[Ottawa,] June 28, 1941
Confidential
On Tuesday and Wednesday, June 24 and 25, I had some informal conversation with a high official, of the Administration at Washington on the subject of the German invasion of Russia. The following are some of the opinions which he expressed:
He was surprised at the undiluted cheerfulness with which Ottawa had greeted Russian entry into the war. He, himself, saw all sorts of difficulties which might arise. If Russia is defeated and a vassal government established, are we going to recognize a Soviet government-in-exile. If the Ukraine and the Caucasus are occupied by Germany, will Great Britain, in order to keep the rest of Russia in the fight, make “immoral” promises to Russia of what Russia will get in the event of a defeat of Germany provided Russia stays in the war? If Great Britain, in order to maintain an eastern front, signs away the independence of the three Baltic states and Finland, not only will public opinion in the United States be gravely affected but the basis of any permanent settlement in Europe will be removed for no the country will any longer trust the word of Great Britain. For centuries, a struggle has been going on to keep Asia from extending into Europe. If the allies embrace Russia too enthusiastically the result may be a further advance of Asia into Europe.
Russia should certainly be provided with arms but she should be given no Political commitments and we should always remember that what Russia desires most are the spoils of the British Empire. During the next few weeks, until the situation becomes clearer, the less said about Russia by public men in the Anglo-American countries, the better. He hoped that after the initial Russian defeats a new government might arise in Russia with which we could deal—perhaps under some general.
He was not certain that we benefited in a military way from the entry of Russia into the war –even if the alternative had been peaceful German occupation of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The latter course would have meant that an undefeated Russian army, would have remained as a continued threat to Hitler. It is possible that by going to war Hitler may destroy that Russian army just as he destroyed the French army. Nor was he certain that a German capture of the Ukraine and the Caucasus was going to help the German economy very much. The Russians would, no doubt, organize sabotage in a wholesale and efficient way in the occupied territories.
Certainly the entry of Russia makes the Latin-American situation even more dangerous. The task of holding Latin America in line had been difficult enough before, partly because the Anglo-American front was so protestant and Anglo-Saxon. The addition of Soviet Russia to that front was going to make matters much worse.
