

Document No. 1

Covering letter from SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Ahrens with reference to the conversations with Dulles.

VI B 3 No. 106 43 **Top secret** *Berlin, April 30, 1943*

TOP STATE SECRET

Made in 1 copy
1st copy

TO
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Internal Interdepartmental

Subject : DULLES, Roosevelt's special representative in Switzerland.

Reference : Conference between Herr Dr. Schudekopf and SS-Hauptsturmfurer Ahrens.

Enclosed :

Enclosed herewith for your information is a copy of the report by No. 144 7957 on his meeting with Roosevelt's special representative in Switzerland, Dulles.

Please let VI B 3 have the item on Dulles from "Who's Who."
VI B 3 will continue to collect information on Dulles.

*On instructions,
AHRENS
SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer.*

Document No. 2

Hohenlohe's record of his conversation with Dulles (Hohenlohe appears as "Herr Pauls," Dulles as "Mr. Bull") Switzerland, mid-February 1943.

Herr Pauls arrived in mid-February in Geneva, where he immediately on arrival received a call from Mr. Roberts. Mr. Roberts was anxious at all costs to arrange at once a conversation with his chief, Roosevelt's special representative for European questions, Mr. Bull. Herr Pauls declined at first, however, and sought information from acquaintances about the position. Among others he saw the present Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican, Herr Barcenas. In talking to him, Herr Pauls turned the conversation as though by chance to Mr. Bull, whereupon Barcenas said that he was a highly influential man and much courted by our allies. Hungarians, Bulgarians, Rumanians (Gafencu) were always seeking contact with him, and with success.

One of Barcenas's own reasons for coming to Switzerland had been to make Mr. Bull's acquaintance. This information from Barcenas Herr Pauls found borne out by his other enquiries. Minister Kordt, Herr Kochert and Herr von Bibra and also the Spanish Minister to Berne and the Swiss Foreign Minister Piler Gola similarly described Mr. Bull as a highly interesting man.

Herr Pauls now accordingly decided to accept Mr. Bull's invitation. I should like to say at once that after his conversation with Mr. Bull Herr Pauls was invited to call on the American Minister, Mr. Harrison, who informed him that he in no sense regarded Mr. Bull as a rival but was on the best of terms with Mr. Bull, who had special powers and whom he had instructions from Washington to render every assistance.

From the above and from other indications it follows that Mr. Bull is the most influential White House man in Europe, and the Swiss believe, for example, that he is in direct telegraphic communication with the American President, bypassing the State Department. An expert on Europe and a direct representative of the U.S. government, he has been given the mission of exploring European, and especially East-European, problems. His command of European languages is good. He is a tall, powerfully built, sporting type of about 45, with a healthy appearance, good teeth and a lively, unaffected and gracious manner. Assuredly a man of civic courage. The rather older Mr. Roberts, whom we know, is his special assistant for European economic problems. Mr. Bull has developed pretty energetic activity and constantly receives semi-official emissaries of various European states and organizations. He can safely be described as a kind of special ambassador of Roosevelt in Europe. Despatched from America to Europe rather late, he managed to get through Vichy France when German troops were already entering the unoccupied zone, and arrived safely in Switzerland without mishap.

He received Herr Pauls very cordially and the two established that they had already met in 1916 in Vienna and between 1923 and in New York. Mr. Bull said he was very glad to see Mr. Pauls again after all this time and exchange ideas with him, as he had a clear head for European problems: he was fed up with listening all the time to outdated politicians, emigres and prejudiced Jews. In his view, a peace had to be made in Europe in the preservation of which all concerned would have a real interest. There must not again be a division into victors and vanquished, that is, contented and discontented; never again must nations like Germany be driven by want and injustice to desperate experiments and heroism, The German state must continue to exist, as a factor of order and progress; there could be no question of its partition or the separation of Austria. At the same time, however, the might

of Prussia in the German state should be reduced to reasonable proportions, and the individual regions (Gau) should be given greater independence and a uniform measure of influence within the framework of Greater Germany. To the Czech question Mr. Bull seemed to attach little importance; at the same time he felt it necessary to support the formation of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and pan-Slavism through the eastward enlargement of Poland and the preservation of Rumania and of a strong Hungary. He did not let himself get submerged in details, but expounded the view that an apportioned industrial production with assured markets would after the war be the best guarantee of lasting peace and understanding among the peoples. America, he specially emphasized, attached the greatest importance to the African market. Germany's claim to industrial leadership in Europe Mr. Bull seemed quite to recognize. Of Russia he spoke with scant sympathy and remarked that that country possessed an adequately large internal market.

Herr Pauls had the feeling that the Americans, including in this case Mr. Bull, would not hear of Bolshevism or pan-Slavism in Central Europe, and, unlike the British, on no account wished to see the Russians at the Dardanelles or in the oil areas of Rumania or Asia Minor. We have here fresh confirmation that for the sake of keeping Western Europe and the Mediterranean free of the Russians Britain would be prepared to split up Northern and Central Europe and divide and delimit spheres of influence with the Russians there. The U.S. on the other hand, wants to preserve a moderately organized Europe as a prosperity zone, a market, and above all as a geo-political factor (see, for example, the Anglo-Russian antagonism in the matter of the Baltic states.)

Herr Pauls now made a very sharp thrust on the Jewish question and declared that any Central European would find it unbearable to think the Jews might ever come back again; people simply would not accept a return of the Jews and a re-establishment of their position of power. Herr Pauls

intimated that he sometimes actually felt the Americans were only going on with the war so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and send them back again. To this Mr. Bull, who in the course of the conversation had clearly evinced anti-semitic tendencies, replied that in America things had not quite got to that point yet and that it was in general a question of whether the Jews wanted to go back. Herr Pauls got the impression that America intended rather to send off the Jews to Africa.

England's somewhat old-fashioned plans of reorganizing Europe on historic lines and setting up various monarchies Mr. Bull seemed to reject in toto. He agreed more or less to a Europe organized politically and industrially on the basis of large territories, and considered that a Federal Greater Germany (similar to the United States), with an associated Danube Confederation, would be the best guarantee of order and progress in Central and Eastern Europe. He does not reject National-Socialism in its basic ideas and deeds so much as the "inwardly unbalanced, inferiority-complex-ridden Prussian militarism." For this reason he also showed himself absolutely opposed to the fantastic project of re-establishing a Hohenzollern monarchy. To give an example, he seems to see the ideal embodiment of things German not in Berlin, Vienna, or Weimar, but rather in Hamburg, Bayreuth or Stuttgart.

Then Mr. Bull turned to the subject of National-Socialism and the person of Adolph Hitler and declared that with all respect to the historical importance of Adolph Hitler and his work it was hardly conceivable that the Anglo-Saxons' worked-up public opinion could accept Hitler as unchallenged master of Greater Germany. People had no confidence in the durability and dependability of agreements with him. And re-establishment of mutual confidence was the most essential thing after the war. Nevertheless, Herr Pauls did not get the impression that it was to be viewed as a dogma of American prejudice. Mr. Bull described the Atlantic Charter as an

important basis; but its excessively wide compass needed to be revised.

Herr Pauls now sought to give the conversation a more topical turn, in order, by means of various questions, to learn something indirectly of the American military plans. He formed the impression that an Anglo-Saxon landing in the Iberian Peninsular was not projected at the moment; however, he thinks that the allies may well be intending to disperse our forces by brief smaller landings elsewhere, after which they want (if possible after conquering Tunisia) to launch a decisive push from Africa in the direction of Ploesti, in order to cut off our oil supplies, force our allies to withdraw from the war and forestall the Russians. On the basis of other information gathered in Switzerland, too, Pauls considers a direct landing in Lower Italy improbable; however, he believes that the allies may land in Sicily in order to cut off Rommel and to exert pressure on Italy by air action from there, thus safeguarding the push against the Balkans.

With our European allies Mr. Bull already has very good contact. At any rate, various semi-official persons from these countries positively besiege him. How far this is done with their governments' approval is not clear.

Mr. Bull particularly stressed the United States' enormously expanding production of aircraft, which will systematically be brought into action against the Axis powers.

Mr. Bull is in close touch with the Vatican. He himself called Herr Paul's attention to the importance of this connection, for the American Catholics also have a decisive word to say, and before the conversation ended he again repeated how greatly Germany's position in America would be strengthened if German bishops were to plead Germany's cause there. Even the Jews' hatred could not outweigh that. It had to be remembered, after all, that it had been the American Catholics who had forced the Jewish-American papers to stop their baiting of Franco Spain.

About Anglo-American antagonisms Mr. Bull did not speak at such length as Mr. Roberts had previously done. Essentially, however, he confirmed what the latter had said on this subject, too.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Bull let fall a remark about a talk in Portugal ("There have been some rumours about talks in Portugal"). Herr Pauls would not respond and put on a show of surprised ignorance. Mr. Bull at once changed the subject, but later on he turned the talk to the personality of Alfonso, about whose friendship with Herr Pauls and his hundred-per-cent. Nazi views Pauls had himself informed Mr. Roberts long before. Herr Pauls again said that he worked together with Alfonso, whom he had known and valued for years, in Skoda and other businesses. There was no denying that Alfonso possessed certain qualities and farsightedness. But there should be no illusions to the effect that this man was not a true follower of the Fuhrer. This apparently was no news to Mr. Bull, who declared that he would be ready to meet Alfonso at any time and was prepared to give every assurance of fair play. Mr. Bull even went so far as to propose a code-word for a telephone call by Alfonso. Herr Pauls took note of these statements of Mr. Bull's, and it was particularly interesting that the latter seemed especially interested to hear in undistorted form the salient views of an up-to-date and candid National-Socialist. Should Alfonso be unable to come, Mr. Bull hoped for much from a talk with State Councillor Lindemann of the North German Lloyd. Herr Lindemann seems, on business grounds, to enjoy personal prestige in the United States.

The conversation ended on a friendly note and Mr. Bull offered of his own accord to instruct the American Embassy in Madrid to be at Herr Paul's service at any time. Mr. Bull specially referred to Embassy Councillor Butterworth, whom he described as the most capable.

The following day Herr Pauls had another short meeting with Mr. Roberts, who speaks with much satisfaction of the

course of the Pauls-Bull conversation and said that Roosevelt himself, who had known Herr Pauls in the past, had instructed Mr. Bull to talk to him.

The same day Herr Pauls also had a brief meeting with the American Minister, Mr. Harrison, who stressed that Herr Pauls should not think that there were any differences between him and Bull over their prerogatives. They were on the friendliest terms, and Bull had direct assignments and powers from the White House.

Document No. 3

Record of the conversation of Mr. Allen Dulles's assistant (who appears under the pseudonym of "Mr. Roberts") with special SS agent "Bauer."

On Sunday, March 21, 1943, taking the usual precautions, Herr Bauer met Mr. Roberts in Geneva in a private apartment which Mr. Roberts considered safe. Mr. Roberts greeted Herr Bauer cordially and said he was always glad to see a friend of Herr Pauls. For his part Herr Bauer stated that he had come in a purely personal capacity on the insistence of his friend Herr Pauls. He had no illusions as to the possible success of these talks, since he possessed no special powers or authority. As a loyal citizen of his country, however, he would gladly answer any questions for the sake of removing, if need be, any unnecessary misunderstandings and erroneous views.

Mr. Roberts remarked that he quite understood this and it was particularly important for him to find out at last the views of the young National-Socialist generation, unembellished with propagandist theories.

From the conversation that followed it transpired that Mr. Roberts (a pleasant man of about fifty) was surprisingly well informed about the problems of Central Europe, and Herr Bauer had to be on the alert all the time. Mr. Roberts began

by expressing the opinion that it had been a colossal mistake on the part of the Germans to bring matters to the point of war, which was what they had done by unnecessarily occupying Prague and thus aggravating the situation. In the course of peaceful development the whole of Eastern Europe would de facto rapidly have fallen into the hands of Germany, for neither Britain nor America would have shown either the will or the energy to prevent such a development by force of arms unless given special cause. If one fine day Germany were then to take over these regions and make them her own, it would be easy for her to wage war on a single front against Russia. Public opinion in Britain and America would never under such circumstances have been sufficiently roused by the entry of these countries into the war to prevent Germany's total victory over Russia, and would then have been forced willy-nilly to accept German superiority after her victory over Russia. Mr. Roberts went on to say that if events had not taken this course Germany had more reason today to regret it than the United States. He could not understand either way the Nazis had insisted on battering at an open door and by so doing—as well as by their cruel attitude over the Jewish question—set the whole world against them. As for his personal feelings on the matter, he did not like the Jews and it was distasteful to think that they were now able to adorn their six-pointed star with an additional wreath of martyrdom. He simply could not understand the attempt to exterminate the Jews or, for that matter, the Poles. A huge proportion of the people of these nations was scattered all over the world and could not be caught. He was not concerned with other reasons. It was a law of nature that the branch of a tree, when cut, grows all the more quickly. The resulting wave of indignation and sympathy had endangered the achievement of Germany's aims. Why had Germany not acted more skilfully in the Jewish question, as the Anglo-Saxon countries had done, for instance? There the Jews were simply not admitted to certain key posts, and in practice—though nothing was actually said about it—a

percentage limit over the number of Jews in offices and colleges was being introduced with increasing success. Perhaps this was a "Pharisaical Anglo-Saxon method" but it got practical results without causing a lot of fuss and providing grounds for accusations. He, Roberts, could foresee trouble in Germany if the Jews were to return there after an Allied victory.

Herr Bauer replied to all Mr. Roberts' opinions with well known arguments and rejected his conclusions without annoying him. Although he was unable, of course, to convince Mr. Roberts, he showed him that the premises of the above-mentioned problems and also the conclusions drawn from them permit of a different interpretation. For example, the Jews had provoked harsh measures against themselves, and these measures were dictated not by a desire for cruelty but by the need to protect vital interests. In spite of all efforts it had turned out to be quite impossible to deal with Poles and Jews in more polite terms.

This had been proved in both cases by history. Poland had always been a trouble spot, and the Jews were an eternal source of parasitism. Such experience was not confined to us. In fact, all other peoples who had had dealings with these nations had found it the same; we were well acquainted with the Anglo-Saxons' methods of protecting their vital interests. Herr Bauer added that the Poles had lost fewer people during the war than the number of Indians destroyed in the United States, or the number of Irish in Ireland through the use of Anglo-Saxon methods. In both these cases, however, it was a matter of crude imperialism, whereas Germany was faced with the problem of lebensraum. But since Germany was interested not in Anglo-Saxon problems but only in issues vital to Germany, it would be a good thing if the Anglo-Saxons showed the same wise restraint and stopped inflaming peace with their egoistic notions of improving the world and demanding more of others than of themselves.

Herr Bauer then went on to deal with Mr. Roberts' criticism of prewar German policy in the East and rejected the argument

that Germany had been free to act as it chose in the South-East. It was the Americans who had opposed any reconciliation between Germany and Britain, inspired by absolutely transparent motives. Even Munich had been a thorn in their flesh. Germany had achieved every one of its successes in the face of open or concealed opposition from the Anglo-Saxons. For the Anglo-Saxons, Munich had not been a culminating point but merely a stop-gap, so that one day, after waiting and arming themselves accordingly, they would be able to take more effective action against Germany. It was the subversive mood of the Czechs, encouraged by the Anglo-Saxons, that had led to the occupation of Prague. Germany bore great responsibility for the development of these regions and was prepared to shoulder that responsibility without bothering to embellish her actions. When Adolph Hitler decided to act, he only did so after prolonged attempts to achieve amicable agreement. But he had not been trusted and nothing had been done to preserve the hopes that then existed for a peaceful adjustment. The Anglo-Saxons had now got the kind of Hitler they deserved. It is understandable, Herr Bauer continued, why the Anglo-Saxons have no liking for this man; but in the eyes of the Germans that is an advantage rather than a disadvantage. Mr. Roberts should cherish no illusions that powerful and influential groups might be found in Germany that might wish to hold negotiations with the enemy. The experience of the last war had played its part in that respect. No clear-headed German could be influenced any more by propaganda about Hitler or the Atlantic Charter. Tricks of that kind had been used too often.

Mr. Roberts agreed with this, saying that it was definitely known that the war with Germany would be long and hard and that reasonable groups with which it might have been possible to conduct successful separate negotiations did not exist. America had no illusions in that respect. Germany was a powerful opponent and her achievements deserved

admiration. Germany, however, would be overcome in the long run, because in spite of submarine warfare the convoy routes were safe and America's shipbuilding capacity was practically unlimited. Germany would soon be driven out of Tunis, in the diplomatic sense she had now lost Turkey for ever, and Bulgaria was beginning to waver. He would not mention Italy because that country and its position were no longer of any serious importance. But Turkey's position was of exceptional importance. America had enough time, money and manpower resources to wage war for a long time to come. Germany was seeing to it that there were no quarrels between the allies by making psychological mistakes. Having already roused the hostility of the socialists, Jews, masons and small nations, she was now annoying the Christian churches. Germany was doing everything to make herself unpopular. America had no intention of going to war every twenty years and was now aiming at a prolonged settlement, in the planning of which she wished to take a decisive part and did not wish to leave that again to Britain, bearing in mind the bitter experience of the past. It would be nothing else but regrettable if Germany excluded herself from this settlement, for that country deserved every kind of admiration and meant a great deal more to him than any other countries. He was still hoping that it would remain a stabilizing factor and continue in the future to play a fitting part, although at present he could not see how this could be achieved. The hatred that it had amassed against itself was a fact that had to be reckoned with. At present Allied public opinion would admit of no compromise; also he could not see any possibility of the Anglo-Saxons agreeing to the personality of Hitler, whose signature no longer inspired the slightest confidence.

To this Herr Bauer replied that this was not at all necessary, because the German people supported Hitler and his aims and would continue the struggle at his side, no matter what outcome had been preordained by fate. In Germany no one

had any illusions concerning the weight and severity of the struggle. Nevertheless there was every reason for optimism; Europe was in German hands, the Russian successes had been checked, the Anglo-Saxons could not land on the continent and their rear communications were under a constant threat. The genius and firmness of the Fuhrer were a magnificent trump-card for Germany, which she had no intention of throwing away. In general the Germans were not the kind of people who shouted "Hosanna!" to their Fuhrer in days of triumph and "Crucify him!" when times were bad. No decent German could do such a thing, National-Socialist or not. The danger of Bolshevism was also bringing the Germans closer together. Mistakes had, of course, been made, but far fewer than on the enemy side; in no occupied country had the Germans acted so ineptly as the Anglo-Saxons in North Africa. Mr. Roberts had spoken of American output, but he should not imagine the Axis powers had been idle; he could rest assured of that. In recent months a new army of a million men had been mustered, and fresh resources that would be wisely used had been obtained by methods of total war. Moreover, in the East the Axis had a first-class ally, who would not remain idle either.

Mr. Roberts again agreed that the last word had not yet been spoken; Herr Bauer should not think he underestimated the strength of the opposing side. The guns would continue to speak till the prospects of ending the war became tangible. It was possible that in the course of the war and as a result of quite possible reverses on both sides people's moods and will to fight might change. No one could prophesy. Perhaps one day it would be possible to hasten the end of the war by a timely arrangement of contacts. This would make it possible to remove misunderstandings leading to a further prolonging of hostilities.

Herr Bauer agreed in principle with Mr. Roberts about this, although he remarked that he could not foresee any such possibility in the near future.

Mr. Roberts concluded the conversation with an invitation to Herr Bauer to take supper the next day with his chief, Mr. Bull. Mr. Bull was also a friend of Pauls and was the President's righthand man in judging matters concerned with Europe. He would be glad to meet Mr. Bauer to discuss problems with him honestly and frankly. He gave his word as a gentleman that the conversation would be kept secret.