. Robertson also noted that this approach would be welcomed by both the Soviet and Canadian society.[44]

In the final stage before establishing diplomatic relations at the envoy level, Canada’s dual orientation toward both Britain and the U.S. was evident. On March 15, 1942, Ottawa sought London’s approval to approach the USSR for an envoy exchange, asserting that this action did not contradict the “principle of democratic imperial unity, i.e., consultative cooperation.” Regarding the Soviet side, V. Massey reported from London that I.M. Maisky had confirmed that the Soviet government welcomed Canada’s initiative and was ready to establish diplomatic relations.[45]

At the same time, despite Canada’s apparent deference to London, it reacted sharply to information received on April 22, 1942, indicating that the British government was unofficially probing the possibility of dominions joining future Anglo-Soviet agreements.[46] Citing the fact that the United States had not signed a treaty guaranteeing the western borders of the Soviet Union, the Canadian War Committee decided on April 29, 1942 that Canada would not sign a treaty similar to the Anglo-Soviet agreement with the USSR.[47]

The Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Germany and Her Satellites between the USSR and the United Kingdom was signed on May 26, 1942. Shortly thereafter, on June 2, George P. de T. Glazebrook, a special assistant to N. Robertson, submitted a memorandum analysing and evaluating this treaty. Glazebrook proposed two options for the Canadian government: either joining the treaty or approving it without joining. He deemed the latter preferable, as it allowed Canada to avoid entanglement in a collective security system.[48] Robertson shared this view, believing that the dominion should not assume postwar obligations that differed from those taken on by the United States.[49] Ultimately, the War Committee reached the same conclusion.[50] Ottawa thus chose a strategy of balancing between the metropolis and its southern neighbour to achieve its goals.

The next day, on June 12, 1942, an agreement for the exchange of envoys between the USSR and Canada was signed in London. As with the consular exchange agreement, I.M. Maisky signed on behalf of the USSR, and V. Massey represented Canada.[51]

Fyodor Tarasovich Gusev, who had headed the Second European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry since 1941, was appointed as the Soviet envoy to Canada. He arrived in Ottawa in October 1942 and presented his credentials to Governor General Alexander Cambridge, Earl of Athlone. The Canadian envoy to the USSR was L. Dana Wilgress, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce in King’s government. Wilgress was chosen due to his prior visits to Russia, knowledge of the Russian language and economic expertise, signalling Ottawa’s primary interest in economic relations with the USSR. King made the appointment on October 7, 1942.[52] The Canadian mission began operating in the USSR five months later than the Soviet mission in Canada. Canadian authorities attributed the delay to difficulties in assembling a staff with knowledge of Russian and political neutrality. In his memoirs, Wilgress noted his preference for personnel who were neither fervent communists nor staunch anti-communists. Organizational issues, such as supplying the mission with food and equipment, also contributed to the delay.[53] The Soviet side attributed it to Canadian hesitation, as they awaited the outcomes of the Battle of Stalingrad and the Caucasus Campaign.

Initially, the Canadian mission was located in Kuybyshev, where all diplomatic missions had been relocated from Moscow. After establishing the mission in the temporary Soviet capital, Wilgress travelled to Moscow and presented his credentials to Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet M.I. Kalinin on March 17 and 18, 1943, respectively.[54]

In August 1943, the Canadian mission moved to Moscow. However, as early as July 8, 1943, Wilgress recommended to Ottawa that Canada elevate its diplomatic representation in the United States or the USSR to an embassy.[55] Consequently, on September 12, Robertson advised King in a memorandum to upgrade the status of envoys in Washington and Moscow, allowing Canada to represent itself independently on the international stage, separate from Britain.[56] On November 17, 1943, the Soviet government responded positively to Canada’s proposal for mutual elevation of diplomatic missions. The agreement to convert the missions in Canada and the USSR to embassies was signed on December 11, 1943, and on February 29, 1944, L. Dana Wilgress became Canada’s first Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Since August 12, 1943, F.T. Gusev had served as the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom (replacing I.M. Maisky). Counselor G.I. Tunkin served as acting head of the Soviet mission in Ottawa. In March 1944, G.N. Zarubin, head of the American Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry,[57] was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Canada, presenting his credentials to the Governor General on June 8, 1944. Thus, Ottawa and Moscow established diplomatic relations that allowed them to communicate without the involvement of London or Washington.

Beyond diplomacy, Canada cooperated with the USSR in several areas, though with varying degrees of intensity. Military cooperation was predictably minimal, as Canada’s primary focus was the defence of North America and joint operations with British and American forces. The Ogdensburg Agreement, signed with the United States on August 18, 1940, secured North American defence, while the strategy of postponing the Second Front in Western Europe until optimal conditions were achieved reflected Canada’s alignment with Britain’s interests, resulting in limited military collaboration with the USSR during the Second World War.

Economic interaction held greater appeal for both Ottawa and Moscow. To characterize this economic relationship, two directions can be identified, as determined by Canada. The first was intergovernmental cooperation, marked by key dates: November 7, 1941, when the USSR became eligible for U.S. lend-lease; October 6, 1942, with the signing of the Second Lend-Lease Protocol in Washington; May 20, 1943, when Canada passed the Mutual Aid Act, allowing direct military aid to recipients rather than through Britain; and February 11, 1944, when Canada and the USSR signed an agreement extending the Mutual Aid Act to the Soviet Union. The second direction involved economic interactions through both governmental and non-governmental channels.

The specifics of Canada-USSR economic contacts were shaped by political and economic factors, primarily Canada’s shift in economic focus from Britain to the United States. This process spurred the growth of Canadian industries producing goods that were either scarce in the UK and the U.S. or were not a priority for those nations due to other obligations.

Another significant factor in understanding Canada-Soviet economic relations was Canada’s relatively young industrial base, which had only begun to develop intensively after the British losses at Dunkirk in 1940, when the British Expeditionary Force lost its transport and heavy weaponry. Britain, unable to recover these losses alone, had to place orders abroad, including in Canada, which stimulated Canadian industry. Consequently, at the onset of the Great Patriotic War, Canada’s industry was limited in its capacity to aid the USSR in terms of equipment, both due to the restricted range of goods produced and the modest output, with most resources directed to Britain. Therefore, in the early stages, the USSR mainly sought Canadian grain and flour. The first major agreement with Canada was signed on September 8, 1942, providing the USSR with a $10 million credit for wheat and flour purchases.[58]

From the second half of 1942, Canadian supplies to the USSR, under the Second Protocol, were included in the broader British supply list. Canadian deliveries primarily consisted of trucks and tanks. For instance, Canadian-produced Valentine tanks were shipped to Britain, which “purchased” them from Canada using a Canadian grant awarded in 1942. Britain allocated $61 million of this grant, totaling $1 billion, for deliveries to the USSR.[59]

Despite the fact that the volume of supplies from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada was far from ideal for the USSR, it should be noted that the significance of these supplies was not underestimated in the Soviet Union during the war. On July 11, 1944, Izvestia published data on the supply of the USSR by its Western allies, noting that the actions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada were “contributing to the successes of the Red Army in liberating their homeland from fascist invaders and in accelerating the overall victory of the Allies over Hitler’s Germany and its satellites.”[60]

In 1943, a turning point occurred in the Great Patriotic War. It became clear that victory would belong to the Anti-Hitler coalition; it was only a matter of time and losses. Consequently, preparations for postwar economic reorganization began in the West, including in Canada. During this period, Canada’s wartime production in key industries reached its peak. The increase in military production, the functioning of the lend-lease system and the emerging competition for postwar markets led Canada to pass the Mutual Aid Act on May 20, 1943 in a similar manner to the United States.

Amid the strengthening Soviet-Canadian relations, it became evident that direct supplies from Canada to the USSR were the optimal arrangement. Under the Third Protocol, Canada received this opportunity by signing the document in a separate declaration alongside the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. The total value of Canadian supplies to the USSR amounted to $75 million.[61] The protocol was signed on October 19, 1943 in London. Mackenzie King, addressing the Canadian Parliament on May 11, 1943, emphasized that Canada’s participation in this protocol reflected “a high regard for the USSR’s extremely important contribution to the common cause and duly recognized the critical Soviet front.”[62]

The next significant stage in Soviet-Canadian economic cooperation was Canada’s inclusion of the Soviet Union in the Mutual Aid system, with a bilateral agreement signed on February 11, 1944. From the USSR, the agreement was signed by V.A. Sergeyev (Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade) and G.I. Tunkin, and from Canada by Mackenzie King and C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply). The agreement’s text slightly differed from those signed by Canada with the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries also covered by the Mutual Aid Act. The treaty, among other things, aimed at addressing postwar issues. The preamble stated that military supplies “should not burden postwar trade, impose trade restrictions or otherwise harm a just and lasting peace.”[63] Article 9 expressed that both governments intended to “develop mutually beneficial economic relations between their countries and worldwide.”[64]

However, despite the generally positive background, Canadian supplies to the USSR were modest compared to those from the United States and the United Kingdom, as the following data illustrate:

Table 1. Canada’s exports (million Canadian dollars)[65]

Export (except gold)	1939	1941	1942	1943	1944
All	925	1621	2364	2972	3440
To the USSR	0.3	5.3	26.6	57.7	103.3
To the USA	380	600	886	1149	1301
To England	328	658	742	1033	1235

Table 2. Canada’s deliveries to the USSR as of April 1, 1945[66]

	1939	1941
1942	163	62.6
1943	126.6	64.4
1944	409.3	93.2
1945 (I–III)	64.9	12.6
Total	763.9	233.8

Despite the overall positive atmosphere, the scale of Canadian supplies to the USSR remained modest compared to those from the U.S. and UK. For instance, in 1943-1944, economic interaction was generally characterized positively in both Canadian and Soviet press. However, the situation began to shift following the signing of the Fourth Protocol on April 17, 1945. By this time, Canada’s economy had become so closely integrated with that of the United States that this influenced Ottawa’s foreign policy, which became increasingly “Americanized.” This shift resulted in a gradual reduction of economic cooperation with the USSR. On May 12, 1945, the U.S. government ceased lend-lease supplies to Allies (except those needed for the war against Japan).

Simultaneously, on May 10, 1945, the Canadian Mutual Aid Committee recommended that Canada suspend supplies to the USSR until it joined the war against Japan. However, on June 20, the committee suggested resuming deliveries to the USSR, a proposal the cabinet endorsed. The period of uncertainty ended on August 16 when King’s administration decided to halt supplies to all countries involved in the Mutual Aid program upon the conclusion of the war with Japan.[67]

Although the Mutual Aid Agreement with the USSR was standard for Canada, it had several notable differences from its American counterpart. For instance, Canada provided specific guarantees that, once hostilities ceased, it would not demand the return or purchase of all goods supplied under the program (as the Americans did under lend-lease). Furthermore, Canada was willing to donate certain items that had been left undelivered by the war’s end, as they were no longer needed in peacetime.[68]

The second direction in Soviet-Canadian economic interaction involved contacts through non-governmental organizations. Soviet historiography has emphasized that the Canadian public, particularly the working class, was warmer and more supportive toward the USSR than the government, frequently calling for maximum assistance to the Soviet Union. In her work, L.V. Pozdeeva highlights “mass rallies” in Canada’s major cities in support of the USSR, with examples from July and October 1941 where crowds of 5,000 and 8,000, respectively, gathered.[69] Given Toronto’s population of 900,000 in 1941,[70] it is clear that while there was notable support for the USSR, it wasn’t universal.

In November 1942, the “Canadian Aid to Russia Fund” was established to coordinate efforts by Canadian organizations and citizens to express solidarity with the Soviet Union. From December 1942 to January 1943, the fund conducted a national fundraising campaign for the USSR, surpassing its $1 million goal. Most contributions ranged from $1 to $10, which Pozdeeva interprets as evidence of support from the working class. To gain a fuller understanding, it is useful to compare this with Canada’s “Victory Loan” campaign in February-March 1942, which aimed to raise $600 million. The most striking moment of this campaign was the “If Day” event, simulating a German invasion of Winnipeg to illustrate the stakes of the war. Following the event, Manitoba alone contributed $65 million, exceeding its quota.[71] This comparison suggests that Canadians, like their government, were more deeply concerned with their country’s security than with a distant, though brave and resilient, Russia.

However, in response to various events, contributions to the Aid to Russia Fund increased. Canadian attitudes toward the war and the USSR improved with the signing of the United Nations Declaration in January 1942 and the Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence in May and the Dieppe Raid in August. Influenced by Canadian media, which grew more positive toward the USSR, public sentiment and perceptions of the Soviet Union in Canada shifted favourably. Consequently, in November 1942, Fund chairman Clifford Sifton informed Mackenzie King that a media campaign in support of the USSR would seek to strengthen ties between Canada and the USSR while avoiding debates over communism. This public relations work led to the fund’s later campaigns gaining significant support.

For example, in June 1944, 1,137 organizations from 505 towns in Ontario took part in a clothing drive. The fund operated independently until early 1945, when it merged into the “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund,” which also aided other Allies, including Belgium, Greece and China. By the end of its activities on August 31, 1945, the fund had raised $10 million for the USSR.[72]

In addition, a National Council for Canadian-Soviet Friendship was established to disseminate accurate information about the USSR and its struggle, similar to organizations in the U.S. and UK. The founding meeting was held in Toronto on June 22, 1943, where Mackenzie King spoke on the need to develop friendly relations with the USSR. Guests included F.T. Gusev and former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Joseph Davies.[73] After the Moscow and Tehran conferences, the Council saw bursts of activity, primarily aimed at popularizing Soviet achievements and promoting peaceful coexistence.

In examining the basic trends and directions of Canada-USSR cooperation during the war, it is clear that the Soviet Union was not among Canada’s top partners for obvious reasons, from geographical to political. This is evidenced by the frequency of references to the USSR in Mackenzie King’s diaries. During the war, the terms “Russia,” “Stalin,” “USSR” and “Moscow” appeared 503, 152, 2 and 31 times, respectively, while “England,” “Britain” and “Churchill” appeared 739, 990 and 1,206 times, and “Roosevelt,” “President,” “America,” “USA” and “Washington” appeared 409, 1,116, 670, 219 and 420 times, respectively.

In fairness, Canada was not a priority partner for the USSR either. L.D. Wilgress’s memoirs provide evidence of this, noting that the Canadian Embassy resolved issues primarily through V.M. Molotov’s deputies — A.Y. Vyshinsky and V.G. Dekanozov — or, in most cases, through N.V. Novikov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Fourth European Department (responsible for Western Europe and the British Commonwealth).[74]

Summing up Canada’s role in the Second World War, it is clear that Canada did not rise to the level of a great power or a primary figure in the “North Atlantic Triangle.” However, the North American dominion managed to take advantage of economic and political opportunities to the extent possible. Mackenzie King’s government realized Canada’s potential, though it faced significant challenges in military, industrial, social and political spheres. The main outcome of the Second World War for Canada was its transformation into the “number one middle power,” with a solid foundation for further industrial development, having significantly reduced its political dependence on Britain while predictably moving into the U.S. sphere of influence.

In this context, Soviet-Canadian relations during the war can be understood. It was clear that the dominion’s Liberal government would not pursue a policy of “open arms” toward a communist state. Moreover, Canada’s alignment with the U.S. and UK made this approach even more predictable. Canada’s assistance to the USSR was proportionate to the place the Soviet Union held in Canada’s “rankings,” and it was neither first nor second. The battles on the Eastern Front were often perceived as distant by most Canadians, as no combat took place on Canadian soil. Yet, it would be incorrect to say Canadians did not understand the Soviet Union’s crucial role in the victory over the Axis powers, and the sources confirm this understanding.

Notes

[1] The Dominion of Canada was established in 1867 but initially did not have foreign policy sovereignty. The Statute of Westminster in 1931 affirmed the new status of the dominions as “autonomous units” within the British Empire, “in no way subordinate to one another.” From this point, Canada effectively became a fully independent state but maintained close ties with Great Britain.

[2] Canada “automatically” entered the First World War alongside Great Britain. Canadian forces actively participated in operations on the Western Front and other theatres. Their total losses amounted to 66,755 (according to Canada’s Book of Remembrance).

[3] During this period, Anglo-Canadians made up 49.68% of the dominion’s population, while Franco-Canadians (mainly concentrated in Quebec) accounted for 30.27% (1941 census data).

[4] Canada at War, 1945, No. 45, p. 30.

[5] M. Whitby, R.H. Gimblett, P. Haydon, The Admirals: Canada’s Senior Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century, Toronto 2006, p. 113.

[6] R. Stuart, “Was the RCN ever the Third Largest Navy?” Canadian Naval Review, Fall 2009, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 4-9.

[7] The Canada Yearbook, 1945, p. 368.

[8] See A.N. Uchaev, “Specifics of Aircraft Production in Canada during the Second World War,” Historical, Philosophical, Political and Legal Sciences, Cultural Studies, and Art Criticism. Questions of Theory and Practice. Tambov: Gramota 2016. No. 6, Part 2, pp. 182-185.

[9] W.A.B. Douglas, B. Greenhous, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 184.

[10] The Canada Yearbook, 1945, p. xxxv.

[11] Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong, December 1941, Report No. 163, November 14, 1946, p. 84, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Reports 1940-1948, Directorate of History and Heritage, URL: http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq163.pdf (accessed: July 25, 2018).

[12] P.J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: The Quest for Action for All the Wrong Reasons,” Queen’s Quarterly, 1994, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 103-115.

[13] W.J. McAndrew, “Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily — 1943,” Military Affairs, Manhattan (Kansas), 1987, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 141.

[14] C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians in Italy 1943-1945, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957, 656 p.

[15] C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. III, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960, 770 p.

[16] E. Humphreys, Great Canadian Battles: Heroism and Courage Through the Years, Arcturus Publishing, 2013, p. 151.

[17] Canada, 1918-1945: An Historical Outline. Moscow, 1976, pp. 96-97.

[18] G.I. Luzyanin, “Russian-Canadian Relations in the Consular Period 1900-1922,” Magistra Vitae: Electronic Journal for Historical Sciences and Archaeology, 2008, No. 35(136), URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/russko-kanadskie-otnosheniya-v-konsulskiy-period-1900-1922-godov-1/viewer.

[19] Canada, 1918-1945: An Historical Outline. Moscow, 1976, p. 183.

[20] Ibid., pp. 266-267.

[21] K. Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-1939, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, pp. 21-23.

[22] Library and Archives Canada (LAC), The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, September 30, 1938, p. 4, URL: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=19454 (accessed: July 12, 2020).

[23] LAC, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, September 6, 1939, p. 2, URL: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=20699.

[24] LAC, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, September 17, 1939, p. 1, URL: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=20780& (accessed: July 12, 2020).

[25] “Which Way Will Russia Strike Next?” Hamilton Spectator, January 20, 1940.

[26] “Release of 100,000 Veterans from Service in Front Line Seen Good for French Morale,” Globe and Mail, October 30, 1939.

[27] Canada’s Party of Socialism: History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1976. Progress Books Toronto, 1982, 332 p.

[28] Documents of Canadian External Relations (DCER), Vol. 8 (1941), pp. 1100-1101.

[29] Public Archives Canada (PAC), Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, June 24, 1941, Vol. 5.

[30] DCER, Vol. 8, No. 955, pp. 1101-1102.

[31] DCER, Vol. 8, No. 958, p. 1104.

[32] W.Y. Elliott, H.D. Hall, The British Commonwealth at War, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1943, p. 301.

[33] “Russian Soldiers Fought With Fanatical Fury Under Czars,” Toronto Telegram, December 6, 1941.

[34] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, July 31, 1941, Vol. 6.

[35] DCER, Vol. 8, No. 956, pp. 1102-1103.

[36] DCER, Vol. 8, No. 961, p. 1107; Canadian Tribune, July 19, 1941.

[37] DCER, Vol. 8, No. 963, p. 1110.

[38] DCER, Vol. 7, No. 506, p. 356; No. 142, p. 95.

[39] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 60, pp. 42-43.

[40] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, January 6, 1942, Vol. 8; DCER, Vol. 9, No. 61, p. 44.

[41] Cooperative Commonwealth Federation — Canadian social-democratic political party.

[42] House of Commons Debates (HCD), November 4, 1941, p. 4072; February 2, 1942, p. 197; February 5, 1942, p. 237.

[43] HCD, February 5, 1942, pp. 327-328.

[44] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 62, pp. 44-45.

[45] DCER, Vol. 9, Nos. 63-64, pp. 45-46.

[46] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, April 22, 1942, Vol. 9.

[47] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, April 22, 1942, Vol. 9; DCER, Vol. 9, No. 1532, p. 1856.

[48] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 1532, encl. p. 1861.

[49] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 1535, p. 1868.

[50] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, June 11, 1942, Vol. 9.

[51] Soviet Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War, Documents and Materials: In 3 Volumes, Moscow, 1946-1947, Vol. 1, pp. 287-288.

[52] LAC, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, October 7, 1942, p. 2, URL: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=24605.

[53] L.D. Wilgress, Memoirs, Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967, p. 125.

[54] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[55] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 111, pp. 76-77.

[56] DCER, Vol. 9, No. 113, pp. 78-79.

[57] Soviet Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War, Documents and Materials: In 3 Volumes, Moscow, 1946-1947, Vol. 1, p. 428.

[58] 50 Years of Soviet Foreign Trade, edited by P.M. Kumykin, Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1967, p. 61.

[59] L.V. Pozdeeva, Canada in the Second World War, pp. 234-235.

[60] Soviet Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War, Documents and Materials: In 3 Volumes, Moscow, 1946-1947, Vol. 2, p. 143.

[61] PAC, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, May 5, 1943, Vol. 12; DCER, Vol. 9, No. 395, p. 447.

[62] HCD, May 11, 1943, p. 2542.

[63] Soviet Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War, Documents and Materials: In 3 Volumes, Moscow, 1946-1947, Vol. 2, p. 81.

[64] Ibid., p. 83.

[65] L.V. Pozdeeva, Canada in the Second World War, p. 249.

[66] Russian State Archive of Economics (RGAE), F. 413, Op. 12s, D. 7945, L. 206.

[67] Ibid., pp. 256-257.

[68] DCER, Vol. 10, No. 572, p. 734.

[69] L.V. Pozdeeva, Canada in the Second World War, pp. 213, 258.

[70] The Canadian Yearbook, 1943-1944, p. 120.

[71] M. Newman, “February 19, 1942: If Day,” Manitoba History, Spring 1987, No. 13, URL: http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/mb_history/13/ifday.shtml (accessed: September 13, 2020).

[72] PAC, Canadian Aid to Russia Fund, Vol. 17 (Fund Bulletin February 16, 1945, No. 30; November 30, No. 32); L.V. Pozdeeva, Canada in the Second World War, p. 264.

[73] LAC, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, June 22, 1943, URL: https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=25537.

[74] L.D. Wilgress, Memoirs, Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967, p. 133.

List of Sources and Literature

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29. The Canada Yearbook, 1945.
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31. L.D. Wilgress, Memoirs, Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967, 190 p.

(Translated from the northernallies.ru original)